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Abstract
The main topic of the dissertation is the e¤ect of scal policy in
dynamic-stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Fiscal policy
has received considerable attention after the introduction of the stim-
ulus package of U.S. government in 2009. In addition, we allow for the
fact that the zero lower bound on the short-term nominal interest rate
was binding since 2008 in the United States. In Chapter 1 we study a
deterministic labour tax cut at the zero lower bound and contribute to
the literature by showing that a labour-tax cut increases GDP when
non-Ricardian households and wage rigidity are included in the model.
In chapter 2 and 3 (both co-authored with Ales Marsal) we depart from
the assumption of zero lower bound. In particular, Chapter 2 discusses
the e¤ect of scal policy on the yields of non-defaultable zero-coupon
government bonds employing a New-Keynesian model with only price
rigidity and Ricardian consumers. There are several empirical pa-
pers supporting the view that there is positive relationship between
indicators of scal stance (like budget decit) and yields of di¤erent
maturities. We show that income taxation raises long-term nominal
bond yields implying higher ination-risks than with lump-sum tax-
ation. Income taxation also generates a rise in ination-risks with
smaller risk-aversion coe¢ cient than the one needed in a model with
time-varying ination-target.
In chapter 3 we extend the model used in chapter 2 with costly rm en-
try and nd that the model is able to account for high bond and equity
premia without compromising the t of the model to key macroeco-
nomic regularities. The model is also successful in achieving ination
risks even with low coe¢ cient on the output gap in the Taylor rule.
The downside of this extension is that it yields a counterfactually low
volatility of equity.
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Introduction
In response to the nancial crises and the recession started in 2008
the United States issued a massive $780 billion scal stimulus pack-
age called American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of February 2009
which provided tax credits of up to $800 per year to working house-
holds. At the onset of the crises banks were reluctant to lend to each
other due to condence problems. To ease credit conditions the Fed-
eral Reserve lowered the rate of its marginal lending facility to a level
close to zero at the end of 2008 i.e. the zero lower bound on the
nominal interest rate has become binding. In the peculiar environ-
ment characterised by low and xed interest rates Eggertsson (2011)
and Christiano et al. (2011) argued that a labour-tax hike is stimu-
lating the economy in a basic New Keynesian model containing only
price-rigidity. Their argument about the depressing e¤ects of a labour
tax-cut is the following. Lower taxes on labour causes an outward
shift in labour supply decreasing wages and the marginal cost which
leads to a fall in ination through the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
Falling prices (deation) are associated with higher real interest rates
(through the Fisher relationship) when nominal interest rate is stucked
at zero level. Higher real interest rates discourage consumption today
relative to future and results in lower aggregate demand. Therefore,
aggregate demand and labour demand are upward-sloping at the zero-
lower bound as demonstrated by Eggertsson (2010, 2011). All these
previous models assume, however, that households in the model are
Ricardian that is, they correctly anticipate the future tax-burden of
the tax-cut in the present and, therefore they do not interpret the tax-
1
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cut as an increase in their disposable income. Instead, Ricardians save
up the amount of the tax-cut and do not consume it. Another way
of telling this story is that Ricardians behave according to the Per-
manent Income Hypothesis and care only about their lifetime income
that is not inuenced by a tax-cut in the present.
However, there is some empirical evidence for non-Ricardian be-
haviour in the U.S. For instance, Parker (1999) nds that households
respond to a temporary cut in payroll taxes by increasing their con-
sumption expenditures. Hence, we enrich the previous model with non-
Ricardian consumers along the lines of Gali et al. (2007) and show that
the tax-cut boosts the disposable income of non-Ricardians who in-
crease their consumption expenditures generating a demand/Keynesian
e¤ect. Due to sticky prices a large fraction of rms which are not able
to revise their prices raises their labour demand and production in
response to the positive demand shock (the tax-cut). The share of
non-Ricardian households is chosen to be 30 percent in line with lower
end of the estimates on the US economy.
The zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate in the model
becomes binding due to a large negative demand shock (a discount
factor shock that induces agents to save). With exible wages the
e¤ects of the negative demand shock is a large fall in the real wage
which is attenuated in the paper by introducing wage stickiness. As
Christiano (2010) points out wage rigidity diminishes the relevance
of the labour supply channel in the propagation of the labour tax-
cut shock and there is more scope for the tax-cut to take positive
e¤ect on the economy through the labour-demand/aggregate demand
channel whose importance is magnied by non-Ricardians. Therefore,
the incorporation of non-Ricardian consumers and wage rigidity into
the model of Christiano et al. (2011) helps to make the case for a
labour-tax cut policy and the result remains true across di¤erent ways
of nancing this policy.
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In particular, we consider two ways of nancing the tax-cut. First,
the tax-cut is covered by lump-sum taxes paid only by Ricardians such
that government budget is balanced in each period. This is perhaps
the simplest possible scal scenario that can be constructed and is
useful for delivering closed-form solutions and for analysing certain
properties of the model. Second, we depart from balanced budget
and, instead, assume that the tax-cut is nanced by government debt
which is paid back through labour tax revenue collected from both
types of households in the same proportion (uniform taxation) either
in the short- or long-run. When debt is retired in the long-run non-
Ricardians enjoy the increase in their disposable income by consuming
more in the present. Whereas Ricardians consume less in anticipation
of the future tax-burden (negative wealth e¤ect). Alternatively we
can say that non-Ricardians receive a transfer from Ricardians in the
present and they pay back the transfer to Ricardians in the future.
When debt is settled in the short-run the tax-cut is o¤set by a tax-
hike in the near future so that the policy has no e¤ects on output. In
sum, the benign e¤ects of the tax-cut are associated with governments
operating with long-run bonds which usually constitute large part of
the debt obligations of modern states.
Without giving a comprehensive overview of the empirical literature
we note that papers by Romer and Romer (2010) and Mertens and
Ravn (2012) using di¤erent types of identication of tax-changes in
Vector Autoregressions (VARs) found that personal income tax cuts
have stimulative e¤ects on the economy.
Chapter 2 joins a growing body of work using a dynamic-stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE henceforth) model to study the interac-
tion between asset prices and the macroeconomy. Rudebusch (2010)
identies three di¤erent directions of term-structure modeling. The
most recent strand of macro-nance models (used in chapter 2 and 3)
are fully structural and micro-founded DSGE models in the sense that
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they are the result of optimal decisions of forward-looking agents with
rational expectations. In fact, this literature studies the bond/equity-
pricing implications of standard macroeconomic DSGE models which
typically preclude the possibility of riskless arbitrage. DSGE-based
term-structure modeling started to really evolve with the seminal pa-
per of Jermann (1998) which applied a basic RBC model with capital
adjustment costs and xed labour supply and made the assumption of
log-normal pricing kernel to derive a second-order approximation to
bond and equity yields.
The second strand of literature employs the canonical nance lin-
ear (or a¢ ne) arbitrage-free model to give a statistical description of
the yields through a couple of unobservable (or latent) factors with
an arbitrage-free condition. While being popular with nance practi-
tioners due to their superb empirical performance these models fail to
o¤er su¢ cient insight into the economic nature of the underlying latent
factors (Rudebusch (2010)). Perhaps the most celebrated arbitrage-
free canonical nance model is the one with the Nelson-Siegel factor
structure.
The third direction of the literature extends the canonical nance
term-structure model with a few macroeconomic variables. For in-
stance, Diebold et al. (2006) combines the dynamic Nelson-Siegel
nance model of Diebold and Li (2006) with a vector autoregression
(VAR) representation of the macroeconomy. Using Kalman lter they
extract three latent factors (level, slope and curvature as usual) from
a set to 17 yields on US Treasuries and associate these factors with
observable macroeconomic variables. In particular, they nd the level
factor to be highly correlated with ination and the slope factor co-
moves strongly with output but the curvature factor occurs to be
unrelated to key macroeconomic variables.
Our approach of modeling macroeconomy and asset prices in a com-
mon DSGE framework is greatly supported by Cochrane (2008, pp.
INTRODUCTION 5
300): "Clearly, there is much to do in the integration of asset pricing
and macroeconomics. Its tempting to throw up ones hands and go
back to factor shing, or partial equilibrium economic models. They
are only steps on the way. We will not be able to say we understand
the economics of asset prices until we have a complete model that gen-
erates articial time series that look like those in the data."
Chapter 2 explores the interaction between scal policy and the
term structure of interest rates in normal times when monetary policy
is governed by a Taylor-rule and, thus, we abstract from zero-lower
bound issues (see Swanson and Williams (2012) who argue that the
ongoing zero lower bound experience in the US did not have large im-
pact on long-term Treasury yields). Orszag and Gale (2004) provides
empirical evidence on the positive relationship between scal decits
and yields on government bonds with various maturities. Production
economies with either time separable preferences or habits face serious
challenge in matching the empirical mean and standard deviation of
the nominal term premium on long-term bonds without compromis-
ing the models t to key macroeconomic moments (see Rudebusch
and Swanson (2008)). In a recent paper Rudebusch and Swanson
(2012) make use of a New Keynesian model with only price rigidity
and Epstein-Zin preferences to demonstrate that their model can ac-
count for high and variable nominal term premium without violating
the t of the model to key macroeconomic moments.
For time separable preferences the elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution (EIS) is the inverse of relative risk-aversion. By making house-
holds more risk-averse the EIS has to drop. However, Epstein-Zin
preferences make it possible to disentangle intertemporal elasticity of
substitution from relative risk-aversion so that consumers can be made
su¢ ciently risk-averse without decreasing the EIS too much. In DSGE
models forward-looking households wish to have a stable consumption
path (consumption-smoothing motive). With habits consumers care
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about uncertainty in consumption growth in the short-term but con-
sumers with Epstein-Zin preferences are concerned about consumption
growth over medium and long horizons as well as short horizons. It
is important to emphasize that habits even long-memory habits by
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) fail to account for the mean and vari-
ability of nominal term premium in a production economy as shown
by Rudebusch and Swanson (2008). The New Keynesian model with
habits has achieved partial success in terms of tting the data. For in-
stance, Hördahl et al. (2008) used a basic New Keynesian model with
habits and managed to generate high real bond term premium (not
nominal) and an upward-sloping real term structure at the cost of vi-
olating the t of the model to some key macroeconomic moments like
the standard deviation of hours worked as pointed out by Rudebusch
and Swanson (2008). Therefore, we devote our attention to models
with Epstein-Zin preferences which are able to facilitate the match of
the model to bond market data without worsening the macroeconomic-
t.
Investors of long-term nominal bonds expect a term premium (or
risk premium) to get compensated for the consumption and ination-
risks over the lifetime of the bond. In a seminal paper Piazzesi and
Schneider (2006) and later Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) argue that
temporary productivity shocks are the main source of ination risks
because they generate a negative comovement between consumption
growth and ination. A negative technology shock makes consump-
tion fall due to its strong wealth e¤ect and increases marginal cost
and ination (through the New-Keynesian Phillips curve) eroding real
yields. Therefore, assets with low real payo¤s in bad times (low pro-
ductivity) are considered to be risky.
Chapter 2 contributes to the literature by showing that government
spending shocks nanced by distortionary income taxes produce the
negative pattern between consumption growth and ination similar
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to productivity shocks. To illuminate this let us consider a positive
innovation to government spending that is nanced by issuing long-
term bonds which are retired through raising income tax revenue. In
a purely Ricardian world (as in chapter 2 and 3) consumers associate
higher government purchases with a strong negative wealth e¤ect that
induces them to reduce consumption and leisure. The fall in leisure
is equivalent to a rise in hours worked for a given time frame. Higher
taxes in the future imply higher marginal cost and ination. Also this
chapter shows that scal policy engineers an increase in long-term
ination risks of similar magnitude to the version of the Rudebusch
and Swanson (2012) model with a time-varying ination target. We
also inferred by comparing the models with scal policy and long-run
ination risks that the risk-aversion coe¢ cient needed to achieve the
empirical mean of the bond term-premium is lower in the former case.
The model used in chapter 2 performs well in terms of match-
ing bond yields and selected macroeconomic moments. However, it
does not capture the high mean and volatility of equities. The rst
contribution of chapter 3 is about the success of the entry model in
matching the high empirical mean of the equity premium as well as the
bond-premium without compromising the t of the model to macro-
moments. To do so chapter 3 extends the New Keynesian model of
chapter 2 with costly rm entry. Originally rm entry has been intro-
duced to match the countercyclical markup and procyclical prot in
U.S. data (see Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)). To our knowledge
this is the rst paper in the literature which attempts to explain both
bond and equity market data in a production economy with costly
rm entry and variable labour supply.
In the entry model we make use of a new rm is associated with a
new variety (or product) as in Bilbiie et al. (2007, 2012). Also this
entry model features the love of variety e¤ect whereby a new variety
leads to a reduction in the overall price index. Bernard et al. (2010)
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provide empirical evidence on the signicant share of product creation
and destruction in overall production using data on US manufacturing
rms. In particular, they report that product creation by both existing
and new rms make up for 46.6 of output in a 5-year period while the
value from product destruction at existing or exiting rms constitutes
44 percent of output.
Firm entry in the model is subject to time-varying entry cost and an
endogenous lag in production as in Bilbiie et al. (2007) who consider
two di¤erent types of entry costs which are either specied in e¤ective
labour units (version 1) or in consumption units (version 2). We found
version 2 of the model to match both macro and nance data better
in several dimensions.
The success of the entry model in reproducing the empirical mean
of the equity premium is related to the fact that there is a strong
positive comovement between consumption and dividends (the yield
on equity) in the model. In our simple model dividends correspond
to prots. Similar to the bond premium the main driver of the equity
premium are temporary technology shocks. In bad times (mostly neg-
ative innovations to technology) consumption as well as the payo¤ to
equity (dividends) are low and, thus, equity (or a share of equity) is
considered to be a risky asset.
Another contribution of chapter 3 which is related to our second
nding (see below) is the ability of model version 1 in achieving
ination risks when the coe¢ cient on the output-gap is small in the
Taylor rule. Papers which estimate the Taylor rule using US data
usually produce two markedly di¤erent estimates of the coe¢ cient on
the output-gap depending on the sample period. For instance, Clarida
et al. (1998) provide an estimate of 0.07 for the output-gap on US data
over 1979-1994. While Clarida et al. (1999) infer a higher value of
0.93 by using a shorter interval of 1983-1996. The latter time interval
can be tagged as a subperiod of what is often called as the period of
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Great Moderation (from mid-1980s to 2007). The implications of a
small/large output gap coe¢ cient on the ination risks component of
long-term yields is explored in Chapter 3 using the Rudebusch and
Swanson (2012) model with/without costly rm-entry.
A baseline New Keynesian model like the Rudebusch and Swanson
(2012) model without entry implies a trade-o¤between stabilising uc-
tuations in ination and the output-gap. In particular, a central bank
which puts higher weight on the output-gap in the Taylor-rule can
achieve lower unconditional standard deviation of the output-gap at
the cost of generating higher unconditional standard deviation of ina-
tion (see Clarida et al. (1999)). A large coe¢ cient on the output-gap
in the Taylor-rule mutes real risks i.e. reduces the standard deviation
of the output-gap and magnies ination risks in the Rudebusch and
Swanson (2012) model without entry.
Our second contribution in chapter 3 is pointing out that the New
Keynesian model with entry features the ination-output-gap volatil-
ity trade-o¤ only for values of the output-gap coe¢ cient lower than
0.5. With an output-gap coe¢ cient higher than 0.5 it is no longer
possible to mitigate uctuations in the output-gap by placing higher
coe¢ cient on it in the Taylor-rule. Therefore, the entry model ex-
hibits substantial real risks rather than ination risks in case of a high
output-gap coe¢ cient. This nding is very interesting from policy
point of view as it implies a constraint on the ability of monetary
policy in stabilising the volatility of output-gap.
As a third contribution we point out that the second version of
the entry model produces the property of scal policy already seen
in chapter 2 i.e. scal shocks nanced by distortionary income taxes
create additional risks. However, scal policy is the source of con-
sumption risks in the entry model in contrast to chapter 2 where scal
shocks lead to a rise in ination-risks.
As a fourth contribution we recognise that the entry model requires
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a risk-aversion coe¢ cient lower than that of Rudebusch and Swanson
(2012) in order to match the mean of the nominal term premium. Still
the risk-aversion coe¢ cient (75) employed to help match the empirical
mean of nominal term premium is considered to be high relative to the
estimates of 5-10 by Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio (2003). Several
suggestions were put forward explaining why a DSGE model needs
to feature high risk-aversion in order to account for the high risk-
premiums. One of them is Barillas et al. (2009) who identify the
reason for the need of a high risk-aversion coe¢ cient is that the agents
have perfect knowledge of the model equations and parameters and
face low degree of uncertainty about the economic environment.
Chapter 1
Rule-of-Thumb Consumers and
Labour Tax Cut Policy at the Zero
Lower Bound
1.1 Introduction
Following the enaction of the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act (ARRA) of 2009 which is a $787 billion scal package containing
labour tax cuts1 and various forms of government purchases there has
been discussion on the sign and magnitude of scal multipliers. On
one hand some inuential papers using New Keynesian type of models
featuring price rigidity concluded that an increase in non-productive
government spending can be very e¤ective in stimulating the economy
under the zero lower bound which is binding in the US since the end
of 2008 (see, e.g., Christiano et al. (2011), Eggertsson (2010a,b) and
Woodford (2010)). On the other hand these papers found that labour
tax cuts can be contractionary when the zero lower bound on the
nominal interest rate is binding.
This paper contributes to the literature on scal policy at the zero
lower bound by showing that the incorporation of rule-of-thumb (or
non-Ricardian) consumers into the baseline new-Keynesian model can
render labour tax cut policy expansionary when nominal interest rate
1In December 2011 President Obama announced that the payroll tax cut is extended until end
of 2012.
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is zero. Non-Ricardian households behave in a Keynesian fashion i.e.
they are willing to raise their consumption expenditure in response
to a rise in their disposable income following the tax-cut2. Whereas
Ricardians recognise that the tax-cut in the present is covered by
taxes in the future and therefore their whole lifetime income on which
they base their consumption decision is not a¤ected. In this paper
we reduce the employeespart of the labour taxes similar to what is
prescribed by the US stimulus package of 2009.
First, let us discuss what the baseline log-linear new-Keynesian
model with only price rigidity and perfectly competitive labour market
with exible wages delivers in the absence of non-Ricardian consumers
in response to a labour tax cut. As in Christiano et al. (2011) the
zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate becomes binding due to
a discount factor shock (i.e. a negative demand shock) which leads to
deation and a fall in output, consumption and the marginal cost. In a
similar model Eggertsson (2011) shows that cutting the labour tax rate
has e¤ects similar to the discount factor shock i.e. a random fraction of
rms that can change their product price will lower the price because
they face a reduction in their production costs. While other rms who
cannot reset their price due to price stickiness will produce less and
also decrease their demand for labour. When nominal interest rate is
zero, the deationary e¤ect of the labour tax cut is coupled with a rise
in the real interest rate that depresses consumption. Also, Ricardian
consumers associate the current tax cut with future rises in taxes and
decrease their consumption to save up (Ricardian equivalence is valid).
Thus, with only Ricardian consumers in the model the tax cut cannot
be stimulative.
However, the labour tax cut happens to be expansionary if we in-
corporate non-Ricardian consumers and wage rigidity into the model.
2Rule-of-thumb households are excluded from the nancial market. Hence, they have no
consumption-savings tradeo¤ (lack of Euler equation) and their decision problem is restricted
to the optimal choice between consumption and leisure. The inclusion of rule-of-thumb households
into DSGE models is a trivial way of generating incomplete asset markets.
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Following the tax-cut Non-Ricardian households consume the rise in
their disposable income generating a demand e¤ect. Due to the higher
consumption demand of non-Ricardian households rms which cannot
alter their price as a result of price rigidity will demand more labour
to be able to produce more. In the absence of an imperfectly com-
petitive labour market with nominal wage inertia3 the discount factor
shock and the labour tax cut would lead to an enormous decline in
the marginal cost (which equals to the real wage due to the constant
returns-to-scale production function in the absence of productivity
shocks and physical capital). But the introduction of wage rigidity
into the model attenuates the reaction of real wage to the discount
factor shock so that the real disposable income of non-Ricardians can
rise following the tax cut. Hence, in our setting the e¤ects of the neg-
ative demand shock is less severe if there is a simultaneous fall in the
labour tax during the zero lower bound period. Our nding is com-
pletely in contrast to Christiano et al. (2011) who argue in favour of
a labour tax rise at the zero lower bound using a middle-sized DSGE
model without rule-of-thumb agents.
In this paper we consider two di¤erent ways of nancing the labour
tax-cut. First, we maintain the simplest scal scenario whereby gov-
ernment budget is balanced in each period by lump-sum taxes paid
only by Ricardians. Secondly, we depart from balanced budget and in-
troduce endogenous government debt which is retired through labour
income taxes levied uniformly on both types of households and col-
lected either in the short- or long-run. In the rst case labour tax-cut
stimulates the economy by construction. In the second case tax-cut
policy boosts economic activity only when debt is paid back in the
long-run so that non-Ricardians can enjoy higher disposable income
due to the tax-cut in the present. An alternative interpretation is
3To motivate imperfectly competitive labor markets households (independently of whether they
are Ricardian or non-Ricardian origin) become members of unions which set wages for them. It is
costly for the unions to change wages because of wage adjustment costs. Hence, we have nominal
wage rigidity. See details in the main text.
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that non-Ricardians receive a transfer from Ricardians in the present,
which is followed by a transfer from non-Ricardians to Ricardians in
the future.
Again it needs to be emphasized that the tax-cut is stimulative
in this paper because we reduce the employees part of the labour
taxes, which leads to an increase in non-Ricardians income and a
rise in labour demand. In general, it matters a lot whether we cut
the employers or the employees part of the labour taxes (Bils and
Klenow (2008)). In the latter case an average labour tax cut acts like
a traditional stimulus tax-cut working through the labour demand
while the labour supply is of reduced importance due to wage-setting
frictions in the model (Christiano (2010)). However, in the previous
case the payroll tax cut directly a¤ects the marginal cost and, as we
argue below, acts like a further deationary factor on the economy
besides the negative demand shock. Therefore, in this paper, it is the
employees part of the average labour tax which is reduced.
Our ndings are based on deterministic labour tax cut experiments
conducted using the shooting algorithm of Christiano et al. (2011) who
studied small and middle-sized new-Keynesian models in log-linear
form without non-Ricardian consumers. Thus, in our experiments the
discount factor shock and the scal action (the labour tax cut) are on
for a deterministic period of time. This modelling strategy received
considerable attention in the recent literature. Here we touch upon
two issues. First, Carlstrom et al. (2012) assert that ination and
output impulse responses of a negative demand shock might exhibit
unorthodox behaviour they rise instead of falling depending on the
number of periods for which the interest rate is xed when there are
state variables like price indexation in the log-linear model. However,
we do not encounter such a problem for our calibrated value of the
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length of the shock4. Second, a number of papers5 raise concerns about
the accuracy of the rst-order perturbation in modeling the zero-lower
bound. However, Christiano and Eichenbaum (2012) present evidence
that rst-order perturbation remains to be a fairly good approximation
to the non-linear model.
This work is closely related to several papers in the literature. One
of them is Coenen et al. (2012) who simulate various middle-sized
DSGEmodels including rule-of-thumb households. We di¤er from that
paper for at least two reasons. First, the zero lower bound period in
our paper is generated endogenously as a result of a negative demand
shock instead of arbitrarily xing the interest rate for a given time
period as Coenen et al. (2012) and Cogan et al. (2010) did. Siemsen
and Watzka (2013) describe why it is misleading to model the ZLB
in a way that Coenen et al. (2012) did. Even with an increase in
government spending output, consumption and ination is below their
steady-state values due to the negative demand shock that makes the
zero lower bound binding in Christiano et al. (2011) and, thus, real
activity and ination remain depressed even after the zero lower bound
period. Whereas the same variables in Coenen et al. (2012) are above
their steady-state even during the zero lower bound in the absence
of the negative demand shock and therefore, monetary policy has to
tighten outside the zero lower bound period as the Taylor rule, which
engineers a sharp increase in real interest rates, is in operation. In
contrast, economic activity in Christiano et al. (2011) still remain
weak in the aftermath of zero interest rates and therefore monetary
policy can be slack (real interest rates are low). Second, we employ
simpler models than Coenen et al. (2012) so that we can provide
intuition on what model features are needed in order for the labour
4Depending on the size and length of the discount factor and the scal shock (tax cut) the
model endogenously generates the date at which the zero lower bound starts and ceases to bind.
5See, e.g., Braun and Körber (2011) and Mertens and Ravn (2011). Especially, Braun and
Körber (2011) argue using a non-linear model that the ignorance of price adjustment cost in the
aggregate feasibility constraint distorts the size and even sign of scal multipliers obtained from
the log-linear model in which the price adjustment cost is zero.
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tax cut policy to be expansionary.
Our paper is also closely related to Bilbiie et al. (2012b) who
have shown that cuts in lump-sum taxes stimulate output and raises
welfare in an economy featuring two types of households (savers and
borrowers), price rigidity and which is constrained by the zero lower
bound on the nominal interest rate. This paper is also related to the
literature on models containing rule-of-thumb consumers like Bilbiie
(2008) and Gali et al. (2007). The model used in this paper is closest to
Ascari et al. (2011), Furlanetto (2011), Furlanetto and Seneca (2009)
who enrich the model of Gali et al. (2007) with wage-setting frictions.
There is a growing empirical literature which founds labour tax cuts
being stimulative. In a well-known study using a narrative approach
Romer and Romer (2010) found that tax increases are contractionary.
Also, Mertens and Ravn (2012) found using a new narrative account
of federal tax liability changes to proxy tax shocks that the short run
e¤ects of a tax decrease on output are positive and large. Hall (2009)
reviews several empirical studies arguing that households do respond
with an increase in their consumption expenditures to a temporary cut
in labour tax. Thus, there is enough empirical evidence in support of
the positive e¤ects of a labour tax cut.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 describes the
agents in the model and their assumed behaviour. Section 2 contains
the calibration. In Section 3 we conduct experiments in various models
to investigate into the e¤ects of the labour tax cut. The last section
concludes.
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1.2 The model
1.2.1 Households
Ricardians
There are two types of households: Ricardians and non-Ricardians.
Ricardian households are able to smooth their consumption using
state-contingent assets (risk-free bonds) while non-Ricardians cannot.
The share of Ricardian and non-Ricardian households in the economy
is 1  and , respectively. The instantaneous utility function of type
i 2 fo; rg household which can be Ricardian (optimiser (OPT), o) or
non-Ricardian (rule-of-thumb (ROT), r), is given by:
U it =
(Cit   hi Cit 1)1    1
1    
(N it )
1+'
1 + '
(1.1)
where Cit ( C
i
t) denotes the time-t consumption (aggregate consump-
tion) of type i 2 fo; rg household and parameter hi > 0 governs the
degree of habit formation in consumption.  is the inverse of the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) which measures the will-
ingness of householdssubstituting consumption across time. Further
 stands for relative risk-aversion. The second term on the RHS of
equation (1.1) denotes the disutility of household i from working. The
Frisch elasticity of labour supply (1=') governs the sensitivity of hours
with respect to changes in the pre-tax real wage assuming that the
wealth of the household remains unchanged through an appropriate
lump-sum transfer. The specication in equation (1.1) follows Con-
stantinides (1990) and recently used by Furlanetto and Seneca (2012)
who argue that habit formation is external in the sense that house-
hold chooses its own current consumption irrespective of its own past
consumption while it is internal to the extent that household of type i
relates its current consumption to aggregate consumption of the same
class of households. When hi = 0 there is no habit formation. N it
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is hours worked by household of type i. Habit formation has some
solid psycological foundation according to Cochrane who argues that
those "who got used to an accustomed standard of living might got hurt
in case of a fall in consumption after a few years of good times even
though the same level of consumption might have seemed very pleasant
if it arrived after years of bad times." Cochrane (2008 pp. 276). Also
importantly, Fuhrer (2000) used habits to explain the hump-shaped
impulse responses obtained from VAR models in response to a mone-
tary policy shock.
First, we discuss the problem of Ricardian households. They max-
imise their lifetime utility
E0
1X
t=0
tU
i
t ; (1.2)
where E0 is the expectation operator representing expectations con-
ditional on period-0 information and  is the discount factor. This
maximisation of the optimiser household is subject to a sequence of
budget constraints6:
PtC
o
t +R
 1
t EtfBot+1g = (1   ot )WtN ot +Dot +Bot   PtT ot   Ft   PtSo
where Pt is the aggregate price level, Wt is the nominal wage and N ot
is hours worked by OPT. Thus, WtN ot is the labour income received
by the optimiser household. T ot are lump-sum taxes (or transfers, if
negative) paid by the Ricardian household (hence, the superscript o).
 ot is a tax rate on labour (WtN
o
t ). Prot income is denoted as D
o
t .
Further, Bot+1 is the amount of risk-free bonds and Rt is the gross
nominal interest rate. Following Gali et al. (2007) and Rossi (2012)
we assume, without loss of generality, that the steady-state lump sum
taxes (So) are chosen in a way that steady-state consumption of ROT
and OPT households equal in steady-state. Hence, So is a steady-
6For the rest of the paper, a variable without a time subscript denotes steady-state value.
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state lump-sum tax used to facilitate the equality of the steady-state
consumptions of ROT and OPT households. Ft stands for a nomi-
nal union membership fee (see later on it below). For an alternative
approach when steady-state consumptions are not equal see Natvik
(2008).
In summary, the optimiser household maximises its lifetime utility
with respect to its budget constraint.
The OPT household rst-order conditions (FOCs) with respect to
consumption (Cot ) and bonds (B
o
t+1)are:
@U it
@Cit
= (Cit   hi Cit 1)  = t; with i = o; (1.3)
t+1Et

t+1
Rt+1
t+1

= t; (1.4)
where t is the marginal utility of consumption. In all the above
equations that contain expectations we ignore covariance terms.
The linearised7 version of equation (1.4) is the intertemporal Euler
equation:
cot =
ho
1 + ho
cot 1 +
1
1 + ho
Etc
o
t+1  
1  ho
1 + ho


[dRt  Ett+1   drt]; (1.5)
where cot  log(Cot =C), t  log(Pt=Pt 1) is the time-t rate of ina-
tion, dRt  Rt   R, i.e. the deviation of nominal interest rate from
its steady-state value. drt can be interpreted as the discount factor
shock8. Notice that ho = 0 delivers the usual Euler equation without
habit formation.
7The fact that Eggertsson (2010a) log-linearise while Christiano (2010) linearise the same model
does not a¤ect the main conclusions. Here we follow the latter strategy.
8Following the appendix of Christiano (2010) the time varying discount factor is made equal to
the inverse of the real interest rate (Rrealt ) :
t =
1
1 +Rrealt
which can be linearised as:
^t =  
1
(1 + r)2
drt;
where ^t  (t   )= and drt  Rrealt  Rreal.
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The labour supply of OPT household is determined by the unions
problem (discussed below).
Non-Ricardians
Non-Ricardian households cannot invest into bonds. In other words,
they are excluded from nancial markets. Hence, this is the case
of limited asset market participation. Therefore, ROT do not make
consumption-savings decision (i.e. the lack of consumption Euler
equation). ROT householdsconsumption depends on their disposable
income i.e. the labour income after taxation, (1   rt )WtN rt which
is reected by their budget constraint:Z 1
0
Pt(i)C
r
t (i)di = (1   rt )WtN rt   PtSr; (1.6)
where Crt (i) and N
r
t are, respectively, the consumption of product
i and hours worked by rule-of-thumb households. The steady-state
lump-sum tax, Sr, ensures that the steady-state consumption of each
types of households coincide.
ROT agents exploit relative price di¤erences in the construction of
their consumption basket and, in optimum, they obtain:
PtC
r
t =
Z 1
0
Pt(i)C
r
t (i)di:
Thus, a ROT household maximises its utility (equation (1.2) with
i = r) with respect to its budget constraint (equation (1.6)).
The budget constraint of ROT households in equation (1.6) can be
expressed in linear form as:
crt = wt + n
r
t   ^ rt ; (1.7)
It follows by using the steady-state condition  = 1=(1 +Rreal) = 1=(1 +R) that:
^t =  drt:
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where ^ rt   rt    r,   1=(1   r).
ROT households delegate their labour supply decision to unions.
1.2.2 Firms
The intermediary goods are produced by monopolistically competitive
rms of which a randomly selected 1   p fraction is able to set an
optimal price each period as in Calvo (1983) while the remaining p
fraction keep their price xed. Intermediary good j, denoted as Y (j),
is produced by a one-to-one production function:
Yt(j) = Nt(j); (1.8)
where Nt(j) is an aggregator of di¤erent labour varieties:
Nt(j) =
Z 1
0
[Nt(j; z)]
"w 1
"w dz
 "w
"w 1
;
where Nt(j; z) stands for quantity of variety z labour employed by
rm j. The one-to-one (constant return-to-scale) production function
in equation (1.8) implies that the average (or economy-wide) marginal
cost equals to the economy-wide real wage in the absence of technology
shocks.
There is a competitive rm which bundles intermediate goods into
a single nal good through the Kimball (1995) aggregator:Z 1
0
G(Xt(j))dj = 1; (1.9)
where Xt(j)  Yt(j)=Yt is the relative demand and G is a function
with properties G(1) = 1, G 0 > 0 and G 00 < 0. With Kimball speci-
cation the elasticity of demand is increasing in the price (Pt(j)) set
by an individual rm or, equivalently, decreasing in its relative output
(Xt(j)). After linearisation it turns out that Kimball demand reduces
the slope of the Phillips curve (see more below). The Kimball aggre-
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gator is also present in popular middle-sized DSGE models like the
Smets-Wouters (2007) model.9
Proposition 1 The prot maximisation problem of the perfectly com-
petitive goods bundler (nal good producer) gives way to the relative
demand for the product of rm j:
Xt(j) = ~G

Pt(j)Yt
f;t

(1.10)
where ~G  G 0 1(:) and f;t is multiplier on the constraint (equation
(1.9)) in the Lagrangian representation of the nal goods producers
maximisation problem:
f;t = PtYt
Z 1
0
G 0 (Xt(j))Xt(j)dj
 1
where the price deator (PtYt) is dened as
PtYt =
Z 1
0
Pt(j)Yt(j)dj:
Proof. The nal good producer problem is given by:
max
Yt;Yt(i)
PtYt  
Z 1
0
Pt(j)Yt(j)
subject to
1 =
Z 1
0
G

Yt(j)
Yt

dj:
Let us denote the Lagrange multiplier as f;t associated with the con-
straint of this problem.
The rst-order conditions with respect to Yt and Yt(j) are given, re-
spectively, by:
Pt =
f;t
Yt
Z 1
0
G 0

Yt(j)
Yt

Yt(j)
Yt
dj (1.11)
9There are several alternative ways to introduce strategic complementarity into price-setting.
In chapter 2, for instance, we employ the model of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) who use rm-
specic capital. Firm-specic labor is another possibility (see e.g. Chapter 3 in Woodford (2003)).
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Pt(j) = f;tG 0

Yt(j)
Yt

1
Yt
: (1.12)
The combination of the previous rst-order conditions leads to
Yt(j) = YtG 0 1

Pt(i)
Pt
Z 1
0
G 0

Yt(j)
Yt

Yt(j)
Yt
dj

which is the same as the equation in proposition 1.
Let us dene the price elasticity of demand by
(Xt(j))    G
0(Xt(j))
G 00(Xt(j))Xt(j) :
In the special case when
G(Xt(j)) = [Xt(j)]
"p 1
"p ;
equation (1.9) boils down to the usual Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator which
implies constant elasticity of substitution: (Xt(j)) = "p for all Xt(j)
(Woodford (2003)). Also in steady-state X = 1 and (1)    G0(1)G00(1)1 =
"p.
In the standard Dixit-Stiglitz case the demand function can be
written as
Xt(j) =

Pt(j)
Pt
 "p
;
where the price index is dened as:
Pt 
Z 1
0
[Pt(j)]
1 "p dj
1=(1 "p)
:
In the general Kimball case the own price elasticity of the elasticity
of demand can be dened as
(Xt(j))  @(Xt(j))
@Pt(j)
Pt(j)
(Xt(j))
= 1 + "p + "p
G 000(Xt(j))
G 00(Xt(j)) ; (1.13)
where in steady-state (1) =  > 0 i.e. the elasticity declines if the
rm sells more or, equivalently, elasticity is increasing in the price
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(Furlanetto and Seneca (2009)).
Intermediary rm z that last reset its price at time T = 0maximises
its present and discounted future prots with the probability of not
resetting its price:
max
P t
1X
T=0
(p)T t;t+T [P

t (j)Yt+T (j)  TC (Yt+T (j))] ; (1.14)
where P t is the optimal reset price at time t, p is the probability of
not resetting the price, TC stands for the total cost of production and
t;t+T is the stochastic discount factor dened as:
t;t+T 

Cot+T   hoCot+T 1
Cot+T+1   hoCot+T

Pt
Pt+T
:
This rms maximisation problem is subject to the production func-
tion in equation (1.8) and to the demand function of good z in equation
(1.10).
Proposition 2 The New Keynesian price Phillips curve in case of
Kimball demand can be written as:
t = Ett+1 + st with   A(1  
p)(1  p)
p
and A  1
1 + I 1 "p
(1.15)
where we can see that the slope of the Phillips curve () is inuenced
beyond the Calvo parameter (p) by the Kimball curvature parameter
() and the elasticity of demand ("p). The indicator variable I is equal
to one when there is strategic complementarity in price setting (due
to Kimball demand). The case of I =0 delivers the standard Phillips
curve without Kimball demand.
Proof. Based on rms problem in equation (1.14) the rst-order
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condition with respect to P t is given by:
0 =
1X
T=0
(p)T Ett;t+T
24 Yt+TG 0 1  P tPt+T  gt+T+ P t Yt+TG 0(xgt+T ) 1Pt+T  gt+T
 Stjt+T (j)Yt+TG 0(xgt+T ) 1Pt+T 
g
t+T
35
where xgt+T  G 0 1(zgt+T ), zgt+T  P

t
Pt 1
Pt 1
Pt+T
 gt+T with 
g
t 
R 1
0 G 0

Yt(j)
Yt

Yt(j)
Yt
dj
and Stjt+T (j) is the time t + T nominal marginal cost of rm j that
last changed its price at time t. It is worth noting that in this sim-
ple economy the average nominal marginal cost is not rm-specic
(Stjt+T (j) = Stjt+T ) and is equal to the average real wage because of
the constant-returns-to-scale assumption and the absence of produc-
tivity shocks.
The previous equation can be further manipulated algebraically after
multiplying through with P t and substituting for
P t
Pt+T
 gt+T the combi-
nation of equations (1.11) and (1.12):
1X
T=0
(p)T Et

t;t+TYt+T (j)

P t + (P

t   Stjt+T )
1
G 0 1(zgt+T )
G 0(xgt+T )
G 00(xgt+T )

:
(1.16)
The preceding equation can be rewritten as
0 =
1X
T=0
(p)T Et
8<: t;t+TYt+T (j) t+ThP t + G0 1(zgt+T )G00(xgt+T )P tG0(xgt+T )   Stjt+Ti
9=; ;
where  t+T  1G0 1(zgt+T )
G0(xgt+T )
G00(xgt+T ). After using P

t =Pt+T = G 0(xgt+T )= gt+T
the former equation takes the form of
0 =
1X
T=0
(p)T Et
8<: t;t+TYt+T (j) t+ThP t + G0 1(zgt+T )G00(xgt+T )Pt+Tgt+T   Stjt+Ti
9=; :
Nominal quantities in the squared bracket can also be expressed in
real terms dividing them by Pt+T . Further, let us multiply and divide
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the rst term in the squared bracket by Pt 1:
0 =
1X
T=0
(p)T Et
8<:t;t+TYt+T (j) t+T
24   P tPt 1 Pt 1Pt+T
 G0 1(z
g
t+T )G00(xgt+T )
gt+T
+
Stjt+T
Pt+T
359=; :
We make three observations about the previous expression. First, the
term P

t
Pt 1
does not depend on T and therefore can be separated from
the terms which are summed up with respect to T . Second, we can
apply geometric summation to P

t
Pt 1
terms which are also incorporated
implicitly in zgt+T and x
g
t+T . As a third point note that it is enough
to loglinearise the expression in the squared bracket in the previous
equation:
1
1  p

2 +
G 000(1)
G 00(1)

(pt   pt 1)
=
1X
T=0
(p)T Et

2 +
G 000(1)
G 00(1)

(pt+T   pt 1) + Ssrealt+T

(1.17)
where 2 + G
000(1)
G00(1) = 1 +
G00(xg)
g
1
G00(xg)
g + G
0 1(zg)
G00(xg) G 000(xg), G 0 1(zg) = 1 and
 g = G 0(1) is true in steady-state and pt  log(P t ), t  log(Pt=Pt 1) =
pt   pt 1 and srealt+T  log(Srealt+T=S) with Srealt+T  St+T=Pt+T .
The RHS of the previous equation can be written as:
1X
T=0
(p)T Et

2 +
G 000(1)
G 00(1)

(pt+T   pt + pt   pt 1) + Ssrealt+T

= Ssrealt +

2 +
G 000(1)
G 00(1)

t (1.18)
+
1X
T=1
(p)T Et

2 +
G 000(1)
G 00(1)

(pt+T   pt 1) + Ssrealt+T

(1.19)
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Let us forward equation (1.17) one period ahead to obtain:
1
1  p

2 +
G 000(1)
G 00(1)

Et(p

t+1   pt)
=
1X
T=0
(p)T Et

2 +
G 000(1)
G 00(1)

(pt+1+T   pt) + Ssrealt+1+T

=
1X
T=1
(p)T 1Et

2 +
G 000(1)
G 00(1)

(pt+T   pt) + Ssrealt+T

or alternatively
p
1  p

2 +
G 000(1)
G 00(1)

Et(p

t+1   pt)
=
1X
T=1
(p)T Et

2 +
G 000(1)
G 00(1)

(pt+T   pt) + Ssrealt+T

:
After substituting the expression from LHS of the former equation
into the third term in the second line of equation (1.18) we obtain:
1
1  p

2 +
G 000(1)
G 00(1)

(pt   pt 1)
= Ssrealt +
p
1  p

2 +
G 000(1)
G 00(1)

t
+
p
1  p

2 +
G 000(1)
G 00(1)

Et(p

t+1   pt): (1.20)
The evolution of the aggregate price level in the Calvo model with
Kimball demand is given by:
Pt  (1  p)P t G 0 1(zgt+T ) + pPt 1G 0 1(zgt+T )
which can be written after dividing with Pt 1 as:
Pt
Pt 1
= (1  p) P

t
Pt 1
G 0 1(zgt+T ) + pG 0 1(zgt+T ):
CHAPTER 1. LABOUR TAX CUT AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND 28
The former equation can be loglinearised to yield:
pt   pt 1 =
1
1  pt: (1.21)
After substituting in the loglinear form of price index from equation
(1.21) into the equation (1.20) we obtain the New Keynesian Phillips
curve:
1
1  p

2 +
G 000(1)
G 00(1)

1
1  pt
= Ssrealt +
p
1  p

2 +
G 000(1)
G 00(1)

t
+
p
1  p

2 +
G 000(1)
G 00(1)

1
1  pEtt+1
or 
1
1  p
1
1  p  
p
1  p

t
=
S
2 + G
000(1)
G00(1)
srealt + p1  p 11  pEtt+1 (1.22)
The steady-state of the marginal cost can be inferred from equation
(1.16):
1 + [1  S] 1G 0 1(G 0(1))
G 0(1)
G 00(1) = 0
or
1 +
G 00(1)
G 0(1) =
G0(1)
G00(1) + 1
G0(1)
G00(1)
=
"p(1)  1
"p(1)
= S (1.23)
where P =P = 1 and G 0 1(zg) = 1 hold in steady-state and (1) =
"p =   G
0(1)
G00(1) is the elasticity of demand. The steady-state markup is
given by 1=S. Using the steady-state of the marginal cost from equa-
tion (1.23) we can rewrite the New Keynesian Phillips curve (equation
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(1.22)) in its usual form:
t =
(1  p)(1  p)
p
h
1 + G
00(1)
G0(1)
i
h
2 + G
000(1)
G00(1)
isrealt + Ett+1
=
(1  p)(1  p)
p
Asrealt + Ett+1 where A 
h
1 + G
00(1)
G0(1)
i
h
2 + G
000(1)
G00(1)
i
Finally let us express A in terms of the Kimball curvature parameter
() and the elasticity of demand ("p):
A 
h
1 + G
00(1)
G0(1)
i
h
2 + G
000(1)
G00(1)
i = 1  1"p
2 + G
000(1)
G00(1)
from which we express for
G 000(1)
G 00(1) =
1  1"p
A
  2
and substitute it back into the denition of the curvature (see equation
(1.13)):
 = (1) = 1 + "p + "p
G 000(1)
G 00(1)
= 1 + "p + "p
"
1  1"p
A
  2
#
= 1 + "p
"
1  1"p
A
  1
#
:
From the previous equation we express A as a function of the Kimball
curvature parameter () and the elasticity of demand ("p):
A =
"p   1
+ "p   1 =
1

"p 1 + 1
which is the same as the one in proposition 2.
The following observations can be made about the new-Keynesian
price Phillips curve and the slope of the Phillips curve derived in
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proposition 2. Recall that the slope is given by
  (1  
p)(1  p)
p
1
1 + I 1 "p
; (1.24)
where I is an indicator variable that can take on the value of one
or zero. When I = 1 the model contains real rigidity in the form of
Kimball (1995) demand. When I = 0 the loglinear Phillips curve is the
standard New Keynesian one without real rigidity. In Experiment one
(see below) which utilises the above model without wage stickiness we
found that real rigidity is necessary because it helps to avoid a non-
uniqueness problem (for more on this see footnote (18)). Now we
proceed to discuss the determination of labour supply.
1.2.3 Unions
To introduce wage stickiness into the model one usually assumes that
households have monopoly power in determining their wage as in Erceg
et al. (2001) who presume that each household can engage in perfect
consumption smoothing. However, the presence of ROT households
who cannot engage in intertemporal trade precludes the possibility of
consumption smoothing. To motive a wage-setting decision we sup-
pose following Gali et al. (2007) and Furlanetto and Seneca (2009)
that there is a continuum of unions (on the unit interval), z 2 [0; 1],
each representing a continuum of workers of which a fraction () are
members of rule-of-thumb and the remaining (1  ) fraction consists
of optimising households. Each union employs one particular type
of labour (independently of the type households they originate from)
that is di¤erent from the type of labour o¤ered by other unions.
Each period the union maximises the weighted current and dis-
counted future utility of its members:
Et
1X
T=0
T [U rt+T + (1  )U ot+T ]
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subject to the labour demand function for labour of type z:
Nt(z) =

Wt(z)
Wt
 "w
Nt
whereWt(z) is the nominal wage set by the union z, "w is the elasticity
of labour demand and Wt is an aggregate of the wages set by unions:
Wt 
Z 1
0
[Wt(z)]
1 "w
 1
1 "w
:
Adjusting wages is costly as in Rotemberg (1982) who originally
applied it to model price adjustment. In particular, there is a wage
adjustment cost which is a quadratic function of the change in the
nominal wage and proportional to the aggregate wage bill. The pres-
ence of this wage adjustment cost is justied by the fact that unions
have to negotiate wages each period and this activity consumes real
resources. The larger is the increase in nominal wage achieved by the
union the higher is the e¤ort associated with it. Each union members
incurs an equal share of the wage adjustment cost. Thus, the nominal
membership fee, F paid by a generic union member z at time t is given
by:
Ft(z) =
w
2

Wt(z)
Wt 1(z)
  1
2
WtNt
where w governs the size of the adjustment costs. In the special case
of w = 0 the labour market features exible wages.
The optimality condition from the unions problem can be derived
by taking the FOC with respect to the wage, ~Wt:
0 =


@U rt
@Crt
+ (1  )@U
o
t
@Cot

(1   lt) ~Wt[("w   1) + w(wt   1)wt ]
 "wN't   


@U rt+1
@Crt+1
+ (1  )@U
o
t+1
@Cot+1


w(
w
t+1   1)wt+1
Wt+1
Pt+1
Nt+1
Nt
; (1.25)
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where wt  Wt=Wt 1 is the wage ination, ~Wt  Wt=Pt is the real
wage and @U
i
t
@Cit
is dened by equation (1.3) for i 2 fo; rg. The consump-
tion also di¤ers between the two types of consumers. When making
a decision on labour demand the rm does not distinguish between
di¤erent workers of type z. Thus, in the aggregate, N rt = N
o
t = Nt
holds i.e. they work the same amount of hours. The linearisation of
equation (1.25) yields what we call the new-Keynesian wage Phillips
curve:
wt = Et
w
t+1   w [wt  mrst   ^ t] ; (1.26)
where wt  log(wt =w), wt  log( ~Wt= ~W ), ^ t   t    , w  "w 1w
10
and the linearised expression for the marginal rate of substitution is11:
mrst = r(c
r
t   hrcrt 1) + o(cot   hocot 1) + 'nt; (1.27)
where
r  

1  hr
(1  ho) 
(1  hr)  + (1  )(1  ho)  ;
o  
1  
1  ho
(1  hr) 
(1  hr)  + (1  )(1  ho)  :
Note that in case of ho = hr = 0 equation (1.27) boils down to the
case of CRRA utility without habits. Without loss of generality we
postulate, following Furlanetto and Seneca (2012), that hr = ho = h
implying r  =(1   h) and o  (1   )=(1   h). The connection
between the wage ination (wt ), price ination (t) and the real wage
(wt) can be expressed, in linear form, as:
wt = wt   wt 1 + t: (1.28)
10In calculating the value of w we use (1 
w)(1 w)
w
1
1+' "w"w 1
which results in case of Calvo
wage setting and equivalent to "w 1w that we obtain under Rotemberg wage setting.
11Note that we assume a tax policy that equates steady-state consumptions across household
types (i.e., Cr = Co).
CHAPTER 1. LABOUR TAX CUT AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND 33
1.2.4 Fiscal and Monetary Policy
Fiscal policy
Similarly to Christiano (2010) and Christiano et al. (2011) we consider
a deterministic experiment: the tax rate is cut by the same amount
in each period for the entire duration of the shock.
We operate with two markedly di¤erent scal scenarios in this pa-
per. The rst one assumes a uniform tax cut (lowering labour taxes
for both types of households by the same proportion) that is nanced
by lump-sum taxes levied on Ricardian agents. Hence, non-Ricardians
do not pay taxes. In this case the government budget is balanced in
each period. This is the simplest possible scal scenario that can be
built into the model. Therefore, our setup is di¤erent from Gali et al.
(2007) where non-Ricardians pay lump-sum taxes.
In the second scal scenario we depart from balanced budget and
assume that a uniform tax cut is nanced by government debt that is
paid back through labour and prot income taxes that are levied on
both types of households12. With this latter arrangement we relax the
strong assumption that non-Ricardians do not bear the burden of the
tax-cut. In the experiments below we assume in contrast to Gali et al.
(2007) and in accordance to Rossi (2012) that the steady-state level of
debt is not zero. The government budget constraint which implicitly
describes the evolution of debt (B) reads as:
Bt +  tWtNt = Rt 1Bt 1 + PtGt
which gives way after linearisation to
bt +
WN
Y
(wt + nt +
1

^ t) =
1

bt 1 + bdRt 1   b
1

t + gt;
where bt  (Bt   B)=Y , drt  rt   r, yt  (Yt   Y )=Y , gt  (Gt  
G)=Y and b is the government debt-to-GDP ratio. ^ t and dRt are
12Only Ricardians are entitled to prot income as they are the owner of the rms.
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dened above. For the rest of the paper we set gt = 0, 8t.
Rossi (2012) proposes the following government revenue rule based
on Leeper (1991):
 tWtNt = 0 + 1
Y
B
(Bt  B) + 2(Yt   Y ) + " ; (1.29)
where 0 > 0. As in Leeper (1991) and Rossi (2012) there is no
restriction on the values of 1 and 2. One usually refers to 2 > 0
(2 < 0) as procyclical (countercyclical) scal policy. Here we simply
set 2 = 0 so that public debt does not uctuate along the business
cycle. We depart from the specication in equation (1.29) in the sense
that we consider the deviation of real government debt from its steady-
state value relative to the steady-state of GDP i.e. bt  (Bt   B)=Y .
Exogenous shocks to the tax revenue are captured by " .
The latter revenue rule can be linearised to yield:
^ t = 1
Y
WN
bt   (wt + nt) + fd"gT=zlb endt=zlb start
where X is the steady-state value of variable X and d"  "t   " =
 0:1 is the deterministic tax cut shock(a ten percentage points re-
duction) that is on for the duration of the zero-lower bound period.
The abbreviations zlb startand zlb endstand for the start and the
end date of the zero lower bound period, respectively. We investigate
into the robustness of our ndings with setting di¤erent values for 1.
Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is described by the rule in Christiano et al. (2011):
Rt = max(Zt; 0) (1.30)
where
Zt = (1=)(t)
1(1 R)(Yt=Y )2(1 R)[Rt 1]R   1; (1.31)
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where Zt is the shadow nominal interest rate which can take on neg-
ative values as well. As usual, we assume that 1 > 1, 2 2 [0; 1)
and 0 < R < 1. 1 controls how strongly monetary policy reacts to
changes in ination while 2 governs the strength of the response of
nominal interest to changes in output gap13. The main implication of
the rule in equation (1.30) is that whenever the nominal interest rate
becomes negative, the monetary policy set it equal to zero, otherwise
it is set by the Taylor rule specied in equation (1.31). The para-
meter R measures how quickly monetary policy reacts to changes in
ination and output gap. Furthermore, ination in steady-state is as-
sumed to be zero which implies that steady-state net nominal interest
rate is 1=.
The monetary policy rule above can be written, in linear form, as:
dRt =
dZt, dZt    1   1 , zero bound not binding
 

1
   1

, otherwise, zero bound binding
,
dZt = RdRt 1 + (1  R)
1

[1t + 2yt] :
Hence, the ZLB on the nominal interest binds when dRt =  

1
   1

.
Otherwise, we set dRt = dZt.
1.2.5 Aggregation, Market Clearing and Equilibrium
The aggregate consumption is a composite of those of the two types
of households:
Ct = C
r
t + (1  )Cot : (1.32)
The aggregate dividend payments are determined by Dt = (1  )Dot .
The presence of unions implies that both types of households work the
same number of hours and, thus, N rt = N
o
t = Nt for all t.
13Precisely, the term Yt=Y does not stand for the output gap as the denition of the output gap
contains the deviation of the actual GDP from its exible price level equivalent. Here we simply
use the deviation of output from its steady-state value.
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It follows that equation (1.32) can be written in linear form as:
ct = c
r
t + (1  )cot ; (1.33)
which is obtained by setting steady-state consumption and hours worked
of each type equal in steady-state (Cr = Co) using a lump-sum tax
appearing in the budget constraint of Ricardian households.
The goods market clearing is
Yt = Ct +Gt;
which can be expressed in linear form as
yt = cct + gt; (1.34)
where for the rest of the paper we set gt  (Gt  G)=Y = 0 and c 
C=Y is calculated as c = 1   g with g  G=Y . After having
outlayed the building blocks we are ready to dene equilibrium of this
model.
Denition 3 The equilibrium is characterised by a sequence of en-
dogenous quantities
fNt; Cot ; Crt ; Ct; Yt; Btg1t=0;
price sequences
ft;wt ;Wt; St; Rt; Zt;  tg1t=0;
and a given set of exogenous deterministic shocks
ft; t g1t=0
and initial values for debt that satisfy equilibrium conditions of the
household, rms, unions, government and monetary authority such
that markets clear, the transversality conditions for the endogenous
states are imposed and the aggregate resource constraint is satised.
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1.3 Calibration
1.3.1 Households
The discount factor, , is equal to 0:99 implying a real annual interest
rate of 4%. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), , is
set to one implying log utility which is a usual choice in the literature.
Following Christiano et al. (2010) the parameter governing the disu-
tility of labour, ' is chosen to be one (i.e. Frisch elasticity of labour
supply, 1=', is also one) which is more conservative than the value of
0:2 used by Gali et al. (2007). Recently, Christiano et al. (2010) ar-
gued that unitary Frisch elasticity is the most reasonable choice our
baseline parametrisation which is in line with both macro and micro
evidence. Also, similarly to Christiano (2010) we use "p = "w = 6.
For habit formation parameter, h, Furlanetto and Seneca (2011) set a
high value of 0:85 while Smets and Wouters (2007) employing a model
with various frictions estimate a value of 0:6. Therefore, we consider
a value in the middle range and set h = 0:7. The steady-state gov-
ernment spending-GDP ratio, g, is set to 0:2 mimicking the post-war
US evidence. This implies a steady-state consumption-income ratio,
c of 0:8. Furlanetto and Seneca (2009) calibrates the share of rule-
of-thumb consumers () to be between 29% and 35% after reviewing
a couple of econometric studies. Based on this we set  = 0:3 which
we think is more plausible empirically than the 0:5 used by Gali et al.
(2007).
1.3.2 Fiscal and Monetary Policy
The steady-state quarterly debt-output ratio (B=Y ) is 2.4 assuming
that the yearly debt-output ratio is 60% as in Rossi (2012). The
steady-state labour tax rate () in the model with balanced budget
is chosen to be 30% as in Christiano (2010) while it is 26.91% in the
model with endogenous debt and pinned down by the discount factor,
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the debt-output ratio and government spending-to-output ratio. The
size of the discount factor shock, rt, is set to -0.01 which is close to
the mode estimate (-0.0104) by Denes and Eggertsson (2010) using
a model that contains only price rigidity and specic labour market.
The duration of the negative demand shock is 10 periods14 which is in
accordance with the modal estimate of Denes and Eggertsson (2009).
The ination coe¢ cient in the Taylor rule, 1, is 1.5. Following Chris-
tiano (2010) and Christiano et al. (2011) there is neither interest-rate
smoothing (R = 0) nor response to output gap in the Taylor rule
(2 = 0).
1.3.3 Firms
The mean posterior estimates of Smets and Wouters (2007) for the
Calvo parameters, p = 0:66 (w = 0:7) imply an average price (wage)
stickiness of around two (three) quarters. The reduced form esti-
mates (see for references Furlanetto and Seneca (2009)) on the new-
Keynesian price Phillips curve imply  = 0:03. Without real rigid-
ity such a value of  would imply a very long-period of price inertia
(p = 0:85). In our baseline calibration without real rigidity (i.e.
I = 0) p = 0:66 implies  = :1786. When I = 1 the calibration
of  = 0:03 is achieved by setting an appropriate value for . The
implied value of  is 24.77 which is in the range of empirical estimates
listed in Furlanetto and Seneca (2009).
14Eggertsson (2010a) and Denes and Eggertsson (2009) consider a stochastic experiment with a
persistence estimate of  = 0:9030 for the discount factor shock process. This  is easily translated
into our deterministic experiment knowing that the average duration of this AR(1) is 1=(1   )
which is roughly 10. For a similar argument see Appendix C of Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian
(2012).
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1.4 Experiments
1.4.1 Experiment 1 only price rigidity
Our zero lower bound experiments are in the spirit of Christiano (2010)
and Christiano et al. (2011)15 who assumed that the discount factor
shock and the corresponding scal policy shock is on for a determin-
istic period of time. A discount factor shock (alternatively, savings or
negative demand shock) hits the economy in period one. The model
is in deterministic steady-state until t = 1. At t = 1 the discount rate
drops from its steady-state value of 0.01 (per quarter) to r =  0:01
and remains low for T = 10 quarters16. From quarter 11 (T + 1) on
the discount rate is back to its steady-state value. Note that all deter-
ministic experiments below assume that the discount factor shock is
on for ten periods. The deterministic simulations are executed using a
standard shooting algorithm to handle the ZLB problem. The details
of this algorithm are available in the appendix of Christiano (2010)17.
Briey, the algorithm can be described as follows. Let t1 and t2 denote
the guess values for dates of the start and the end of the zero lower
bound period, respectively such that 1  t1  t2  T . Then taxes are
decreased for period t 2 [t1; t2]. Next check whether the zero lower
bound binds for t 2 [t1; t2]. If not, revise the guess for t1 and t2.
The steady-state level of labour tax in the model with balanced
government budget is 30 per cent ( = 0:3). In the no policy response
simulation the labour tax rate is at its steady-state level for the entire
simulation. In the alternative simulation (denoted with dashed line)
15Note that section 2 and 3 of Christiano et al. (2011) consider a stochastic experiment similar
to those in Eggertsson (2010a) and Woodford (2010) while section 4 and 5 consider deterministic
experiments that are accomplished by using a standard shooting algorithm. In case of only price
rigidity (or only wage riditiy) the system can be re-written using the Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003) type of methodology applicable if the system contains no state variable. The latter is not
true any more in case of the inclusion of both price and wage stickiness when one of the variables
(potentially the real wage) becomes an endogenous state. Hence, we make use of the shooting
algorithm of Christiano (2010).
16For comparison, Christiano (2010) considered a shock of similar size although a somewhat
longer period (T = 15).
17In particular, we made use of some of the codes of Christiano (2010) and Christiano et al.
(2011). The codes are available from Lawrence Christianos website.
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the labour tax rate is decreased (in contrast to Christiano (2010) and
Christiano et al. (2011) who considered a rise in the tax rate) to 20
per cent for the time period in which the zero lower bound on the
nominal interest rate is binding. The shooting algorithm determines
endogenously the date at which the zero lower bound becomes binding
and the date at which the zero lower bound ceases to bind. Thus we
have at least two regimes. One of them is with xed interest rate
(the zero lower bound period) and the other one is with a Taylor
rule. In general there can be many regimes with either xed interest
rate or with a Taylor rule operating. It is well known that there is
indeterminacy in the new Keynesian model when interest rate is xed
(see, e.g., Woodford (2011)). However, inclusion of the Taylor rule
in one of the regimes guarantees determinacy in the other regimes
characterised by xed interest rate (see, among others, Carlstrom et
al. (2012)). We conduct four experiments and elements of the models
used in each experiment are listed in Table (1.1).
Figure 1.1 shows experiment one featuring a model that includes
two types of households and only price rigidity. In experiment one we
assume that there is no wage rigidity in the economy (i.e. the wage
Phillips curve in equation (1.26) is removed equivalently w is set
close to zero). Therefore, wages are exible in experiment one18. In the
absence of tax policy the ZLB ends in period 6 while the presence of tax
policy makes the ZLB bind for 9 periods. One can observe that each
of the variables except for nominal and real interest rates decline due
to the negative demand shock in each experiment and, therefore, the
question is always whether the tax-cut is able to mitigate the negative
e¤ects of the demand shock or not.
18In this experiment we found numerically that there are two solutions to the shooting problem
(hence no unique solution). Also we realised that the drop in output and ination is extremely
large in this simplest variant of model (without capital, habits and wage rigidity) containing two
types of households. To avoid the non-uniqueness problem and to reduce the extreme negative
impact of the shock we introduce strategic complementarity into price setting in the way discussed
above. As Ascari et al. (2011) argues the non-uniqueness problem is mitigated by the inclusion
of wage rigidity into the baseline model. Thus, in the models containing wage rigidity we do not
encounter such non-uniqueness problem.
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Figure 1.1: This is experiment 1 in the text and in Table (1.1). The + signs indicate
the date at which the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate becomes binding
and circles appear on the date at which the zero lower bound ceases to bind. ss means
steady-state. There are two shocks in this experiment: a strong negative demand
shock with size that equals to -0.01 in each period for ten quarters, which leads to
huge fall in all variables. Also there is a labour tax cut of size -0.1 in each quarter
during the zero lower bound period which does not necessarily last as long as the
negative demand shock. Consumption (both ROT and OPT), hours, output and
real wage rate are expressed as percentage deviation from their steady-state values
(on the graphs it is indicated as "% deviation from ss") while price ination, wage
ination, shadow interest rate, nominal and real interest rate is expressed in annual
percentage rate (APR).
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Figure 1.2: Labour demand and supply at the zero lower bound using the stochastic
two-state version of the model used in experiment 1.
In experiment one consumption of non-Ricardians falls even more
in case of the decrease in labour taxes and, hence, labour tax cut
does not alleviate the negative consequences of the demand shock
(huge deation and fall in output). Also note that the drop in real
wage which equals to the marginal cost due to constant return-to-
scale assumption is considerable without and with the labour tax-
cut. When zero lower bound ceases to bind the Taylor rule becomes
operational and monetary policy reacts to positive ination resulting
from expansionary scal policy (i.e. the labour tax cut) by raising
the nominal interest rate. Thus, there is a large upward movement
in nominal interest rate following the zero lower bound period (see
Figure 1.1). Similarly, real interest rate jumps during the zero lower
bound period because nominal interest rate is xed and there is huge
deation due to the negative demand shock. Real interest rate rises
even more with a tax-cut that is associated with more pronounced
fall in real wages and, hence, bigger drop in ination through the
new-Keynesian Phillips curve.
To provide intuition for experiment 1 let us study the labour market
of model. The e¤ects of the tax-cut is depicted on Figure 1.2.
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Proposition 4 Both labour demand and supply are upward-sloping at
the zero lower bound such that the labour demand is steeper than the
labour supply.
Proof. Let us examine the stochastic case of the model used in ex-
periment 1 as in Eggertsson (2011, 2010), Christiano et al. (2010) and
Woodford (2011). The model in experiment 1 does not contain state
variables and is therefore easy to implement. The analytical solution
also provides lots of intuition.
Another reason why one can obtain analytical solution is that the sim-
plifying assumption of the rst scal scenario when non-Ricardians do
not pay taxes i.e. neither lump-sum nor distortionary taxes (yet they
enjoy the tax cut) making the government budget constraint redun-
dant. More precisely, the government budget constraint is implicitly
included in the aggregate resource constraint which combines the lat-
ter with Ricardian and non-Ricardian householdsbudget constraint.
There is monopolistic competition on the labour market as in the main
text and labour incomes are pooled by unions which set wages for each
type of labour. It is useful to describe the system in the short-run and
in the long-run. In the short-run (hence, the subscript s) an endoge-
nous variable xt is denoted as xt = xs = fws, ns, ys, cos, crs, sg.
In the long-run we are back to the steady-state such that xt = 019.
Here we consider the short-run with a binding zero lower bound. [See
not-for-publication appendix of the paper version of this chapter for
a characterisation of the model in the short-run with positive interest
rates.]
The maximum number of periods for which the zero lower bound is
binding is equal to the length of the shock (T ). At time t < T the
economy is at the zero-lower bound and stays there, at the next pe-
riod t + 1, with probability  or going back to the steady-state with
probability20 1  . Therefore the exit from the zero lower bound pe-
19Remember that x is dened as percent deviation from steady-state.
201    can also be interpreted as the transition probability of switching from the zero lower
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riod is stochastic and happens at texit  T . The exogenous discount
factor shock that makes the zero lower bound binding is rt = r

s < 0
for t  T and rt = 0 in the steady-state for t > T . [The discount
factor shock is also zero when interest rate is positive.] The second
exogenous shock is the tax cut that is lowered during the zero lower
bound period ^ t = ^ s for t < texit. Otherwise taxes do not deviate
from the steady-state i.e. ^ t = 0 for t  texit. In the next labour
demand and supply are derived. Then we argue that equilibrium at
the zero lower bound is well-dened when labour demand is steeper
than labour supply.
The aggregation of Ricardian and non-Ricardian intratemporal condi-
tions results in:
ws =


c
+ '

ns   ^ s (1.35)
where we used the aggregate resource constraint (yt = cct) and the
production function (yt = nt).
The budget constraint of non-Ricardians is reproduced here:
crs = ws + n
r
s   ^ rs; (1.36)
The Euler equation of Ricardians can be written as:
cos   cos =  (0  s   rs)
where the nominal interest rate is zero when the zero lower bound is
binding. The previous can also be expressed as:
(1  )cos = s + rs (1.37)
Taxation is uniform i.e. Ricardians and non-Ricardians pay the same
bound state to the steady-state.
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tax-rate:
^ s = ^
r
s + (1  )^ os
^ rs = ^
o
s = ^ s
The New Keynesian price Phillips curve can be written as:
(1  )s = ws
s =
ws
1   (1.38)
Let us start with the aggregate resource constraint that equals to the
consumption aggregator:
ys = ccs = c[c
r
s+(1 )cos] = c

(ws + n
r
s   ^ s) + (1  )
(s + r

s)
(1  )

;
where we substituted in for crt and c
o
s from equations (1.36) and (1.37),
respectively.
The previous one can be expressed as:
yt = c
24(ws + ns   ^ s) + (1  )

 ws(1 ) + r

s

(1  )
35
where we substituted in from equation (1.38) for s.
Multiplying out terms in the previous equation leads to
yt = cws + cns   c^ s +
c(1  )
(1  )(1  )ws +
(1  )c
(1  ) r

s :
After collecting some terms the preceding one results in:
ns(1 c) =
c(1  )(1  ) + c(1  )
(1  )(1  ) ws c^ s+
(1  )c
(1  ) r

s
And the resulting labour demand is a function of the real wage, the
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tax shock and the discount factor shock:
nlds =
c(1  )(1  ) + c(1  )
 (1  )(1  ) ws  
c
 
^ s +
(1  )c
 (1  )r

s
(1.39)
where    1  c. Two observations can be made about the preced-
ing equation. First, the slope of the labour demand in equation (1.39)
is positive (  > 0 for our baseline calibration) similar to Eggertsson
(2011, 2010) who used a model without non-Ricardian households.
In gure 1.2 labour demand is steeper than labour supply as in Eg-
gertsson (2011) and the tax cut has contractionary e¤ects that is, a
rightward shift of the labour supply leads to a fall in real wages and
hours worked. It needs to be stressed that changes in the tax-rate
(^ s) directly a¤ect aggregate labour demand through the budget con-
straint of non-Ricardian households. The fact that the tax cut raises
disposable income of rule-of-thumbers and also leads to higher labour
demand is of reduced signicance in experiment 1 while it is the key
to generate a demand e¤ect in experiment 2 with rigid wages (see dis-
cussion following this proof and also experiment 2).
Second, by choosing an appropriate value for  ceteris paribus we
make sure that labour demand is steeper than labour supply so that
the condition for a determinate equilibrium is satised as in Eggerts-
son (2011). It turns out that  has to be su¢ ciently low in order for
the labour demand to be steeper than the labour supply21. The intro-
duction of Kimball demand (see the rms problem in the main text)
helps to achieve low  without departing from the baseline calibration
of the other parameters of the model. In fact, Kimball demand (and
other types of real rigidities in general see Woodford (2003) chapter
3) is a useful tool to reduce  instead of assuming unrealistically long
average duration of price rigidity (high p) that could also reduce .
Next we determine the equilibrium amount of hours worked as a func-
tion of the shocks and argue that conditions for a binding zero lower
21We plot wages on the vertical and hours worked on the horizontal axis.
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bound are satised.
Substituting from aggregate labour supply equation (1.35) into equa-
tion (1.39) we derive an equilibrium expression for n as a function of
the shocks (r and ^):
nlds =
c(1  )(1  ) + c(1  )
 (1  )(1  ) (cs + 'n
ls
s + ^ s)
 c
 
^ s +
(1  )c
 (1  )r

s
and after using the aggregate resource constraint (equation 1.34) and
the production function (yt = nt) we obtain:
nlds =
c(1  )(1  ) + c(1  )
 (1  )(1  )


c
+ '

nlss + ^ s

 c
 
^ s +
(1  )c
 (1  )r

s
In equilibrium labour supply equals labour demand (nlds = n
ls
s ) so that
it follows
ns
241  [c(1  )(1  ) + c(1  )]


c
+ '

 (1  )(1  )
35
=

[c(1  )(1  ) + c(1  )]
 (1  )(1  )  
c
 

^ s
+
(1  )c
 (1  )r

s
which can also be written as
ns =


^ s +
(1  )c(1  )

rs
where   [(1 )(1 )+(1 ) (1 )(1 )]c > 0
and    (1 )(1 ) [c(1  )(1  ) + c(1  )]


c
+ '

>
0. For reasonable parameter values  and  are positive constants and
the deationary shock (r < 0) as well as the tax cut (^ < 0) are both
decreasing labour so that the zero-lower bound is binding. It is useful
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to note that  > 0 corresponds to condition C2 in Eggertsson (2011).
Assuming that c and  are xed expressions  and  are positive for
high values of the IES or Frisch labour supply elasticities (i.e. when
 or ' is low, respectively).
Furthermore, our baseline calibration ensures that the shock is large
enough for the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate to start
binding so that another condition which is equivalent to C1 in Eggerts-
son (2011) is also respected by our model solution (for further details
see our not-for-publication appendix). A unique bounded equilibrium
at the zero lower bound respects both C1 and C2. It can be shown
that C2 is enough to hold for a well-dened equilibrium at positive
interest rates (see Eggertsson (2011) and the not-for-publication ap-
pendix of the paper version of this chapter).
Our baseline calibration of the model containing Kimball demand that
keeps  low and helps to maintain ,  > 0 is consistent with  < 0:7
which implies a duration much shorter than with  = 0:903 estimated
by Denes and Eggertsson (2011) using a model that contains only
Ricardian households. Therefore, the model with two types of house-
holds satisfy the condition of binding zero lower bound (,  > 0)
only when the zero lower bound period is not too long with a maxi-
mum duration of 1=(1 0:7) = 3:33 quarters (on average) and there is
strategic complementarity in price-setting ensuring a low value of .
The labour supply shifts to the right from LS to LS due to a
decrease in the tax rate (see again gure 1.2) leading to a drop in
wages and hours worked along labour demand LD. The leftward shift
of labour demand is associated with a drop in the consumption of
Ricardians after the tax-cut. There are at least two reasons why con-
sumption of Ricardians declines to higher extent in case of a tax cut
(see gure 1.1). First, the sharp increase in real interest rates make
them delay their consumption expenditures. Second, the tax cut in
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the present is associated with future tax-hikes (a large negative wealth
e¤ect) to satisfy the budget constraint of the government and in ex-
periments 1-3 it is only the Ricardians who bear the burden of the tax
cut. As a result labour demand falls so much (from LD to LD) due
to lower consumption demand of Ricardians (rms produce less) that
equilibrium hours worked nally drops even more with tax cut relative
to the case of no policy intervention. Also importantly, with exible
wages the tax cut ( ^ t > 0) is not strong enough to counteract the
decline in real wages and hours worked due to the negative demand
shock and the tax cut so that the disposable income of non-Ricardians
cannot rise22. In sum the tax cut magnies the deationary e¤ects de-
scribed by Eggertsson (2011): price deation and the contraction in
hours worked are more severe with the tax cut even after the inclusion
of non-Ricardian households in the absence of wage rigidity.
1.4.2 Experiment 2 price and wage rigidity
Figure 1.3 shows an experiment similar to the rst one but this time
we introduce wage stickiness into the model (experiment two). The
discount rate is set to  0:01 per quarter. The ZLB binds for period 1
to 6 with or without policy. Wages are set by unions and assumed to
remain xed for about 3 quarters. The wage tax cut increases the dis-
posable income of ROT households who consume it. Again, the rise
in the consumption of ROT households (and similarly for the other
variables) in response to a labour tax cut should be read as the con-
sumption of ROT households (and also other variables) fall less in
case of the tax-cut than without the policy (see Figure 1.3).
Real wage does not fall dramatically due to the presence of wage
stickiness in sharp contrast to the previous experiment (the absence
of wage rigidity). But, still, the tax cut remains deationary (labour
supply shifts slightly more to the right than labour demand) and real
22Based on the budget constraint of non-Ricardians (see equation (1.7)) crt drops due to the fall
in nrt and wt which is not neutralised by  ^ rt > 0.
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Figure 1.3: This is experiment 2. The model used in the experiment 1 is extended
with wage rigidity. The + signs indicate the date at which the zero lower bound on
the nominal interest rate becomes binding and circles appear on the date at which
the zero lower bound ceases to bind. ss means steady-state. There are two shocks
in this experiment: a strong negative demand shock with size that equals to -0.01
in each period for ten quarters leading to a huge fall in all variables. Also there is a
labour tax cut of size -0.1 in each quarter during the zero lower bound period which
does not necessarily last as long as the negative demand shock.
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wage in the case of tax policy falls more than without policy. Ob-
serving the graph we can also see that the wage deation is higher
than the price deation implying a fall in the real wage rate. With
perfect wage-stickiness (w is close to one) which is not the case here
but serves as a useful abstraction (see e.g. the argument of Chris-
tiano (2010)) the labour supply would remain inact. In the next we
analyse the indirect reaction of labour demand to the tax cut.
The higher consumption demand of non-Ricardian agents induces
many of the rms which cannot charge a higher price due to price
stickiness to increase their production. To produce more rms demand
more labour i.e. the labour demand shifts out. As it is well-known
in sticky-price models a rise in aggregate demand due to the higher
consumption expenditures of ROT households leads to a fall in the
markup, which induces an outward shift in the labour demand. Below
we discuss the reaction of labour supply following the tax cut.
On the one hand, the labour tax cut raises the pre-tax real wage
creating an incentive for the union to increase the labour supply (sub-
stitution e¤ect). On the other hand, the labour tax cut has a strong
negative wealth e¤ect: Ricardians know that the present tax cut will
be o¤set by higher lump-sum taxes in the future and, therefore, they
decrease their demand for consumption and leisure. As the time frame
is normalised to one, the fall in leisure implies spending more time
working i.e. Ricardians supply more labour. Due to unions non-
Ricardians work the same number of hours as Ricardians. Thus, both
Ricardians and non-Ricardians satisfy higher labour demand by work-
ing more. On gure 1.3 the pre-tax real wage falls more for the tax-cut
scenario relative to the case of no policy change. Also we observe that
hours worked increases i.e. it decreases less with tax cut. It follows
that the labour supply must have increased more than the labour de-
mand.
It also needs to be emphasized that rigid wages imply that labour
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supply (or wage schedule, WS) curve is atter with rigid relative to
exible wages (Ascari et al. 2011) and the outward shift of labour de-
mand in response to higher consumption expenditures of non-Ricardians
is associated with more movement in hours worked (drop) rather than
real wage (rise) which is rather apparent on Figure 1.4.
The prot on gure 1.3 rises either with or without a tax-cut. It
is easy to show algebraically that this is always the case. In rst-
order loglinear terms prot can be written as profitt = yt   wt   nt.
Because of the constant returns to scale assumption yt = nt and, there-
fore profitt =  wt. The real wage always drops due to the negative
demand shock so it follows that prot has to increase. Prot income
that accrues only to Ricardians has an important role in the model. It
helps Ricardian consumers who are the owner of the rms to insulate
themselves from the negative wealth e¤ects of the future tax increases
and also from the rise in the real interest rate that discourages them
from further consumption in the present. Thus, prot income enables
Ricardians to avoid larger cuts in consumption due to the future tax
burden and the higher real rates.
1.4.3 Experiment 3 price rigidity, wage rigidity and con-
sumption habits
Experiment three that is shown on Figure 1.5 makes use of the model
in the previous simulation but now it includes external habit formation
in consumption as well. Due to the lagged consumption term habit for-
mation injects some endogenous persistence into the model and leads
to hump-shaped impulse responses in consumption and hours. Habit
formation is a well-known feature of middle-sized DSGE models like
the one of Smets and Wouters (2007) and is found useful in matching
the empirical VAR evidence. Also habit formation is usually regarded
to have some solid psychological foundation. The presence of habits
mitigates the e¤ects of the negative demand shock. This can be ex-
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Figure 1.4: Comparison of labour markets under positive and zero nominal interest
rate. WS-sticky stands for the wage schedule under sticky wages while WS-exible
means the wage schedule under exible wages. Source: the left-hand-side gure is a
reproduction of Ascari et al. (2011 page 12) while the right-hand-side one is based
on gure 4 of Eggertsson (2010b page 15 )
plained as follows. As argued above it is the rise in the real interest
that makes people delay their consumption expenditure. The intro-
duction of habits reduces the sensitivity of consumption to changes in
the real interest (this can be quickly veried by looking at equation
(1.5) where the coe¢ cient on the interest is smaller in case of habits
[1 ho1+ho

 ] than it is for the standard CRRA case [=]). The ZLB binds
from period 1 to 8 (9) without (with) policy. Still output (hours)
declines less when labour tax cut policy is applied.
1.4.4 Experiment 4 price rigidity, wage rigidity, consump-
tion habits and government debt
In experiment four we assume more realistically that the tax cut is
nanced by government debt which is retired through an increase in
labour tax revenue either in short- or long-run. We allow for inherited
debt from the past: that is, the steady-state debt-to-output ratio is
positive and interest payments on current debt a¤ects the evolution
of future debt. In previous experiments it was only the Ricardians
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Figure 1.5: This is called Experiment 3 in the text. Here we used the model in
Experiment 2 extended with external habit formation in consumption.
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Figure 1.6: This is experiment 4a in the text. Here we set 1 = 0:02.
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Table 1.1: Details of the models used in experiment 1-4
Features of the model used
Experiment 1 price rigidity
Experiment 2 price and wage rigidity
Experiment 3 price and wage rigidity, consumption habits
Experiment 4a price and wage rigidity, consumption habits
and government debt with 1 = 0:02
Experiment 4b see Experiment 4a with 1 = 0:9
Robustness checks
Experiment 4c see Experiment 4a with  = 1:5 (lower IES)
Experiment 4d see Experiment 4a with ' = 1:5 (lower Frisch)
Experiment 4e see Experiment 4a with  = 0:2 (lower share of non-Ricardians)
Experiment 4f see Experiment 4a with p = 0:6 (lower price rigidity)
Experiment 4g see Experiment 4a with w = 0:66 (lower wage rigidity)
Experiment 4h see Experiment 4a with (wage ination in the Taylor rule)
All experiments contain both Ricardian and non-Ricardian households.
Experiment 1, 2 and 3 assumes a uniform tax cut that is nanced by lump-sum
taxes levied on Ricardian agents. Experiment 4 assumes that the uniform tax cut
is nanced by government debt that is retired through labour tax revenue
collected from both types of households either in the short-run (1 is close to one)
or in the long-run (1 is close to zero).
who bear the burden of the tax cut. However, now, it is also the
non-Ricardians who have to take part in settling the bill. Taxation is
uniform: both types of households pay the same tax rate.
The parameter choice for 1 in the scal rule (equation 1.29) turns
out to be crucial for the outcome. When 1 is low the tax-cut is mainly
nanced with debt which paid back in the distant future (see, for in-
stance, the impulse responses with 1 = 0:02 on Figure (1.6) where
bond holdings refer to real debt). This case lends support for tax-cut
policy and is in accordance to the ndings of Bilbiie et al. (2012)
who argues in favour of a (lump-sum) tax-cut23 as follows. When debt
repayment happens far in the future a uniform tax cut is pure redis-
tribution (transfer) from Ricardians to non-Ricardians in the present
23In this chapter we found that intuition in case of labour-tax cut that is very similar to the
lump-sum tax-cut discussed by Bilbiie et al. (2012) who also assume consolidation of the debt
in form of higher lump-sum taxes. In this chapter, however, consolidation of debt is carried out
through increases in labour taxes which distort consumption-leisure tradeo¤, discourage from work
and depress output even more beyond the zero lower bound period.
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while it is a transfer from non-Ricardians to Ricardians in the future.
The evolution of Ricardian consumption is totally consistent with our
story. Ricardians pay attention to changes in their whole lifetime
income (the present discounted value of income) which remains unal-
tered with temporary changes in taxes (see the straight and dashed
lines coincide on Figure (1.6)).
Thus, the outcome of the policy in case of endogenous debt with low
1 is very similar to the rst scal scenario in which only Ricardians
pay for the tax-cut through lump-sum taxes. In particular, Ricardians
do not react to the policy while non-Ricardians enjoy the tax-decrease
as it is not o¤set in the present by a rise in the labour tax. Also note
that this tax cut policy leads to better outcome only in the zero-lower
bound period which coincides with the period of sharp accumulation
in debt. As soon as the Taylor rule is operative again (from period
11) this type of tax cut policy is strictly worse mainly because of its
negative e¤ects on the consumption of non-Ricardians. Indeed, from
period 11 the tax-cut is over and non-Ricardians also have to take part
in settling the debt accumulated in the zero lower bound period. As a
result non-Ricardian consumption with scal policy beyond the zero
lower bound period is below the one without scal policy.
On the contrary when 1 is closer to one (see Figure (1.7) for 1 =
0:9) the tax cut in the present is counteracted by a tax rise and there
is no rationale for such a policy. This is also conrmed by looking at
the evolution of bonds on the same Figure. In the rst ten periods
bond holdings are positive but from period eleven they are the same as
in the case of no policy. This is markedly di¤erent from the previous
experiment where the late repayment ensured that bond holdings are
positive even beyond period ten in case of a tax-cut relative to no
policy intervention. Values of 1 that equals to one or above are to be
avoided as they would render the path of debt explosive.
It deserves explanation why we observe a run-up of the debt in the
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Figure 1.7: This is experiment 4b in the text. Here we set 1 = 0:9.
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zero lower bound period even without scal policy (see straight lines
for bond holdings on Figures 1.6 and 1.7). All the gures plot the
evolution of real debt. In particular, increases in debt during the zero
lower bound period (in the absence of scal policy) reects the fact
that the real value of debt increases due to deation.
1.4.5 Robustness checks using the model in Experiment 4
It is necessary to test the robustness of the tax-cut policy in case of
government debt that is settled far in the future (i.e. 1 is close to
zero). Several estimated middle-sized DSGE models like Smets and
Wouters (2007) consider a value of lower than one for the IES and
Frisch elasticities. Figure (1.8) and (1.9) show experiments with either
IES or Frisch elasticity chosen to be 2/3 (ceteris paribus). Based on the
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gures we conclude that the main result is not sensitive to the choice of
the values of the EIS or the Frisch elasticity. In fact, the tax-cut seems
to be even more desirable when the EIS and the Frisch elasticity are
below one. Figure (1.10) is the case when we reduce the share of non-
Ricardian households to 20% in the economy (baseline calibration is
30% which is not considered to be high according to several estimates,
see the section on calibration) and the positive e¤ect of the tax-cut
disappears. Figure (1.11) demonstrates that our result is robust if we
use a shorter average duration of price rigidity. Our result is also very
sensitive to the average duration of wage stickiness: see gure (1.12)
where the average duration of wage contract is 3 quarters instead of
the baseline choice of 3.33 quarters on average. Finally, we report an
experiment where we replace price ination with wage ination in the
Taylor-rule (see gure (1.13)). With wage ination in the Taylor rule
tax-cut policy is still somewhat better than the absence of it.
In sum, we have seen that the result is very sensitive to the share of
non-Ricardian households, the duration of wage stickiness and which
variable is included in the Taylor rule. However, it needs to be stressed
that these experiments were conducted using unitary values for the
consumption and leisure curvatures parameters (Frisch and IES, re-
spectively). As previously pointed out several empirical studies esti-
mated these values to be slightly or well below one. Hall (1988) re-
view the early literature on estimates of EIS and settles with a value
of around 0.1. Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) uses data from the U.S. Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey over 1980-1996 and estimates EIS to be
around 0.3-0.4 for stockholders and 0.8-1 for bondholders. Impor-
tantly, Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) utilises time-separable utility func-
tion without habits to estimate EIS. However, Vissing-Jorgensen and
Attanasio (2003) conclude that the EIS might be higher than one for
stockholders estimating a structural model that is based on Epstein-
Zin preferences which help to separate EIS from risk-aversion. Also
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note that in chapter two and three we found that a model containing
Epstein-Zin preferences match the macro and nance data best when
IES and Frisch elasticity are below one.
An inuential labour market literature estimated 1=' to be small
using household level data (see, e.g., Pistaferri (2003)). First, 1=' can
be treated as the elasticity of hours worked to changes in the real wage
holding household wealth xed (the intensive margin) and individual
labour supply elasticities are found to be small based on micro data.
It is also true that data shows little variation in either hours worked or
real wage along the business cycle. However, data shows substantial
movement in employment (extensive margin) in response to changes
in the wage. Therefore, Christiano et al. (2010) argue that it is more
reasonable to treat Nt as the number of people working in a particular
household and reinterpret 1=' as "the elasticity with which di¤erent
members of the households enter or leave employment in response to
shocks" (Christiano et al. (2010) pp. 18). This suggests that ' is
meant to capture the aversion to work by di¤erent members of the
household and, thus a small ' means that several members of the
households are close to be indi¤erent between working and not working
and a small change in the wage triggers a large labour supply response.
Based on this Christiano et al. (2010) argue that it makes sense to
set a value of around one or larger than one (their Bayesian estimate)
for 1='.
Based on the previous arguments we set IES to be 0.5 and Frisch
elasticity to 1.67 (for higher value of the Frisch elasticity the numerical
approximation of the policy function is found to be inaccurate). Then
the tax-cut policy is still better even with a share of non-Ricardian
consumers of 25% which is lower than the baseline calibration of 30%.
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Figure 1.8: This is experiment 4c in the text. The elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution (EIS) is 2/3 here (i.e.  = 1:5)
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Figure 1.9: This is experiment 4d in the text. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply
is 2/3 here (i.e. ' = 1:5)
0 10 20 30
-20
0
20
Shadow nominal interest rate
A
P
R
0 10 20 30
-20
0
20
Ricardian consumption
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
s
10 20 30
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
hours(=output)
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
s
0 10 20 30
-10
-5
0
price inflation
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
s
10 20 30
0
2
4
nominal rate of interest
A
P
R
10 20 30
-1.5
-1
-0.5
real wage
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
s
10 20 30
-20
-10
0
10
non-Ricardian consumption
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
s
10 20 30
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
wage inflation
A
P
R
5 10 15 20 25
2
4
6
8
A
P
R
real rate of interest
no policy response
wage tax rate cut from 0.3 to 0.2
10 20 30
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
aggregate consumption
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
s
10 20 30
20
40
60
80
bond holdings
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
s
10 20 30
0.5
1
1.5
profits
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
s
CHAPTER 1. LABOUR TAX CUT AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND 63
Figure 1.10: This is experiment 4e. The share of non-Ricardian households ( = 0:2)
is lower.
0 10 20 30
-20
0
20
Shadow nominal interest rate
A
P
R
0 10 20 30
-20
-10
0
Ricardian consumption
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
s
10 20 30
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
hours(=output)
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
s
0 10 20 30
-20
0
20
price inflation
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
s
10 20 30
0
2
4
nominal rate of interest
A
P
R
10 20 30
-2
-1
0
real wage
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
s
10 20 30
-15
-10
-5
0
non-Ricardian consumption
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
s
10 20 30
-15
-10
-5
0
wage inflation
A
P
R
5 10 15 20 25
4
6
8
10
12
A
P
R
real rate of interest
no policy response
wage tax rate cut from 0.3 to 0.2
10 20 30
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
aggregate consumption
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
s
10 20 30
20
40
60
80
100
bond holdings
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
s
10 20 30
0
1
2
profits
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 s
s
CHAPTER 1. LABOUR TAX CUT AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND 64
Figure 1.11: This is experiment 4f. Price rigidity lasts for 2 quarters (on average)
instead of the baseline of 3 quarters (on average).
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Figure 1.12: This is experiment 4g. The duration of wage rigidity is reduced to 3
quarters (on average) instead of the baseline 3.33 quarters (on average).
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Figure 1.13: This is experiment 4h. Here price ination is replaced for wage ination
in the Taylor rule.
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1.5 Conclusion
After augmenting the baseline new-Keynesian model containing price
and wage rigidity with rule-of-thumb (or non-Ricardian) households
we argued that a labour tax cut can partly o¤set the fall in output and
deation caused by a negative demand shock that made the zero lower
bound on the nominal interest rate binding. Importantly, we assumed
that we cut the labour tax rate that is levied upon the households and
not upon the rms. Under such an arrangement the labour tax cut
acts like a traditional scal stimulus that raises aggregate demand. We
found that the tax-cut policy is stimulative if it is nanced by lump-
sum taxes levied completely on Ricardian agents. We also explored a
more realistic scenario when tax-cut is covered by long-term govern-
ment debt which is settled by both types of households in the form
of taxes on labour income. Still the tax-cut is found to have positive
e¤ects on output because non-Ricardians who doesnt take into the
consideration the future tax burden enjoy the increase in their dispos-
able income by spending more. Finally, rule-of-thumb consumers can
be thought of as a shortcut of modeling agents with borrowing con-
straint. Based on the logic of the model with rule-of-thumb households
our nding should remain valid in a model with savers and borrowers
who face borrowing constraints.
Chapter 2
Fiscal Policy and the Nominal
Term Premium
with Ales Marsal1
2.1 Introduction
Long-term nominal bonds deliver term-premium in order to compen-
sate for future ination and consumption risks the bond-holder has to
bear. Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) make use of a basic New Keyne-
sian model and nds that the term premium can be large and volatile.
They assume the simplest scal scenario where government spending
is nanced with lump-sum taxes and decits are not allowed. Further
they show that long-run ination risks like uncertainty about the ina-
tion target substantially increase the term-premium. Van Binsbergen
et al. (2012) estimate a simplied version of the model in Rudebusch
and Swanson (2012) with Bayesian methods and points toward further
investigation of the model with a scal structure added. There are sev-
eral empirical papers like Engen and Hubbard (2004), Laubach (2009)
and Canzoneri et al. (2002) who nd a positive connection between
decit and long-term bond yields using various econometric methods.
Barth et al. (1991) is an early paper surveying fourty-two studies on
1Ales Marsal is based at the Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles
University in Prague.
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the e¤ects of scal policy on the yield curve. He nds positive e¤ects
in eighteen cases, six of them are mixed and the rest of them (nine-
teen cases) exhibits not signicant or negative e¤ects. The reduced
form econometric models di¤er mainly by the variables they use to
make inference. In particular, they explore the e¤ect of current (or
projected) decit on current (or forward) interest rates. For instance,
Elmendorf (1993) nds that 1% increase in projected decit-to-GNP
ratio raises 5-year bond yields by 43 basis points. Also Canzoneri et
al. (2002) predicts a 1 percent increase in the future decit/GDP ra-
tio to elevate long-term yields by 53-60 basis points. Orszag and Gale
(2004) nd a 1% rise in the expected decit-to-GDP ratio to lift 10-
year bond yields by 30-36 basis points. They also provide a summary
of the more recent literature and report thirteen positive, ve mixed
and one case with no e¤ects. Similar to Orszag and Gale (2004) En-
gen and Hubbard (2004) estimate the e¤ect of 1 percent increase in
the predicted decit-to-GDP ratio to drive up long forward rates by
18-24 basis points. Laubach (2009) reports that a 1 percent jump in
expected decit-to-GDP lifts long-term forward rates by 24-40 basis
points.
This chapter proposes a simple alternative way to generate long-run
ination risks. In particular, we introduce distortionary income taxa-
tion into the model of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) and nd that
the term premium on nominal bonds is higher than with lump-sum
taxes. Thus, scal policy provides another good reason why long-term
nominal bonds are risky. Further we show that the model with income
taxation is able to generate the mean level of the empirical nominal
term premium with a risk-aversion coe¢ cient that is lower than the
one needed in case of the model with long-run ination risks. We
consider only Ricardian scal policy where agents anticipate current
rises in government spending to be covered by present or future taxes
causing a negative wealth e¤ect that make households reduce their
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consumption in the present in order to save up for the tax-burden.
Even if Ricardian scal policy occupies a prominent place in modern
macroeconomic theory it has to be noted that it is not necessarily
consistent with some of the VAR evidence predicting a positive re-
sponse of consumption to positive government spending shocks (see,
for instance, Gali et al. (2007)).
Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) show that a basic New Keynesian
model approximated to the third order in the sense of Taylor series is
able to generate large and volatile term premium that is in line with
US data. The term-premium is constant to the second order while
it becomes time-varying to the third-order. The only asset in their
model is a default-free government bond. These assets are risky as
their real payo¤ covaries positively with consumption. In particular,
shocks that result in low consumption, high ination and, thus, low
real yields are important sources of the term premia. There are no
liquidity risks in their model.
The most important feature of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012)
model are Epstein-Zin preferences. Earlier papers in the literature
considered preferences with consumption habits (see, for instance, de
Paoli et al. (2006) and the literature review in Rudebusch and Swan-
son (2008)). With habits households are mainly concerned about sud-
den changes in consumption. However, with Epstein-Zin preferences
they are unhappy with changes in consumption over medium and long
horizons as well as short horizons. The household can o¤set short-run
changes in consumption by modifying its labour supply and savings
(also known as precautionary savings) but its ability to smooth con-
sumption at medium- and long-run is much more limited.
Unlike previous papers of endowment economies with either long-
memory habits (see Campbell and Cochrane (1999)) or Epstein-Zin
preferences (like Wachter (2006)) Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) is
a production economy. In endowment economies it is easy to gen-
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erate high term-premium with consumption habits as consumption
risk cannot be insured away by varying labour supply. In produc-
tion economies the e¤ects of a negative consumption shock can be
mitigated by increasing labour supply so that term-premium on risky
assets is considerably lower.
This paper departs from Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) who as-
sume that government spending is nanced by lump-sum taxes in each
period. In their model there is no decit allowed and, hence, no role for
government debt. Below we show that allowing for government debt
change properties of the term-premium to a small extent if decit is
nanced by lump-sum taxes. As an alternative of lump-sum taxes
we introduce distortionary taxation into the Rudebusch and Swanson
(2012) model following Linnemann (2006) who postulates that gov-
ernment collect revenue by levying the same tax rate on labour and
prot income. When government debt is paid back through income
taxes the mean term-premium is substantially higher than with lump-
sum taxes and similar in magnitude to what can be obtained using
the long-run ination risk version of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012).
Also the t of the model with our scal extension and the one with
long-run ination risks relative to US data are quite similar using the
baseline calibration of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 is on calibration and solution method. Section 3 provides
details about the main results. The last section concludes.
2.2 The model
2.2.1 The households problem with Epstein Zin preferences
The household maximises the continuation value of its utility (V ):
Vt =
(
U(Ct; Lt) + 

EtV
1 
t+1
 1
1  if U(Ct; Lt)  0
U(Ct; Lt)  

Et( Vt+1)1 
 1
1  if U(Ct; Lt) < 0
(2.1)
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with respect to its ow budget constraint.  is the discount factor.
Utility (U) at period t is derived from consumption (Ct) and leisure
(1   Lt). Et denotes expectations conditional on information avail-
able at time t. As the time frame is normalised to one leisure time
(1   Lt) is what we are left with after spending some time working
(Lt). The recursive functional form in equation (2.1) is called Epstein-
Zin preferences and is the same as the one used by Rudebusch and
Swanson (2012). To be consistent with balanced growth Rudebusch
and Swanson (2012) imposes the following functional form on U :
U(Ct; Lt) =
C1 't
1  ' + 0Z
1 '
t
(1  Lt)1 
1   ; ',  > 0:
where Zt is an aggregate productivity trend and ', , 0 > 0. The
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) is 1=' and the Frisch
labour supply elasticity is given by (1  L)=L where L is the steady-
state of hours worked. As we restrict our attention (see details on
calibration below) to ' > 1 and  > 1 we employ the second row of
equation (2.1).
Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) derives the following relationship
between coe¢ cient of relative risk-aversion (CRRA) and the curvature
parameter  in the recursive utility (2.1):
CRRA =
'
1 + '
1 L
L
+ 
1  '
1 + 1 '1 
1 L
L
:
The budget constraint of the household can be written as:
pstbst + PstCst = (1   it)(WstLst +Dst) + pstbstt 1
where assets bst with price pst are available in each period t and state
of the world st. The same tax-rate ( it) is levied on labour (WstLst)
and prot (Dst) income. With the choice of  it = 0 we obtain the
model in RS.
The household sets up the following Lagrangian and chooses state-
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contingent paths for consumption (Cst), labour (Lst) and asset hold-
ings (bst).
max
Ct;Lt;bt
L  Vs0  
1X
t=0
X
st
st
(
Vst   U(Cst; Lst)
+
P
st+1 st+1jst(Vst+1)
1  11 
)
 
1X
t=0
X
st
st
h
pstbst + PstCst   (1   it)(WstLst +Dst)  pstbstt 1
i
where st+1jst stands for the probability of realising state st+1 at time
t+ 1 conditional on being in state st at time t. The price per unit of
consumption is Pst.
The rst-order conditions associated with this problem are given
by:
@L
@cst
: stU1(Cst; Lst) = Pstst;
@L
@Lst
:  stU2(Cst; Lst) = (1   it)Wstst;
@L
@bst
: stpst =
X
st+1st
st+1pst+1;
@L
@Vst
: st = st+1jststt 1
24 X
~ststt 1
~stjstt 1(V~st)
1 
35 1  V  st ;s0 = 1;
where U1 and U2 denote the partial derivaties of U with respect to its
rst and second arguments, respectively. Letting 1 + rst+1  pst+1=pst
denote the gross rate of return on assets and dening the discounted
Lagrange multipliers as ~st   t 1stjs0st and ~st   t 1stjs0st we
arrive at (after making some substitutions):
@L
@cst
: ~stU1(Cst; Lst) = Pst~st; (2.2)
@L
@Lst
:  ~stU2(Cst; Lst) = (1   it)Wst~st; (2.3)
@L
@bst
: ~st = Est~st+1(1 + rst+1); (2.4)
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@L
@Vst
: ~st = ~stt 1
h
Estt 1(V~st)
1 
i 
1 
V  st ; ~s0 = 1 (2.5)
where Estt denotes the expected value of being in state s
t. We can
combine equation (2.2) and (2.3) to obtain the intratemporal condi-
tion:
  U2(Cst; Lst)
U1(Cst; Lst)
=
(1  Lt) 
C 't
= (1   it)
Wst
Pst
(2.6)
Similarly the substitution of equation (2.2) and (2.4) into equation
(2.5) results in the intertemporal condition:
U1(Cst; Lst) = Est
h
Estt 1(V~st)
1 
i 
1 
V  st U1(Cst+1; Lst+1)(1+R
net
st+1)Pst=Pst+1
(2.7)
where Rst+1  (1+Rnetst+1) = Bt=Bt 1 is the gross return on a short-term
nominal bonds. Equation (2.7) is equivalent to the equation in row 13
(the Euler equation to price bonds) in Table (2.1).
2.2.2 The intermediary rms problem
Intermediary rm i produces output (Yt(i)) using the technology:
Yt(i) = At[Kt(i)]
1 [ZtLt(i)] (2.8)
which after substituting for Yt(i) the demand for product i (Yt(i) =
Pt(i)
Pt
  1+
Yt) and aggregating across rms gives way to:
Yt = 
 1
t At[Kt]
1 [ZtLt], 0 <  < 1, (2.9)
where Kt = Zt K is the aggregate capital stock ( K is xed),  is the
share of labour in production, t 
R 1
0

Pt(i)
Pt
  1+
di is price dispersion
(which can also be dened recursively, see Table (2.1) below), At is a
stationary aggregate productivity shock:
logAt = A logAt 1 + "
A
t ,
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where "At is an independently and identically distributed (iid) stochas-
tic technology shock with mean zero and variance 2A.
Intermediary rms which maximise their prots face price-setting
frictions of Calvo style. With Calvo frictions a 1   fraction of rms
can set its price optimally in each period. We follow Rudebusch and
Swanson (2012) in laying out the intermediary rms problem. Inter-
mediary rm i chooses a state-contingent plan for prices that max-
imises its current and future prots:
Et
( 1X
T=0
()TKt;t+T [Pt(i)Yt+T (i) Wt+TLt+T (i)]
)
(2.10)
where Kt;t+T is the representative households (nominal) stochastic
discount factor (or pricing kernel dened below in equation (2.17)).
The rst term in the squared bracket in equation (2.10) is the revenue
of the rm while the latter one is the cost of labour.
There is a perfectly competitive sector that purchases the contin-
uum of intermediary goods and turns them into a single nal good
using a CES aggregator:
Yt =
Z 1
0
[Yt(i)]
1
1+di
1+
:
Each intermediary rm i faces a downward-sloping demand curve:
Yt(i) =

Pt(i)
Pt
  1+
Yt (2.11)
where the economy-wide price index Pt is a CES aggregator of the
individual prices:
Pt 
Z 1
0
[Pt(i)]
  1di
 
:
After taking the derivative of the prot equation (2.10) with respect
to the optimal price Pt(i) we obtain the standard optimality condition
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in case of sticky prices:
Pt(i) =
(1 + )
P1
T=0()
TKt;t+TMCt;t+T (i)Yt;t+T (i)P1
T=0()
TKt;t+TYt;t+T (i) (2.12)
where 1 +  is the gross markup and the (nominal) marginal cost of
rm i can be written as:
MCt(i) =
WtLt(i)
Yt(i)
(2.13)
After making use of the aggregate production function (equation (2.9))
and aggregating equation (2.13) across rms we arrive at the formula
of marginal cost in Table (2.1).
Also the optimality condition in equation (2.12) can alternatively
be expressed in recursive (and aggregate) form as the equations in
rows three, four and ve in Table (2.1) and in the next proposition.
Lemma 5 It can be shown that the optimality condition in equation
(2.12) can be rewritten as
~P
1+ (1+)(1 )
t 

Pt(i)
Pt
1+ (1+)(1 )
=
(1 + )
P1
T=0()
TKrealt;t+TMCrealt;t+T
1+

t;t+TYt+TP1
T=0()
TKrealt;t+T
1

t;t+TYt+T
(2.14)
where the (real) stochastic discount factor is
Krealt;t+T 

Ct+1
Ct
 ' 
Vt+1
(EtV
1 
t+1 )
1=(1 )
 
and the (real) marginal cost is
MCrealt;t+T 
Wt+T=Pt+T


Yt+T
K
 1 

A
  1
t+T :
Proof. One can decompose the nominal marginal cost of an individual
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rm in the following way:
MCt(i) =
Wt=Pt

Pt

Yt(i)
K
 1 

A
  1
t (2.15)
=

Pt(i)
Pt
  (1+)(1 ) Wt=Pt

Pt

Yt
K
 1 

A
  1
t
=

Pt(i)
Pt
  (1+)(1 )
PtMC
real
t
where the second line made use of the demand function in equation
(2.11).
The previous equation can be substituted for MCt(i) in equation
(2.12) to obtain:
Et
1X
T=0
()TKt;t+TPt(i)Yt+T (i)
= (1 + )Et
1X
T=0
()TKt;t+T

Pt(i)
Pt
Pt
Pt+T
  (1+)(1 )

MCrealt;t+TPt+TYt+T (i) (2.16)
where
Kt

Ct+1
Ct
 ' 
Vt+1
(EtV
1 
t+1 )
1=(1 )
 
1
t;t+T
= Krealt;t+T
1
t;t+T
: (2.17)
Then using the demand for an individual product (equation (2.11))
we can express equation (2.16) as:
Et
1X
T=0
()TKrealt;t+T
1
t;t+T
Pt(i)

Pt(i)
Pt;t+T
  1+
Yt+T
= (1 + )Et
1X
T=0
()TKrealt;t+T
1
t;t+T

Pt(i)
Pt
Pt
Pt+T
  (1+)(1 )

MCrealt;t+TPt+T

Pt(i)
Pt;t+T
  1+
Yt+T :
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Next we multiply both sides of the previous equation by Pt(i)
1+
 and
Pt
  1+ and derive:
Et
1X
T=0
()TKrealt;t+T
1
t;t+T
Pt(i)

Pt
Pt;t+T
  1+
Yt+T
= (1 + )Et
1X
T=0
()TKrealt;t+T

Pt(i)
Pt
Pt
Pt+T
  (1+)(1 )

MCrealt;t+T [
 1
t;t+TPt+T ]

Pt
Pt;t+T
  1+
Yt+T :
We can make use of the identity
[ 1t;t+TPt+T ] = [Pt]
to rewrite the previous expression as:
Et
1X
T=0
()TKrealt;t+T 1t;t+TPt(i) (t;t+T )
1+
 Yt+T
= (1 + )Et
1X
T=0
()TKrealt;t+T

Pt(i)
Pt
Pt
Pt+T
  (1+)(1 )

MCrealt;t+T [Pt]

Pt
Pt+T
  1+
Yt+T :
Regarding PtPt+T terms in the previous equation the following algebraic
manipulation can be carried out on the RHS:
Pt
Pt+T
  (1+)(1 )  Pt
Pt+T
  1+
=

Pt
Pt+T
 (1+)()


Pt
Pt+T
  (1+)  Pt
Pt+T
  1+
=

Pt
Pt+T
  (1+)
= 
(1+)

t;t+T
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and the ination term on the LHS can be written as:
 1t;t+T (t;t+T )
1+
 = 
  
t;t+T (t;t+T )
1+
 = 
1

t;t+T :
Using the previous result the optimality condition can be transformed
as:
Et
1X
T=0
()TKrealt;t+T
1

t;t+TYt+TPt(i)
= (1 + )Et
1X
T=0
()TKrealt;t+T

Pt(i)
Pt
  (1+)(1 )
MCrealt;t+T [Pt]
(1+)

t;t+TYt+T
which is the same as the expression in the Lemma.
The preceding lemma has shown that the optimality condition of
the rm in equation (2.12) can be rewritten as equation (2.14).
Proposition 6 Here we demonstrate that equation (2.14) can be ex-
pressed recursively as follows (so that we can input them into Dynare):
~P
1+ (1+)(1+)
t =
Znt
Zdt
where
Znt = (1 + )MC
real
t Yt + Krealt 
1+

t+1Znt+1 (2.18)
and
Zdt = Yt + Krealt 
1

t+1Zdt+1: (2.19)
Proof. The nominator of the fraction in equation (2.14) can be tagged
as Zn:
Znt  (1 + )Et
1X
T=0
()TKrealt;t+TMCrealt;t+T
1+

t;t+TYt+T
which can also be written as:
Znt = (1 + )MC
real
t Yt + (1 + )Et
1X
T=1
()TKt+TMCrealt+T
1+

t;t+TYt+T :
(2.20)
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After iterating the denition of Zn one period ahead we obtain:
Znt+1 = (1 + )Et+1
1X
T=0
()TKrealt+1+TMCrealt+1+T
1+

t+1;t+1+TYt+T+1
= (1 + )Et+1
1X
T=1
()T 1Krealt+TMCrealt+T
1+

t+1;t+TYt+T
= (1 + )Et+1
1X
T=1
()T 1Krealt+TMCrealt+T
1+

t;t+T
  1+
t+1 Yt+T(2.21)
where the last line made use of
t+1;t+T  Pt+T
Pt
Pt
Pt+1
= t;t+T
 1
t+1:
Finally let us multiply equation (2.21) by 
1+

t+1:

1+

t+1Znt+1 = (1 + )Et+1
1X
T=1
()TKrealt+TMCrealt+T
1+

t;t+TYt+T (2.22)
and recognise that the resulting expression is the the second term on
the RHS of equation (2.20).
Hence the combination of equations (2.20) and (2.22) give way to
equation (2.18) in the proposition. Similar derivation can be used to
obtain equation (2.19).
The average real marginal cost is dened as follows:
MCrealt =
Wt=Pt
MPLt
=
C't (1 Lt) 
1  it
MPLt
: (2.23)
where MPLt denotes the marginal product of labour and can be ob-
tained from equation (2.15). For the real wage the intratemporal con-
dition is substituted in from equation (2.6). Equation (2.23) can be
loglinearised as
cmct = 'c^t + L
(1  L)l^t + d
i
t  dmplt (2.24)
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where c^t  log(Ct= C), l^t  log(Lt=L), d it   it    i and dmplt 
log(MPLt=MPL). Variables with an upper bar mean steady-state.
Based on a rst-order Taylor-series approximation of equation (2.12)
and aggregate version of equation (2.13) one can derive the New Key-
nesian Phillips curve that establishes log-linear connection between
ination rate (^t) and the real marginal cost (cmct)2:
^t = ~Et^t+1 + cmct. (2.25)
where ^t  log(t=), cmct  log(MCrealt =MCreal).  and MCreal
stand for steady-state ination and real marginal cost, respectively.
The parameter  > 0 is an inverse function of ,  and " which is
the elasticity of substitution among intermediary goods. Variables
without a time index denote steady-states. ~ stands for the discount
factor that is corrected by the growth rate () of the productivity
trend (Zt) i.e.  '. The positive connection between income tax
rate and ination is described below by making use of the Phillips
curve in equation (2.25) where loglinear marginal cost is dened by
equation (2.24).
Intermediary products are bundled into a nal product through a
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. Bundlers are perfectly competitive rms.
2.2.3 Monetary policy
The New-Keynesian model is closed by a monetary policy rule (so
called Taylor rule):
Rt = Rt 1+(1 )[R+log t+g(log t log t )+gy(Yt Y t )=Y t ]+"it
(2.26)
where Rt is the policy rate, t is a four-quarter moving average of
ination and Y t is the trend level of output yZt (where y denotes the
steady-state level of Yt=Zt ). t is the target rate of ination, "
i
t is an
2Here we use the log-linear version of the Phillips curve for illustration purposes the model is
solved using the Phillips curve in its non-linear form.
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iid shock with mean zero and variance 2i . In the baseline version of
the Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) model without long-run ination
risks the ination target is constant (t = 
 for all t).
The four-quarter moving average of ination (t) can be approxi-
mated by a geometric moving average of ination:
log t =  log t + (1  ) log t, (2.27)
where the choice of  = 0:7 ensures that the geometric average in
equation (2.27) has an e¤ective duration of about four quarters.
In the long-run ination risk version of Rudebusch and Swanson
(2012) model they make the ination target stochastic:
t = 



t 1 + #(t   t ) + "

t , # > 0, "

t > 0, (2.28)
where "

t is an iid ination target shock with mean zero and variance
2. Note that equation (2.28) can also be described as a learning
process in the sense that the ination target (t ) is updated in pro-
portion to the deviation of the actual average ination from the target
one (t t ). The specication in equation (2.28) follows Gürkaynak
et al. (2005).
Note that in this paper we set # =  = "

t = 0 when considering
di¤erent sorts of scal scenarios.
2.2.4 Fiscal Policy
The government spending follows the process:
log(gt=g) = G log(gt 1=g) + "
G
t , 0 < G < 1,
where g is the steady-state level of gt  Gt=Zt, and "Gt is an iid shock
with mean zero and variance 2G.
Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) assume that government spending
is nanced through lump-sum taxes in each period i.e. government
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budget is balanced. Instead, we can allow for decit that is retired
through lump-sum taxes:
bt + tt =
 1rt 1bt 1
t
+ gt (2.29)
where bt, tt, ~Rt and t stand for the de-trended government debt,
lump-sum taxes, short-term nominal interest rate and ination, re-
spectively. All quantities are expressed as real except for the nominal
interest rate (rt). rt 1bt 1 are interest-payments on the previous period
debt. If one imposes the restriction of bt = bt 1 = 0 for all t expression
(2.29) boils down to the case of balanced budget (gt = tt for all t).
The tax rule in case of lump-sum taxes is given by:
tt =  
 1bt 1 (2.30)
where  2 (0; 2) ensures that scal policy is passive in the sense of
Leeper (1991). When  is set to be close to zero debt is paid back in
the very long-run. By contrast a coe¢ cient of  close to two roughly
mimics the case of balanced budget.
An alternative way to retire government debt is through income
tax revenue ( tyt):
bt + 
i
tyt =
 1rt 1bt 1
t
+ gt: (2.31)
where  it is the income tax rate. yt is the de-trended level of output
that equals to the sum of prot and labour income which are taxed at
the same rate.
The tax revenue rule for the latter case is given by:
 ityt =  
 1bt 1: (2.32)
To observe the role of steady-state debt we linearise equation (2.31)
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to the rst-order:
b^t + d
i
t + 
iy^t = 
 1(bdrt 1 + rb^t 1   br^t) + g^t (2.33)
where b^t  (bt   b)=y, d it   it    i, drt  ~Rt   ~R, y^t  (yt  
y)=y, g^t  (gt   g)=y and b is the government debt-to-GDP ratio.
Variables without a time index denote steady-state values. Note that
the deviations of debt and government spending from their respective
steady-states is dened relative to the steady-state output, which is
standard in the literature (see, e.g., Linnemann (2006)). When steady-
state debt is zero i.e. b = 0 real interest rate (drt 1   rt) does not
have a direct e¤ect on taxes (d it). More intuition is provided below.
Finally we note that goods and labour markets clear in equilib-
rium and the transversality condition regarding the bond-holdings is
satised.
The equations of the model are summarised in Table 2.1 and follows
close the Appendix of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012).
2.2.5 Pricing Real and Nominal Assets
Real bonds
We closely follow Ferman (2011) on the pricing of ination-protected
(or real) bonds.
Under no-arbitrage the Euler equation for real bonds can be written
as:
Br ;t = Et[Mt+1B
r
 1;t+1] (2.34)
where Br ;t is the price of a real bond of maturity  .
Therefore, bond prices with maturity ranging from  = 1 to  = 40
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Table 2.1: Summary of the model
Pricing kernel Krealt 

Ct+1
Ct
 ' 
Vt+1
(EtV
1 
t+1 )
1=(1 )
 
Intratemporal condition (1   it)Wt=P t= C't (1  Lt) 
Optimal-Aggregate price ratio ( ~Pt  P

t
Pt
) ~P
1+
(1+)(1+)

t =
Znt
Zdt
Denition of Zn Znt= (1 + )MC
real
t Yt+K
real
t 
1+

t+1Znt+1
Denition of Zd Zdt= Y t+Krealt 
1

t+1Zdt+1
Price index in case of Calvo pricing 
  1

t = (1  )( ~P tt) 
1
+
Denition of Real Marginal Cost MCrealt =
Wt=Pt

 
Yt
K
 1 
 A
  1

t
Production function Yt=  1t At K1 L

t
Price dispersion 
1

t = (1  ) ~P
 (1+)

t +
1+

t 
1

t 1
Aggregate accounting Yt= Ct+ K +Gt
Taylor rule see equation (2.26)
Denition of  in the Taylor rule see equation (2.27)
Euler equation to price bonds 1 = KtEt
Rt
1+t+1
Recursive utility (the second row of equation 2.1) Vt=
C1 't
1 ' +0Z
1 '
t
(1 Lt)1 
1  +V kt
The denition of V e V et=

Vt+1
V
1 
The denition of V k V kt= V V e
1
1 
t
Government Budget Constraint see equation (2.29) or (2.31)
Fiscal Policy Rule see equation (2.30) or (2.32)
are constructed recursively using a chain of 40 Euler equations:
Br1;t = Et[Mt+1]
Br2;t = Et[Mt+1B
r
1;t+1]
Br3;t = Et[Mt+1B
r
2;t+1]
...
Br40;t = Et[Mt+1B
r
39;t+1]
where we assumed that Br0;t+1 = 1. In order to convert bond prices
into yields let us take the log of equation (2.34), denote the  -period
yield-to-maturity as Rr ;t = log(1 +R
r;net
t )   1 logBr ;t and we arrive
at:
Rr ;t = Etmt+1 +R
r
 1;t
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which can be written after a second-order Taylor approximation and
forward iteration as:
Rr ;t =  
1

P
j=1
Et[mt+j]  1
2
V art[
P
j=1
mt+j] +O(
3)
where mt+1  log(Mt+1) and O(3) denotes terms of order three or
higher.
Ferman (2011) shows that the Real Term Premium (RTP) can be
expressed as:
RTP  R ;t   1

P
j=1
Et[R
r
 ;t+j 1]
'  1

 1P
j=1
P
k=j+1
Covt(mt+j;mt+k)
  1
2
P
j=1
V art[Et+j 1[mt+j]] (2.35)
where the rst line indicates that real term premium is measured as the
di¤erence between the long-term real yield (R ;t) and the one implied
by the Expectations Hypothesis of the term structure (1
P 1
j=0 Et[R
r
t+j]).
R ;t can be interpreted as the risk-adjusted average of future short-
term interest rates while 1
P 1
j=0 Et[R
r
t+j] is simply the average of fu-
ture short-term interest rates (see more intuition below). This di¤er-
ence is able to capture changes in risk-premiums when approximated
to the third-order. In practice, yields consistent with Expectations
Hypothesis are computed in a recursive fashion similar to the way we
calculated risk-adjusted bond prices above i.e. a set of 40 equations
(assuming that the highest maturity is 40 quarters).
Based on the second line in equation (2.35) RTP depends mainly
on the autocovariance structure of the real stochastic discount factor
(mt). The second term which is a convexity term is quantitatively
negligible.
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Nominal bonds
Under no-arbitrage the Euler equation for real bonds can be written
as:
B ;t = Et[Mt+1B 1;t+1]
where B ;t is the price of a nominal bond of maturity  . Let us denote
the  -period yield-to-maturity as R ;t  log(1 + Rnett ) =  1 logB ;t
. Nominal bond prices and yields can be computed in a recursive
fashion similar to real bond prices and yields in previous section but
this time the nominal stochastic discount factor has to be used in order
to to build risk-adjusted nominal bond prices and yields. Also nominal
yields consistent with the Expectations Hypothesis are simply a set
of recursive equations ranging all maturities and are regarded as the
forward iteration of the short-term nominal interest rate.
Ferman (2011) decomposes nominal term premium in the following
way:
NTP ;t ' RTP ;t +
Convexity;t + 
1
 covt[m^t;t+ ; ^t;t+ ]
 1
P 1
j=0 Et fcovt+j[m^t+j;t+j+1; ^t+j;t+j+1]g
!
(2.36)
where a variable with a hat means percentage deviation from steady-
state. The rst term is the  -period real term premium (RTP) which
is dened as RTP ;t  R ;t   1
P 1
j=0 Et[Rt+j] where R ;t is the yield-
to-maturity on a  -period real bond (or ination-indexed bond/TIPS)
and Rt is the real short-rate. As the previous section has shown RTP
can also be described by the autocorrelation structure of the real sto-
chastic discount factor (SDF). The second component of NTP ;t is an
ination convexity term that is of small size and, thus, is of minor
importance.
The third-term in the parenthesis is the compensation for ination
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risk and has two parts. The rst part shows that covariance of ination
from period t until maturity with the SDF. The latter term is positive
when nominal bonds loose real value in times of low consumption
growth i.e. the SDF is high (recession). The second part measures the
one-period-ahead ination co-variability risk that is relatively low in
such short horizon and, therefore, less important.
The rst part of the ination risk-premium in equation (2.36) can
be further rewritten using the denition of correlation as:
1

covt[m^t;t+ ; ^t;t+ ] =
1

corrt[m^t;t+ ; ^t;t+ ]stdt(m^t;t+)stdt(^t;t+):
Thus, the covariance between ination and the SDF is governed by
three elements: the correlation between ination and the SDF, the
standard deviation of the SDF (real uncertainty) and the standard
deviation of ination (nominal uncertainty). Again, the higher is the
correlation between ination and the stochastic discount factor (or
alternatively the more negative is the correlation between ination
and consumption growth) the higher are ination risks. Also when
either real or nominal uncertainty is higher ination risks are higher.
2.3 Calibration and solution method
Calibration can be found in Table (2.2) that follow the baseline pa-
rameter values of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012). The coe¢ cient in
case of the lump-sum tax rule ( ) is set to 0.01 which is the choice
of Corsetti et al. (2012). Unlike Linnemann (2006) who linearises his
model to the rst-order we make use of the tax-rule in its non-linear
form so that  is needed to pin down the steady-state tax rate which
is given by  = ((1=)(b=y)(1=) + g=y)=(1 + = ). The quarterly
steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio (b=4y) of sixty per cent is based on
Rossi (2012). As a baseline we set  = 0:12 so that the steady-state
tax rate is 0:2767 which is slightly higher than that of Linnemann
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(2006)3. The whole model is approximated to the third order using
Dynare (Adjemian et al. 2011) in Matlab when calculating all the
moments in table (2.3) and (2.4). To speed up calculations for gure
(2.6) we used second-order approximation as unconditional means
unlike standard deviations are quite similar in magnitude for second-
and third-order approximations. Yearly data on US Treasury yields
with maturities ranging from one- to thirty-year for 1961-2014 are
taken from Gürkaynak et al. (2007). Data on ination-indexed bonds
(or Treasury Ination Protected Securities, TIPS) is available from
Gürkaynak et al. (2008) for period 1999-2014. The US TIPS market
opened in 1997 only.
Table 2.2: Calibration
 1.0025 ' 2 i 0.73 A .95
~ 0.99  3 g 0.53 G .95
 0.02 CRRA 75 gy 0.93 2A 0.005
2
l 1/3  2/3  1 2G 0.004
2
K=Y 10  0.2  0.99 
2
i 0.003
2
G=Y 0.17  0.75 2 .0005
2 b 2.4
" 6 # 0.01  0.12
where G=Y is the government spending-GDP ratio, K=Y is the share of xed capital
in GDP,  is the depreciation rate of xed capital. The rest of the parameters are
explained above.
2.4 Results
The mean and standard deviation of the empirical US nominal and
real yield curves for various maturities and time intervals are plotted
on Figure (2.1). Time periods 1961-2014 and 1985-2007 are associated
with the highest levels of the average nominal yield curve. Although
it is also apparent that the data ranging from 1961 to 2014 includ-
ing several crises is associated with higher standard deviations than
the one based on the period of Great Moderation (1985-2007). The
3The choice of  = 0:02 used by Corsetti et al. (2012) in case of the model with lump-sum
taxes implies a steady-state tax rate of less than 1 percent that is empirically implausible.
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Figure 2.1: Empirical yield curves based on US data.
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di¤erence between the average nominal and real yield curve is called
break-even ination rate which contains investorsexpectation of fu-
ture ination and also ination risks4 (Hördahl, 2008). Based on the
previous graph, break-even ination rate is lowest for the period 2003-
2014. The means and standard deviations of the yield curves implied
by the model are depicted on Figure (2.2) and (2.3), respectively. Sim-
ilar to the data, average nominal and real yield curves from the model
are upward-sloping and standard deviations exhibit a negative slope.
Other features of the model graphs are discussed below.
Binsbergen et al. (2012) and Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) show
that a DSGE model successfully replicates several properties of the
4However, DAmico et al. (2010) recently argued that a correct estimate ination expectations
(and risks) based on TIPS yields should correct for the liquidty premium content of TIPS. Since
start liquidy on the US TIPS market was quite low compared to the vast turnorver of nominal
Treasuries.
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term-structure when consumption growth and ination are negatively
correlated contemporaneously and forecast each other with a negative
sign. The Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) model features temporary
productivity shocks in order to generate the previous patterns. In par-
ticular, a temporary negative shock to productivity leads to a fall in
consumption and an increase in ination due to the rise in marginal
cost. As a result, nominal bonds carry positive term premia as de-
pressed consumption is associated with a time of low real bond yields
due to higher ination. The negative relationship between consump-
tion and ination in case of a positive productivity shock is illustrated
on Figure (2.4).
The negative correlation between consumption growth and ination
is prerequisite for a positive nominal term premium and, therefore, it
is of major interest whether there is empirical evidence in support of
it. In a comment to Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) Benigno (2006)
investigated whether this negative correlation can be recovered from
US data. In particular, he found that for the whole sample (1952-2004)
and for the subsample of 1952-1984 the correlation between ination
and consumption growth is signicant at the one percent signicance
level and is equal to -0.35 and -0.44, respectively. However, for the
subsamples of 1984-2004, 1987-2004 and 1995-2004 the correlation is
less negative and not signicant.
Ferman (2011) who argues that nominal term premium mainly
captures ination risks through the negative correlation between con-
sumption growth and ination if real term premium which is can be
described by the autocorrelation of the real stochastic discount factor
is close to zero. de Paoli et al. (2010) investigate into the determi-
nants of nominal term premium using a second-order approximation
and nd that it is the covariance between consumption growth and in-
ation that matters if real term-premium is low. Further, Andreasen
(2012) proves that ination risk-premium can be well approximated by
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Figure 2.2: Average nominal and real yield curves from the model
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the di¤erence between nominal term premium and real term premium
in case of a third-order approximation. Our graphs are based on a
third-order approximation of the model and, thus, the area between
nominal term premium and real term premium for each maturity is
an indicator of positive ination risks which are even higher for in-
come taxation. In chapter 3 we illuminate the role of the size of the
coe¢ cient on the output gap in driving ination risks.
Figure (2.2) and (2.3) show that income taxation is associated with
higher nominal term premium and also higher standard deviation of
the nominal yield curve for all maturities. Our scal extension with
income taxation has the implication similar to that of productivity
shocks. The inverse connection between consumption and ination
in case of positive government spending shock is depicted on Figure
(2.5). To shed light on the mechanism let us study what happens after
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Figure 2.3: Standard deviations of the yield curves from the model
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a positive innovation to government spending that needs to be nanced
sooner ( is close to two) or later ( is close to zero) with income taxes.
Higher taxes on income imply less hours worked and lower output
because households substitute away from labour to leisure. Also higher
income taxes means higher real marginal cost (see equation (2.24))
and higher ination through the New Keynesian Phillips curve (see
equation (2.25)). The e¤ect of the previous channel is magnied by
positive steady-state debt (see b > 0 in equation (2.33)) establishing
direct connection between taxes and real interest rate which surely
rises after a stimulative shock according to the logic of the Taylor
rule to curb ination expectations (Linnemann, 2006). It would be
of interest to test the signicance of the size of the steady-state debt-
to-GDP ratio. However, it is impractical to carry out an experiment
with zero steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio because this would result in
a steady-state tax rate that is extremely low (around 1.8 percent).
Figure (2.6) shows that there is positive linear relationship between
the risk-aversion coe¢ cient and mean of the nominal term premium.
The straight line reproduces the baseline model of Rudebusch and
Swanson (2012) without debt and long-run risks. The introduction of
debt into the baseline model with lump-sum taxes raises the term-
premium (see dashed line). The baseline model with long-run risks
is depicted with dots. The model with debt and income taxes are
demonstrated for two di¤erent values of the coe¢ cient in the policy
rule,  (see the circles and diamonds). One can see that the ex-
tension of the Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) model with debt and
distortionary taxes generates a term-premium close to the one ob-
tained with long-run risks for both values of  . When taxation is
distortionary the curve is steeper than with lump-sum taxes implying
higher ination/real risks in case of income taxation.
Table (2.3) summarises means and standard deviations of selected
macro and nance variables using the baseline calibration of Rude-
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Figure 2.4: Impulse responses of selected variables to a positive technology shock.
All of them are expressed in percentage deviation from steady-state. Interest rates,
yields and ination are annualised.
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Figure 2.5: Impulse responses of selected variables to a positive government spending
shock. All of them are expressed in percentage deviation from steady-state. Interest
rates, yields and ination are annualised.
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Figure 2.6: The relationship between the coe¢ cient of relative risk-aversion (CRRA)
and the mean of the nominal term premium using di¤erent versions of the Rudebusch
and Swanson (2012) (=RS) model.
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busch and Swanson (2012). Nominal term premium on a long-term
bond, say a 10 year-bond, is computed as the return on the risky 10-
year bond minus the return on a bond that is rolled over 10 years. The
yield on the latter strategy is often called as risk-neutral yield which
is consistent with the expectations hypothesis of the term structure.
The nominal term premium cannot be observed empirically. There-
fore, we also calculate alternative measures of the term premium like
the mean and standard deviation of slope of the term structure and
excess holding period returns that are observable.
The slope of the term structure is the di¤erence between the yield
on a long-term bond (say a 40-quarter bond) and the short-term bond
(R(40) R). The excess holding period return (x(40)) is dened e.g. for
a 40-quarter bond as: p(39)t =p
(40)
t 1 Rt 1where the rst term is the gross
return to holding the 40-quarter bond for one period (p is the price of
the bond) and the second term is the gross one-period risk-free rate.
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RS (2012 pp. 119) consider the slope and the excess holding period
return as "imperfect measures of the riskiness of the long-term bond
because they can vary in response to shocks even if all investors in the
model are risk-neutral."
Note that the mean value of the nominal term premium is very sim-
ilar across the four versions of the baseline model. Regarding the stan-
dard deviations of nance variables it is the model with ination risks
that ts the data best. With the introduction of lump-sum taxes and
endogenous debt (column three) we improve upon the performance
of the baseline model. The macro and nance moments derived us-
ing the model with long-run ination risks (column four) and the one
with scal extension (column ve) are roughly similar. The moments
reported in column one (called RS) are directly comparable with those
in Rudebusch and Swanson (2012).
We note that the standard deviations of macro and nance mo-
ments in column one (called RS) are slightly lower than those of Rude-
busch and Swanson (2012, pp. 124, column 3 of table 2) for at least
two reasons. First, they calculate theoretical moments while we ob-
tain simulated moments. Second, they use a numerical precision of 90
digits available in software Mathematica while we have only sixteen
digits available in Matlab.
Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) decrease their baseline values of
IES and Frisch elasticity and increase the CRRA parameter in or-
der to match US data5. A lower IES means that households dislike
changes in consumption over time more than with a higher IES. A
lower Frisch elasticity implies that households are less able to use their
labour supply to o¤set negative shocks to consumption. As a conse-
5To be precise, Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) change not only the IES and Frisch parameters
when they consider their best-t experiments but also properties of the stochastic processes and
duration of the price rigidity. Instead, here, we focus only on changes in the IES, Frisch and
CRRA parameters whose e¤ects are well documented in the literature (see, e.g., van Binsbergen
et al. (2012)). de Paoli et al. (2006) describes how a shorter duration of price rigidity raises the
term-premium. However, we do not intend to deviate from the price-stickiness of a duration of 4
quarters on average (this is the baseline calibration).
CHAPTER 2. FISCAL POLICY AND THE NOMINAL TERM PREMIUM 99
quence consumption stream is more volatile for relatively low values
of IES and Frisch elasticity. Also a higher risk-aversion coe¢ cient rep-
resents that households are more concerned about changes in future
consumption ow and, therefore, require higher compensation in or-
der to hold risky bonds whose real return co-moves positively with the
consumption stream.
In Table (2.4) we lower the IES from 0.5 to 0.09 and the Frisch
elasticity from 2/3 to 0.28 leaving other parameters at the level of the
baseline calibration. The risk-aversion coe¢ cient of 106 is chosen so
that the model with scal policy can match a nominal term premium
of 1.06 inferred from US data. Indeed after a reduction in the values
of IES and Frisch elasticity the macro and nance variables exhibit
higher standard deviations. Still some of the simulated moments like
the standard deviation of the excess holding period return and the
slope for a 10-year bond (denoted by SD(x(40)) and SD(R(40)   R)
respectively) are below the corresponding US data.
Also importantly, the model with scal policy produces a mean of
the nominal term premium (1.06) that is higher than the one with
ination risks (0.72). The version of the model with ination risks
is able to generate the empirical mean of the term premium (1.06)
only if the risk-aversion coe¢ cient is 155. Thus, it follows that a
particular level of the average nominal term premium can be achieved
with lower CRRA using the scal extension compared to the ination
risk alternative. However, it is also true that the ination risk model
performs better in terms of matching standard deviations of US data.
A shortcoming of the model with either long-run ination risks or
with scal policy is that the simulated standard deviation of real wage
(2.77 and 2.35 for each version respectively) is in excess of US data
(0.82). One might suggest to remedy this problem by introducing
wage-rigidity. However, it is well-known since at least Rudebusch and
Swanson (2008) that wage-stickiness reduces the standard deviation
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of real wage at the cost of a high standard deviation of labour well
above the corresponding US statistic.
2.5 Conclusion
Fiscal policy can be an important source of long-run nominal risks
in the sense that nominal term premium on government bonds rises
substantially when spending is nanced through income taxes relative
to lump-sum taxes. Also employing the model with income taxes we
can match the empirical level of the nominal term premium with lower
risk-aversion coe¢ cient than the one needed in case of the model with
long-run ination risks. In a companion paper we augment the above
model with physical capital as in de Paoli et al. (2006) and nd our
main message to be robust.
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Table 2.3: Moments from variants of the Rudebusch and Swanson (=RS) (2012)
model compared to US data
Unconditional US data, RS A B* C
Moment 1961-2007
SD(C) 0.83 1.42 1.46 1.35 1.49
SD(L) 1.71 1.5 1.54 1.44 1.46
SD(W) 0.82 1.32 1.32 1.35 1.21
SD() 2.52 1.64 1.64 2.11 1.86
SD(R) 2.71 1.6 1.61 2.01 1.76
SD(Rreal) 2.30 0.93 0.93 0.98 0.98
SD (R(40)) 2.41 0.85 0.85 1.33 0.95
Mean(NTP (40)) 1.06 0.39 0.4 0.42 0.44
SD(NTP (40)) 0.54 0.04 0.04 0.1 0.05
Mean(R(40)  R) 1.43 0.43 0.45 0.48 0.49
SD(R(40)  R) 1.33 0.9 0.89 0.87 0.96
Mean(x(40)) 1.76 0.69 0.72 0.81 0.79
SD(x(40)) 23.43 7.81 7.98 10.14 8.88
where SD=unconditional standard deviation, NTP (40)=nominal term premium on
a 40-quarter bond, Mean=Unconditional Mean, R(40)   R is the slope and x(40) is
the excess holding period return for a 40-quarter bond. Each version of the models
listed above utilises the baseline calibration of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) that
does not t macro and nance moments of US data (neither here nor in their paper).
RS=reproduction of the results of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) without entry
(Note that their results are very close to ours.)
A: RS with debt and lump-sum taxes.
B*: RS with debt and long-run ination risks.
C: RS with debt and income taxation.
*Note that the results in this column are obtained using the baseline calibration of
RS while they provide results using their best-t calibration (see column 3 of table 3
on pp. 136 in Rudebusch and Swanson (2012)). In this paper we deem it important
to compare the performance of the long-run ination risk version with other versions
making use of the baseline calibration of RS.
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Table 2.4: Moments from variants of the Rudebusch and Swanson (=RS) (2012)
model compared to US data
Unconditional US data, RS with RS with debt
Moment 1961-2007 long-run risks and income taxes
SD(C) 0.83 0.44 0.65
SD(L) 1.71 1.41 1.83
SD(W) 0.82 2.77 2.35
SD() 2.52 2.57 2.20
SD(R) 2.71 2.24 2.42
SD(Rreal) 2.30 1.55 1.42
SD (R(40)) 2.41 1.92 1.51
Mean(NTP (40)) 1.06 0.72 1.06
SD(NTP (40)) 0.54 0.57 0.25
Mean(R(40)  R) 1.43 0.79 0.68
SD(R(40)  R) 1.33 1.13 1.25
Mean(x(40)) 1.76 1.41 2.01
SD(x(40)) 23.43 16.18 14.58
where SD=unconditional standard deviation, NTP (40)=nominal term premium on
a 40-quarter bond, Mean=Unconditional Mean, R(40)   R is the slope and x(40) is
the excess holding period return for a 40-quarter bond.
In this table we used a risk-aversion coe¢ cient (CRRA) of 106, a Frisch elasticity
((1  L)=L) of 0:28 and an IES coe¢ cient (1=') of 0:09. The rest of the parameters
follow the baseline calibration of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012).
Chapter 3
Explanining Bond and Equity
Premium Puzzles with Epstein-Zin
Preferences in a New Keynesian
Model of Costly Firm Entry
with Ales Marsal
3.1 Introduction
Rudebusch and Swanson (2012; RS henceforth) produce high and
volatile nominal bond term premium using a basic New Keynesian
model with Epstein-Zin (1989) preferences. RS point toward further
investigation of the model including other types of assets like equi-
ties. The empirical literature estimates the mean value of the equity
premium to be around 6 per cent and a volatility of equity returns
of around 15 per cent based on post-war US data (see the literature
review in Donaldson and Mehra (2008)). Kim and Wright (2005) use
an arbitrage-free three-factor model and report estimates of the mean
and standard deviation of a 10-year bond term-premium of around one
and 0.54 per cent, respectively. We contribute to the macro-nance
literature by showing that the RS model extended with costly rm
entry is able to generate a high mean value of bond and equity risk-
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premia without compromising the models t to macro data. Using
US data Clarida et al. (1998) estimate the Taylor-rule coe¢ cient on
the output gap to be 0.07 for the period 1979-1994 while Clarida et
al. (2000) obtained an output gap coe¢ cient estimate of 0.93 (both in
quarterly terms) for 1984-1996 which is a subperiod of the Great Mod-
eration (from mid1980s until the onset of the recent nancial crises).
We refer to the previous as low and the latter one as high estimate
on the output gap. RS utilised the high output gap estimate in their
simulations.
Standard New Keynesian models like the RS model without entry
imply a trade-o¤ between stabilising the standard deviation of ina-
tion and the output gap, that is, a lower volatility of ination can
be achieved at the cost of higher standard deviation of the output
gap (see also Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003)). Further,
this trade-o¤ means that the larger is the coe¢ cient on the output
gap the higher is the relative weight a central bank places on stabil-
ising uctuations in the output gap and, therefore, the lower is the
unconditional standard deviation of the output gap and the higher is
the unconditional standard deviation of ination. The case of a high
coe¢ cient on the output gap in the standard New Keynesian model
is associated with low standard deviation of the output gap and a
relatively high standard deviation of ination (nominal uncertainty)
and high ination risks. However, the RS model with entry implies
the existence of this trade-o¤ for output gap coe¢ cients lower than
0.5. For values of the output gap coe¢ cient higher than 0.5 it is no
longer possible to engineer a decrease in the volatility of the output
gap at the cost of higher volatility of ination i.e. they move together.
It follows that the RS with entry and with a high coe¢ cient on the
output gap generates real risks instead of ination risks which is the
implication of the RS model without entry.
As a second contribution we show that the RS model with entry
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produces ination risks when the coe¢ cient on output gap in the Tay-
lor rule is small unlike RS where only a high coe¢ cient on the output
gap guarantees the existence of ination risk premia. Our third con-
tribution is that the RS model with entry imply substantial increase in
consumption risks in case of distortionary income taxation relative to
lump-sum taxation even for risk-aversion coe¢ cients below one hun-
dred and, from this aspect, improves upon Kaszab and Marsal (2013)
[chapter 2] who highlight the possibility of scal policy with distor-
tionary income taxation in raising ination risks when households are
su¢ ciently risk-averse.
We introduce rm entry into the RS model along the lines of Bil-
biie et al. (2007, 2012) where the mass of rms entering the industry
in each period are subject to a time-varying sunk entry cost and a
time-to-build lag in production. The RS model features Epstein-Zin
preferences which are widely employed to increase risk-aversion of the
consumer without decreasing intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio (2003) estimated risk-aversion to be
around 5-10 for stockholders using US data over 1982-1996. This pa-
per, however, maintains a high value of risk-aversion similar to RS to
obtain a reasonable amount of nominal term premium on long-term
default-free bonds. As a fourth contribution, we demonstrate that the
entry model makes some progress by matching the estimated mean
of the equity premium with a risk-aversion (75) smaller than that of
RS (110). RS cite a number of papers in order to support the high
risk-aversion coe¢ cient. One of them is based on Barillas et al. (2009)
who show that a model with Epstein-Zin preferences and high risk-
aversion is "isomorphic to a model in which households have low risk
aversion but a moderate degree of uncertainty about the economic
environment." (RS pp. 123). Another interpretation can be derived
from Malloy et al. (2009) who nd that consumption of stockholders
has higher standard deviation than consumption of nonstockholders.
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Therefore, risk-aversion should be higher in a representative agent
model like the RS model with/without entry than in a model which
can distinguish between agents with di¤erent consumption smooth-
ing behaviour. To put it di¤erently, the DSGE models we use might
understate the quantity of risks faced by households so that a higher
risk-aversion is needed to match risk premiums in the data.
Firm entry has been incorporated into basic RBC model in order
to reproduce the countercylical markup and procyclical prot found
in the data (see, e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)). In fact, it is
the strong procyclicality of the prot that justies the high-premium
on equities which bring low return in bad times i.e. when output (and
consumption) is also low. RS is able to match a high nominal term
premium on long-maturity bonds. Besides the high-equity premium
the extension of the RS with entry in this paper exhibits a reasonable
bond-premium as well because the negative covariance between con-
sumption and ination a pre-requisite for the existence of a positive
bond term premium is also maintained. Investors expect long-term
government bonds to pay an excess return (a term premium) in order
to be compensated for consumption/ination risks over the duration
of the bond. Thus, a bond is considered to be risky when low con-
sumption is coupled with high ination that erodes the real payo¤ of
the bond.
The representative consumer of Bilbiie et al. (2012) model has love
for variety i.e. a new (monopolistically competitive) rm is associated
with a new product. Also, consumers benet from the appearance of
new varieties through a reduction in the aggregate price index. Indeed,
there is empirical evidence on the contribution of product creation
and destruction to aggregate output. In a pioneering work Bernard
et al. (2010) studied US manufacturing rms and showed that the
value of new products account for 33.6% of the overall output over a
business cycle horizon (5 years) while product destruction explaining
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-30% loss in the value of output (both at existing rms). Hence the
overall contribution of the extensive margin (product creation and
destruction) is quite substantial.
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section describes the
model. The third section explains why we need to employ translog
preferences in the model. Then the parametrisation of the model is
presented. Results follow with particular attention given to di¤erent
specications of the entry cost and nally we conclude.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Firm entry and prot maximisation
Our short description of the production sector borrows heavily from
Bilbiie et al. (2007) who feature a two-sector RBC model with price
rigidity. Labour is the only factor of production. In one sector labour
is used to produce consumption goods. The other sector requires
labour e¤ort to set up new rms. We start with the description of
the latter one.
There is a mass of rms. Firm ! employs labour (lt(!)) in order
to produce output (yt(!)) using a constant-return-to-scale technology:
yt(!) = Ztlt(!) where Zt is a stationary productivity shock:
logZt = Z logZt 1 + "
Z
t ,
where "Zt is an independently and identically distributed (iid) stochas-
tic technology disturbance with mean zero and variance 2Z . The unit
cost of production in units of consumption good Ct is wt=Zt where
wt  Wt=Pt is the real wage. There is also a mass of prospective
entrants. Firms pay an entry cost of fE e¤ective labour units, equal
to wtfE=Zt. Each period rms correctly anticipate their future prots
and the probability  of the exit-inducing shock. The model features
a time-to-build lag in the sense that rms entering at time t start to
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produce one period later. Therefore, the number of rms producing
at period t, Nt, is described by:
Nt = (1  )(Nt 1 +NE;t 1) (3.1)
where NE stands for new entrants and both new entrants and incum-
bents survive with probability 1  .
The real prots of rm ! at time t (transferred back to households
in the form of dividends, dt(!)) can be expressed as:
dt(!) = t(!)y
D
t (!)  wtlt(!)  pact(!)t(!)yDt (!)
where t(!)  pt(!)=Pt is the real price of rm !, yDt (!) is the de-
mand schedule coming from the cost-minimisation problem (yDt (!) =
(pt(!)=Pt)
 [Ct+Gt+PACt]). Lower-case letters denote rm-specic
variables while upper-case ones stand for the aggregate.
Adjusting prices is costly. Hence, nominal rigidity is introduced
in the form of price adjustment costs that can be described with a
quadratic function as in Rotemberg (1982):
PACt(!) =
P
2

pt(!)
pt 1(!)
  1
2
where P measures how strong price adjustment costs are.
The real value of rm ! in units of consumption at time t, denoted
as vfirmt (!) can be expressed as the sum of present and discounted
future dividends:
vfirmt (!) = Et
1X
j=0
t+jdt+j(!)
where t is the marginal utility of consumption used to discount future
prots. Firms face a death shock occuring with probability  2 (0; 1)
in each period.
Thus, at time t, rm ! chooses pt(!) to maximise dt(!) subject to
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yt(!) = y
D
t (!) taking wt, Pt, Ct, PACt, and Zt as given. Equivalently,
rm ! maximises the present and future discounted value of its prots:
max
pt(!)
Et
1X
j=0
[(1  )]jt+j
24 t+j(!)yDt+j(!)  wtlt+j(!)
 P2

Pt+j(!)
Pt 1+j(!)
  1
2
t+j(!)yt+j
35
where t is the marginal utility of consumption, t+j(!)y
D
t+j(!) is the
revenue, wtlt+j(!) is the cost of labour and the last term appears
because of Rotemberg price adjustment costs.
Next we make use of the demand curve for the product of an in-
dividual rm ! (yDt+j(!) =

pt+j(!)
Pt+j
 "
yt+j), the production function
(yDt (!) = Ztlt+j(!)) and the price ratio t+j(!) =
pt+j(!)
Pt+j
:
Et
1X
j=0
jt+j
264

pt+j(!)
Pt+j
1 "
yt+j    t+j

pt+j(!)
Pt+j
 "
yt+j
 P2

pt+j(!)
pt 1+j(!)
  1
2
pt+j(!)
Pt+j
yt+j
375
where  t = wt=Zt is the economy-wide real marginal cost. Note that
this is true for the marginal cost as long as we have a one-to-one
production function as in this chapter (and similarly in chapter 1).
The rst-order condition with respect to the price of an individual
rm (pt(!)) can be written as:
0 = (1  ")t

pt(!)
Pt
 "
yt
Pt
+ t" t

pt(!)
Pt
 " 1
yt
Pt
 tP

pt(!)
pt 1(!)
  1

pt(!)
Pt
1 "
yt
1
pt 1(!)
 tP
2

pt(!)
pt 1(!)
  1
2
(1  ")

pt(!)
Pt
 "
yt
1
Pt
 Et

t+1P

pt+1(!)
pt(!)
  1

pt+j(!)
Pt+j
yt+1

 pt+1(!)
p2t (!)

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After multiplying out each term with pt and dividing by t we obtain:
0 = (1  ")

pt(!)
pt
 "
yt + " t

pt(!)
Pt
 " 1
yt
 P

pt(!)
pt 1(!)
  1

pt(!)
Pt
1 "
yt
Pt
pt 1(!)
 P
2

pt(!)
pt 1(!)
  1
2
(1  ")

pt(!)
Pt
 "
yt
 Et

t+1
t
P

pt+1(!)
pt(!)
  1

pt+1(!)
Pt+1
yDt+1
yDt

 pt+1(!)
p2t (!)

Pt

;
which can be further simplied after dividing each term by

Pt(!)
Pt
 "
yt =
yDt (!) and imposing symmetric equilibrium such that the producer-
price ination (PPI) is pt(!)pt 1(!) =
Pt
Pt 1
 1+ t and yDt (!) = yDt for any
rm !:
0 = (1  ") + " t
1
t
 P (t) (1 + t)
 P
2
(t)
2 (1  ")
+Et

t+1
t
P (t+1)
yDt+1
yDt
(1 + t+1)
t+1
t

:
The previous one can alternatively be written as:
" t
1
t
= ("  1)

1  P
2
(t)
2

+ P (t) (1 + t)
 Et

t+1
t
P (t+1)
yDt+1
yDt
(1 + t+1)
t+1
t

and we obtain the same formula as in Bilbiie et al. (2007) (it is
equation 2 there):
t = t t = t
wt
Zt
(3.2)
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where
t 
"
("  1)

1  P2 (t)2

+ P (t) (1 + t)  Et
n
t+1
t
t+1
o
with t+1  P (t+1)
yDt+1
yDt
(1 + t+1)
t+1
t
(3.3)
which is the denition of the time-varying price markup. Intuitively,
equation (3.2) can be interpreted as follows: the rm sets the relative
price of its product (t) as a markup (t) above the marginal cost
(wt=Zt). The markup is time-varying because of the presence of the
Rotemberg price-setting frictions.
Next we can also make use of the aggregate production function
Y Ct = tNty
D
t = tNtZtlt
to substitute for yDt in equation (3.3):
t 
"
("  1)

1  P2 (t)2

+ P (t) (1 + t)  Et fKt;t+1t+1g
t+1  P (t+1)
Y Ct+1
t+1Nt+1
Y Ct
tNt
(1 + t+1)
t+1
t
where we applied the notation of Table (3.1) for the ratio of marginal
utilities (Kt;t+1  t+1t ).
3.2.2 The households problem
The representative household maximises the continuation value of its
utility (V ):
Vt =
(
U(Ct; Lt) + 

EtV
1 
t+1
 1
1  if U(Ct; Lt)  0
U(Ct; Lt)  

Et( Vt+1)1 
 1
1  if U(Ct; Lt) < 0
(3.4)
with respect to its ow budget constraint.  2 (0; 1) is the subjective
discount factor. Utility (U) at period t is derived from consumption
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(Ct) and leisure (1 Lt). As the time frame is normalised to one leisure
time (1 Lt) is what we are left with after spending some time working
(Lt). The recursive functional form in equation (3.4) is called Epstein-
Zin preferences and is the same as the one used by Rudebusch and
Swanson (2012). The period utility U which is additively separable in
consumption and labour is given by1:
U(Ct; Lt) =
C1 t
1     0
L1+'t
1 + '
(3.5)
where  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(IES), ' is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply to wages
and 0 > 0. Note that in this paper we consider an IES<1 so that
U < 0 and, thus, the second line of equation (3.4) is employed.
Swanson (2012) shows that the connection between coe¢ cient of
relative risk-aversion (CRRA) and parameter  of the recursive utility
in equation (3.4) is2:
CRRA ' 
1 + '
+
(1  )
1 +  11+'
:
Households possess two types of assets: shares in a mutual fund of
rms and government bonds. Let xt denote the share in the mu-
tual fund of rms entering period t. In each period the mutual fund
pays the representative household a total prot (in units of currency)
of all rms that produce in that period, PtNtdt. In period t the
representative household purchases xt+1 shares in a mutual fund of
NH;t  Nt +NE;t rms where the rst term refer to rms already op-
erating at time t while the second term stands for the new entrants.
Only Nt+1 = (1  )NH;t rms will produce and pay dividends at time
t + 1. As the household does not know the share of rms induced
to leave the market due to the exogenous exit shock  at the end of
1Note that this felicity function is slightly di¤erent from the one of RS mainly because we
abstract from deterministic growth in line with Bilbiie et al. (2007, 2012).
2Note that this formula applies only when the utility function in equation (3.5) is used.
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period t, it nances the continuing operation of all preexisting rms
and all new entrants during period t. The nominal price of a claim
to the future prot stream of the mutual fund of NH;t rms at time t
equals to V firmt  Ptvfirmt .
At time t the representative household holds nominal bonds and a
share xt in the mutual fund. It receives labour income (WtLt) interest
income it 1 on nominal bonds and dividend income (in nominal terms)
on mutual fund share holdings (Dt  Ptdt) in nominal terms and the
value of selling its initial share position (V firmt ).
Therefore, the period budget constraint of the representative house-
hold (in units of currency) can be written as:
BN;t+1+V
firm
t NH;txt+1+PtCt = (1+it 1)BN;t+(Dt+V
firm
t )Ntxt+WtLt+T
L
t
whereDt stands for the nominal value of dividends (Dt  Ptdt), 1+it is
the gross nominal interest rate and TLt are lump-sum taxes in nominal
terms.
The previous equation can be expressed in real terms by dividing
both sides with the price level (Pt):
Bt+1 + v
firm
t NH;txt+1 +Ct = (1 + rt)Bt + (dt + v
firm
t )Ntxt + wtLt + t
L
t
where Bt+1  BN;t+1=Pt and 1 + rt  (1 + it 1)=(1 + Ct ) is the
consumption-based real interest rate on bond holdings between time
t   1 and t with consumer-price ination (CPI) dened as Ct+1 
Pt+1=Pt   1, and tLt  TLt =Pt.
The rst-order conditions derived from the householdsoptimisa-
tion problem are the same as those in chapter 2. The Euler equations
for bond and share-holdings are repeated here:
1 = Et
(
Ct+1
Ct
 
1 + it
1 + Ct+1
)
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vfirmt = (1  )Et
(
Ct+1
Ct
 
(vfirmt+1 + dt+1)
)
The intratemporal condition says that labour e¤ort is chosen optimally
when the marginal disutility of labour equals to the marginal utility
from consuming real wage received for one more hour worked:

L
1
'
t
C t
= (1   i)Wt
Pt
where  is set such that hours worked makes up for one-third of the
total time endowment and  i is a tax rate on labour income.
3.3 Equilibrium
In the symmetric equilibrium all rms make identical choices so that
pt(!) = pt, dt(!) = dt, yt(!) = yt, v
firm
t (!) = v
firm
t , lt(!) = lt,
t(!) =  and pact(!) = pact.
The labour market clearing is given by:
Lt = Ntlt +NE;t
fE;t
Zt
(3.6)
where the rm term on the RHS denotes the amount of labour used
in production while the second term stands for the amount of labour
employed to set up new rms. One can use equation (3.6) to back out
NE;t in equation (3.1).
The aggregate output of the consumption basket (Y Ct ) is used for
private (Ct) and public consumption (Gt) and to pay price adjustment
costs:
Y Ct  Ct +Gt + PACt
= Nttyt
= NttZtlt
The previous accounting identity says that total absorption (the rst
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line) equals to total production (second line). The last line made use
of the production function.
3.3.1 Monetary and scal policy
The New-Keynesian model is closed by a monetary policy rule (so
called Taylor rule):
Rt = Rt 1+(1 )[R+log t+(log t log t )+y(Yt Y t )=Y t ]+"it
(3.7)
where Rt  1+it is the policy rate, t is a four-quarter moving average
of ination and Y t is the trend level of output yZt (where y denotes
the steady-state level of Yt=Zt ). As in RS we annualise log  and R
so that the choice of  = 0:53 corresponds to roughly one-fourth of
the empirical estimates using quarterly data (see, e.g., Clarida et al.
(2000)).
t is the target rate of ination, "
i
t is an iid shock with mean
zero and variance 2i . In the baseline version of the Rudebusch and
Swanson (2012) model without long-run ination risks the ination
target is constant (t = 
 for all t).
The four-quarter moving average of ination (t) can be approxi-
mated by a geometric moving average of ination:
log t =  log t + (1  ) log t, (3.8)
where the choice of  = 0:7 ensures that the geometric average in
equation (3.8) has an e¤ective duration of about four quarters. In
this paper we do not consider long-run ination risks as in one of the
version of RS.
In Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) exogenous scal spending is as-
sumed to be nanced with lump-sum taxes. In the previous chapter
we have shown that the way government spending is nanced a¤ects
rst and second moments calculated from the model to a large extent.
CHAPTER 3. BOND AND EQUITY PREMIUM PUZZLES 116
Therefore, as an alternative of lump-sum taxes we present results for
the case when spending is nanced by distortionary taxes levied on
labour and prot income (for a formal description see chapter 2).
3.4 Comparison of the model with that of Rude-
busch and Swanson (2012)
We summarised the equations of the model in Table (3.1) below. This
is slightly di¤erent from the Table 5.1 of Bilbiie et al. (2007) be-
cause our extension contains Epstein-Zin preferences and government
spending as well (as in Rudebusch and Swanson (2012)). Note that the
Calvo-type of price stickiness used by RS is equivalent to the Rotem-
berg style price rigidity applied in Bilbiie et al. (2007) and in this
paper.
The model used in this paper departs from Rudebusch and Swanson
(2012) to the extent of i) the inclusion of rm entry, ii) the omission
of xed capital (and hence xed investment)3 and iii) using a lower
estimate on the coe¢ cient of output gap in the Taylor rule (y = 0:125
which is close to one of the estimate by Clarida et al. (1998) instead
of y = 0:93 in Rudebusch and Swanson (2012)).
We shortly elaborate on points ii) and iii). First, we describe con-
sequences of the omission of xed capital (see point ii) above). In
Woodford (2003) xed/rm-specic capital is a way of introducing
strategic complementarity into price-setting. A higher level of strate-
gic complementarity manifest in a smaller coe¢ cient on the marginal
cost (or output gap) in the New Keynesian Phillips curve. A smaller
coe¢ cient on marginal cost in the Phillips curve is equivalent to lower
level of price-rigidity in the model. However, alternatively, we can
induce a lower level of price stickiness by reducing  which is the pa-
rameter of price adjustment costs in the Phillips curve (see equation
3We plan to explore the role of physical capital with adjustment costs in the entry model in
another paper.
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called markup in Table 3.1 below).
Regarding iii) we motivate low coe¢ cient on the output gap in
the Taylor rule for four reasons. First, in the RS model with entry
a coe¢ cient of y = 0:93 leads to indeterminacy
4 when entry cost is
specied in consumption units (discussed below). The highest output
gap coe¢ cient with which the model can be solved is around 0.6.
Second, most estimated New Keynesian models place small coe¢ cient
on the output gap (see e.g. Smets and Wouters (2007)). Bilbiie et al.
go even further asserting that a small coe¢ cient on the output gap is
consistent with the behaviour of Federal Reserve since that 1980s and
places a coe¢ cient of zero on the output gap. Third, a small positive
output gap coe¢ cient is also in line with the empirical evidence (see
Clarida et al. (1998) and more in the calibration section) Fourth, it is
argued below that the higher is the output gap coe¢ cient the stronger
is the negative covariance between consumption and ination, which is
a pre-requisite for achieving a high term premium on long-term bonds
(see chapter 2 for more on this).
The behaviour of the RS model with entry and a zero coe¢ cient on
the output gap is contrasted with the case of a small, positive coe¢ -
cient (y = 0:125) by looking at the impulses responses of a positive
technology shock (see Figure 3.3). In both versions the markup re-
sponds positively on impact although it turns to negative (below zero)
sooner when the output gap coe¢ cient is zero.
Most importantly ination falls more when y is higher than zero
stengthening the negative comovement between consumption and in-
ation and contributing more to the nominal term premium. The rea-
son why ination plummets to higher extent in case of a positive y
is due to the reaction of the real interest rate. As Figure 3.3 indicates
real interest rate rises more with (y > 0) and depressing aggregate
demand so much that it leads to huge deation.
4We do not face this challenge when entry costs are dened in e¤ective labour units.
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Table 3.1: Summary of the Model
Pricing kernel Kt;t+1

Ct+1
Ct
  h
Vt+1
(EtV
1 
t+1 )
1=(1 )
i 
Pricing t = t
wt
Zt
Markup t =
(Nt)
((Nt) 1)
h
1 P
2
2t
i
+P [(1+t)t (1 )Et[Kt;t+1t+1]]
Variety e¤ect t = exp

 1
2
~N Nt
& ~NNt

Prots dt =
h
1  1
t
  P
2
2t
i
Y Ct
Nt
Free Entry vfirmt = wt
fE;t
Zt
Number of rms Nt = (1  )(Nt 1 +NE;t 1)
Intratemporal Condition Ct N
1
'
t = Wt
Euler equation (shares) vfirmt = (1  )Et
n
Kt;t+1(vfirmt+1 + dt+1)
o
Euler equation (bonds) 1 = Kt;t+1 Rt1+Ct+1
Output of the consumption sector Y Ct =
h
1  P
2
2t
i 1
(Ct +Gt)
Aggregate accounting Y Ct +NE;tV
firm
t = WtLt +NtDt
CPI ination 1+t
1+Ct
= t
t 1
Taylor Rule The non-linear version of equation (3.7).
The denition of  The non-linear version of equation 3.8
Plus three more equations describing U(Ct; Lt)   [Et( Vt+1)1 ]
1
1  .
For details see Chapter 2 and the appendix of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012).
Here we provide a brief description of some equations of interest in
Table 3.1. The rst equation is the pricing kernel used to value payo¤s
across time and states of nature. The second and third equations say
that the optimal price ratio (or a value of a variety) equals to the
marginal cost with a markup which is time-varying due to endogenous
entry and price rigidity. Equation four is the variety e¤ect in case of
translog preferences (see more below). Equation ve is the denition
of prots. Equation six is the free-entry condition stating that the
value of the rm (the present value of prot) equals to a sunk cost.
The entry cost could uctuate for exogenous reasons (Bilbiie et al.
(2012) study deregulation as an exogenous fall in fE;t) but we keep
it xed i.e. fE;t = fE. Equation seven describes the evolution of the
number of rms at time t (Nt) as a function of rms in the previous
period (Nt 1) and new entrants (NE;t 1) allowing for the fact that
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some of existing rms exit with probability . The interpretation of
the rest of the equations is quite standard.
3.5 Translog preferences
Bilbiie et al. (2007) show that the basic New Keynesian model pro-
duces countercyclical markup in response to productivity shocks when
i) variety e¤ect operates through a CES aggregator ((Nt) = N
1=( 1)
t
and  is the constant elasticity of substitution among goods), ii) ag-
gregate labour supply is inelastic and iii) the coe¢ cient on the output
gap in the Taylor rule is zero.
However, we found that the markup is not counter-cyclical any-
more under a CES aggregator if labour supply is endogenous and
there is a positive coe¢ cient in the Taylor-rule on the output gap. In
order to maintain the countercyclical markup the model has to fea-
ture the competition e¤ect which makes the elasticity of substitution
among goods ((N)) rise with the appearance of new entrants and,
hence, new varieties (N). In the literature there are several ways to
induce competition e¤ect. In particular, Colciago and Etro (2010a) in-
duce strategic interactions among rms through quantity competition
a la Cournot while Colciago and Etro (2010b) consider competition in
prices a la Bertrand. Furthermore, Colciago and Etro (2010b) com-
pare the response of the markup to a temporary technology shock
under Cournot, Bertrand and translog preferences and conclude that
competition e¤ect is the strongest under translog preferences as in Bil-
biie et al. (2012). Therefore, the markup which is an inverse function
of  declines with an increase in the number of varieties. The variety
e¤ect ((N)) and the markup ((Nt)) under translog preferences can
be written as:
(Nt) = exp
 
 1
2
~N  Nt
& ~NNt
!
, ~N Mass(
)
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(Nt) = 1 +
1
&Nt
where & is chosen such that the steady-state number of rms under
the CES and translog case is the same.
Figure (3.1) and (3.2) show simulated autocorrelations of the markup
with lagged GDP for the case of zero and positive coe¢ cient on the
output gap, respectively. The gures also provide details on which
shocks contribute most to the autocorrelation between markup and
GDP.
We make the following observations. First, the autocorrelation be-
tween the markup and lags of the GDP is negative although the model
cannot generate the shape observed in data5. Second, a positive coef-
cient on the output gap decreases the absolute value of the autocor-
relations especially when only technology and scal shocks are consid-
ered. Third, monetary policy shocks facilitate matching the empirical
markup-GDP autocorrelation especially in the case of y = 0 when
technology shock causes this correlation to be excessively negative. To
understand why monetary policy shocks mitigate the negative auto-
correlation between markup and lagged GDP we can contrast impulse
responses for technology and monetary policy shocks (Figure 3.3 and
3.4, respectively). Although for a positive technology shock markup
increases on impact it switches to negative for most of the transition
to the steady-state (Figure 3.3). For a negative technology shock the
markup falls already on impact and remains negative for most of the
transition path (not shown).
From the graphs we can also recognise that a monetary policy shock
has much stronger e¤ect on the markup (0.6% per cent on impact)
compared to a technology shock with 0.15% even if the monetary pol-
icy shock is assumed to have zero persistence in line with the literature.
Thus, in sum, highly persistent technology shocks are the main drivers
5This paper does not endeavour to match the exact shape of the empirical autocorrelation
function. Our aim to maintain the negative correlation between markup and GDP is fullled.
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Figure 3.1: Autocorrelation of the markup with lagged GDP when coe¢ cient on the
output gap is zero in the Taylor rule
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of the countercyclical markup and monetary policy shocks have the
potential to limit the strength of technology shocks.
3.6 Parametrisation and solution method
Parameter values are collected in Table 3.3 which closely follows Rude-
busch and Swanson (2012). The model is approximated to the third-
order using Dynare (see Adjemian et al. (2011)). We follow Bilbiie
et al. (2007) and assume that the entry cost is unity (fE = 1). We
havent found proper guidance6 on how to calibrate ~N so we picked
a high value of 10,000 varieties. In fact we dont experience a ma-
jor change in results when we use either ~N = 1000 or ~N = 10; 000.
Parameter 0 is chosen such that steady-state hours worked is nor-
malised to one-third of the total time endowment (L = 1=3). Data
on equity premium and the standard deviation of equity is taken from
Beaubrun-Driant and Tripier (2005). In this chapter the implications
of two di¤erent estimates of the output gap coe¢ cient (either 0.07 or
6Bilbiie et al. (2007, 2012) use the rst-order loglinear form of the entry model and they can
rewrite the model in such a way that ~N drops. However, when the non-linear model is maintained
as in this paper ~N cant be eliminated.
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Figure 3.2: Autocorrelation of the markup with lagged value of the GDP when
coe¢ cient on the output gap is positive in the Taylor rule
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Figure 3.3: Impulse responses of selected variables to a positive (temporary) tech-
nology shock. All of them are expressed in percentage deviation from steady-state.
Ination, real and nominal interest rates and the return on equity are annualised.
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Figure 3.4: Impulse responses in case of contractionary monetary policy shock. All
of them are expressed in percentage deviation from steady-state. Ination, real and
nominal interest rates and the return on equity are annualised.
10 20 30
-0.4
-0.2
0
C
quarters
10 20 30
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
YC
quarters
10 20 30
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
LC
quarters
10 20 30
0
1
2
3
LE
quarters
10 20 30
-0.020
0.020.04
0.060.08
L
quarters
10 20 30
-0.4
-0.2
PI
quarters
10 20 30
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
NU
quarters
10 20 30
0
10
20
30
Real Rate (risk-free)
quarters
10 20 30
0
0.005
0.01
RHO
quarters
10 20 30
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
W
quarters
10 20 30
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
MC(=V)
quarters
10 20 30
0
1
2
3
D
quarters
10 20 30
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
SDF
quarters
fy=.125
f
y
=0
10 20 30
0
0.5
1
1.5
Re
quarters
10 20 30
0
50
100
R
quarters
CHAPTER 3. BOND AND EQUITY PREMIUM PUZZLES 124
0.93) are explored in line with the estimates of Clarida et al. (1998,
2000) and Rudebusch (2002) (for more information see Table 3.2).
The price-adjustment cost (P = 77) coincides with the one in Bilbiie
et al. (2007) and is in line with most of the literature.
Table 3.2: Calibration
Taylor-rule estimates of Clarida et al. (1998, 2000) for the US
  y
Rule 1 (Clarida et al. 1998) for 1979-1994 0.92 1.79 0.07
Rule 2 (Clarida et al. 2000) for 1983-1996* 0.79 2.16 0.93
Clarida et al. (1998, 2000) estimated the following forward-looking Taylor rule:
it = it 1 + (1   )[t+1 + yyt]. In Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) and also in
our chapter 2 and 3 t is used instead of t+1, although we found similar results
for the case of t+1. *Quite close to the values of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012)
who utilised the estimate by Rudebusch (2002):  = 0:73,  = 2:1 and y = 0:93
[Remark: in Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) ination is annualised in their Taylor
rule as well as in our chapter 2 and 3 and, therefore,  = 0:53 is set].
Table 3.3: Calibration
 2 ' 3/2 i 0.73 Z 0.95
 0.99 CRRA 75  0.53 G 0.95
L 1/3  0.2 y 0.93 M 0
G=Y 0.17 P 77 
 1 2Z 0.005
2
" 6 2M 0.003
2
2G 0.004
2
where G=Y is the government spending-to-GDP ratio. This table closely follows the
calibration of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012).
3.7 Results
3.7.1 Entry cost in e¤ective labour units
Ination Risks
In this section we argue that the RS model with entry exhibits in-
ation risks when coe¢ cient on the output gap in the Taylor-rule is
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small. Before that we shortly summarise the empirical evidence on
the ination risk content of long-term nominal bonds. Early stud-
ies which dont include information from indexed bonds usually pre-
dict substantial ination risk-premia based on no-arbitrage models.
One such paper is by Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005) who nd an aver-
age ination risk premium of 70 basis points from 1960. Ang et al.
(2008) estimate a term-structure model in which US ination display
regime-switching and report an ination risk premium of around 115
basis points on average for bonds of ve-year maturity over the pe-
riod 1952-2004. Studies that incorporate information from indexed
bonds reveal smaller estimates. For instance, Durham (2006) esti-
mates a no-arbitrage model using US TIPS data and nd a slightly
positive ination risk-premia for the sample starting at 2003. Before
2003 risk premia on 10-year ination indexed bonds reected liquid-
ity risks rather than ination risks. DAmico et al. (2008) employ a
model similar to Durham (2006) utilising data from 1990 onwards and
report a positive and relatively stable 10-year ination risk premium
of about 50 basis points.
The case when entry cost is dened in terms of e¤ective labour
units is treated as the baseline in Bilbiie et al. (2012) and in our
paper as well. We present a detailed decomposition of the nominal
and real term premium in Table 3.4. In particular, nominal term pre-
mium is calculated as the di¤erence between the yield on a 10-year
nominal bond held by a risk-averse investor (yieldnom10-year) and the yield
on a nominal bond that is rolled over in each quarter for 10 years
(yieldnom, eh10-year ). The latter can be interpreted as the yield expected by a
risk-neutral investor and is consistent with the expectations hypoth-
esis (eh) of the term structure. Similarly, real term premium is the
di¤erence between the same measures but for ination-indexed (real)
bonds i.e. RTP=yieldreal10-year yieldreal , eh10-year .
We make the following observations. First, the correlation between
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ination and consumption growth is negative in the RS model with
entry unlike the RS without entry where it is negative only when co-
e¢ cient on output gap is high in the Taylor-rule. Second, nominal
uncertainty ((^)) is much higher in the model with entry (5.43) than
in the model without entry (1.63). Third, real uncertainty ((c^))
is slightly higher in the model with entry. Fourth, nominal term pre-
mium is somewhat higher in the model without entry irrespectively
of the size of the coe¢ cient on the Taylor rule. Fifth, RTP is low in
the model without entry when output gap coe¢ cient is high and there
are positive ination risks with the opposite is true in case of a high
coe¢ cient on the output gap. Sixth, exactly the inverse of observation
ve is true in the model with entry i.e. RTP is high in the model with
entry.
Before we provide intuition regarding the previous observations, it
is worth having a look at nominal and real yield curves as well as
the ination risk premium obtained from the entry model (see Figure
3.5). On the left-hand side of the graph we can see that the nominal
yield curve is above the real yield curve mainly for bonds with ma-
turities of at least 10 or 15 quarters depending on whether lump-sum
or distortionary taxation is assumed. The di¤erence between nominal
and real term structure captures ination risks. On the right hand
side we observe that the nominal term premium is higher than real
term premium and, thus, ination risks emerge. The previous plot is
generated based on the assumption that the coe¢ cient on the output
gap is low (y = 0:125). However, the RS model without entry implies
positive ination risks only when the coe¢ cient on the output gap is
high (y = 0:93). To show this we plot yield curves of the RS model
without entry on Figure 3.6. On the left panel of the preceding gure
inations risks are positive for y = 0:93 while, on the right panel,
they are negative for y = 0:125. Hördahl et al. (2008) employ a
model similar to RS with low coe¢ cient on the output gap and also
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Figure 3.5: Yield curves, nominal and real term and ination-risk premium
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nd that ination risks are zero. It is well-known about the New Key-
nesian model that the higher is the coe¢ cient on the output gap in
the Taylor rule (ceteris paribus) the higher is the standard deviation
of ination (or other nominal variables in general) and the amount
of ination risks (see e.g. Clarida et al. (1999)). Hence, the size of
the coe¢ cient on the output gap appears to be a key determinant of
ination risks.
One can gain insight into the workings of the models with/without
entry by inspecting the ination and output gap volatility trade-o¤. In
the RS model without entry the ination-output gap volatility trade-
o¤ is the standard one: a higher coe¢ cient on the output gap reduces
real uncertainty (the standard deviation of the output gap) and raises
nominal uncertainty (the standard deviation of ination) (see, e.g.,
Clarida et al. (1999)). Rather surprisingly this trade-o¤ becomes non-
linear after adding entry to the New Keynesian model. For an output
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Figure 3.6: Yield curves from the Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) model without
entry and with di¤erent coe¢ cients on the output gap.
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gap coe¢ cient of lower than 0.5 the trade-o¤ is maintained similar to
the standard New Keynesian model. However, for output gap coe¢ -
cients of 0.5 or above the trade-o¤ between ination and output gap
volatility disappears. Figure (3.7) and (3.8) show that these ndings
are independent of the specication of the entry costs that can be
either in e¤ective labour units or in consumption units (see more on
this below), respectively. The gures also indicate that the standard
deviations for both ination and output gap are higher for the entry
model in general.
After comparing Figure 3.9 and 3.10 we recognise that the response
of the short-term real interest rate on impact is much stronger in the
model with entry compared to the one without entry implying that
real interest rate increases to a large extent in order to counteract the
sizeable real and nominal uncertainty when coe¢ cient on the output
gap is high (Y = 0:93). Figure 3.9 and 3.10 also reveal that di¤erences
in the short-term real rates are reected by long-term real rates as
well. Indeed, the 10-year real rate falls in the model without entry
after a positive innovation to technology while 10-year real rate in the
entry model jumps to the same shock. These di¤erences are more
pronounced the higher is the coe¢ cient on the output gap.
Therefore, it follows that the RS model without entry implies low
real and high nominal term premiums when the output gap coe¢ cient
is large. On the contrary the entry model exhibits substantial real term
premium (real/consumption risks) for a high output gap coe¢ cient
and ination risks exist only when coe¢ cient on the output gap is
low.
Unconditional moments
Table 3.5 collects several simulated macro and nance moments. The
rst column is taken from RS and contain moments calculated from
US data for the period 1961-2007. The second column shows simulated
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Figure 3.7: Trade-o¤ between ination and output-gap volatility in the Rudebusch
and Swanson (2012) model with and w/o entry (entry costs are specied in e¤ective
labour units). The coe¢ cient on the output-gap increases as we move from left to
the right.
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Figure 3.8: Trade-o¤ between ination and output-gap volatility in the Rudebusch
and Swanson (2012) model with and w/o entry (entry costs are specied in consump-
tion units). In this case we faced di¢ culties with simulations when the output-gap
coe¢ cient was higher than y > 0:5 so that we graph ination-output-gap volatility
pairs for y 2 [0:125; 0:5]. The coe¢ cient on the output-gap increases as we move
from left to the right.
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Figure 3.9: Impulse responses of selected variables to a positive (temporary) tech-
nology shock using the Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) model with entry. All of
them are expressed in percentage deviation from steady-state. Ination, real and
nominal interest rates and the return on equity are annualised.
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Figure 3.10: Impulse responses of selected variables to a positive (temporary) tech-
nology shock using the Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) model without entry. All
of them are expressed in percentage deviation from steady-state. Ination, real and
nominal interest rates and the return on equity are annualised.
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moments based on our reproduction of the RS model (our results and
theirs are quite similar). The third column (denoted with A) provides
simulated moments of the RS model with rm entry using temporary
technology and scal shocks. All the columns except for E and F
are based on the model in which government spending is nanced by
lump-sum taxes. However, column E and F present an alternative
when spending is covered through income taxation as in the previous
chapter.
Nominal term premium on a long-term bond, say a 10 year-bond,
is computed as the return on the risky 10-year bond minus the return
on a bond that is rolled over for 10 years. The yield on the latter
strategy is often called as risk-neutral yield which is consistent with
the expectations hypothesis of the term structure. Besides the mean
and standard deviation of the nominal term premium we report its
alternative measures like the slope of the term structure and the excess
holding period return. The slope of the term structure is the di¤erence
between the yield on a long-term bond (say a 40-quarter bond) and
the short-term bond (R(40)   R). The excess holding period return
(x(40)) is dened e.g. for a 40-quarter bond as: p(39)t =p
(40)
t 1  Rt 1where
the rst term is the gross return to holding the 40-quarter bond for
one period (p is the price of the bond) and the second term is the gross
one-period risk-free rate. Equity premium is dened as the return on
the prot (dividend) claim minus the return on the risk-free asset.
Consistent with Bilbiie et al. we also provide moments of real vari-
ables that are consistent with the change in the composition of goods
of the consumption basket after the arrival of new varieties. In partic-
ular, a data-consistent variable ~X is calculated as X= where  is the
price ratio that changes with the appearance of new varieties. Data-
consistent variables can be found in column B, D and F. Generally,
data-consistent standard deviations are higher than the baseline ones
except for consumption.
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The inclusion of the monetary policy shock (see columns C and D)
facilitates the match of data for nominal and real interest rates. Also,
we establish after comparing column A with columns C and D that
the RS model with entry containing all three shocks outperforms the
RS model without entry in achieving higher standard deviations for
short-term nominal and real interest rates and a lower standard devi-
ation for consumption. A shortcoming of the RS model with entry is
the small standard deviation of labour compared to data. However,
the introduction of scal policy with income taxation mitigates this
problem to some extent (see columns E and F). On the negative side
scal policy with income taxation further magnies the standard de-
viation of real wage departing more from its empirical counterpart. It
deserves some explanation why scal policy with income taxation is
able to raise the standard deviation of labour and real wage.
Fiscal policy has substitution and wealth e¤ects. The higher vari-
ability of hours worked is associated with a rise in government spend-
ing that is covered (partly) by higher labour taxes making people
reduce (increase) their labour supply due to the substitution (wealth)
e¤ect. At the same time income taxation leads to higher standard
deviation of the pre-tax real wage compared to the lump-sum taxes
case and we depart more from its empirical counterpart. Thus, scal
policy with income taxation improves (worsens) the t in terms of
labour (real wage).
3.7.2 Entry cost in consumption units
Unconditional moments
In the previous section entry cost is dened in units of e¤ective labour
that is equal to the rms value (vt = wt
fE;t
At
). Following Bilbiie et
al. (2012) we can instead assume that all labour is utilised in the
goods-producing sector and entry cost is dened in units of the con-
sumption basket (entry cost has a di¤erent notation now: fCE;t). Still
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we maintain the assumption that entry cost is constant (fCE;t = f
C
E for
all t). This modication imply some changes in the equations listed
in Table 3.1 above. In particular, there is no need to di¤erentiate
output of the consumption sector from the whole GDP so that the
accounting identity becomes Yt = Nttyt = wtLt + Ntdt and there is
no longer sectoral reallocation of labour between product creation and
production of consumption goods. This also means that Yt replaces
Y Ct in the denition of prots and there is no need for a separate
equation dening Y Ct . Remember that in the model of Bilbiie et al.
the real price of investment (vt) is time-varying and is equal to the
entry cost in e¤ective labour units (wt
fE;t
At
). However, in this case the
consumption-based price of investment is constant and equal to one
unit of consumption (after imposing the normalisation of fCE = 1 as
in Bilbiie et al.)
Results obtained from applying a second-order approximation7 are
collected in Table 3.6. The structure of the columns is similar to that of
the previous table. This version of the model denitely improves upon
the baseline one not just in terms of higher nominal term premium but
also producing higher standard deviations for both macro and nance
moments. The standard deviation of the nominal term premium is
zero because of the second-order approximation. However, it would
turn to positive with an approximation to the third-order8.
It also needs to be added that distortionary scal policy elevates
real/consumption risks and not ination risks in this version of the
model. An analogous way of stating this is that the additional increase
in the nominal term premium occurs due to a rise in the real term
premium and not ination risk premium. This is in stark contrast to
RS where the additional increase in the nominal term premium is due
7Unfortunately, we obtain a non-trivial error in Dynare when taking a third-order approximation
so we have to rely on second-order approximation in this case.
8This conrms Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) who argue that the nominal term-premium is
time-varying only when the model (or, at least, the asset-pricing equations) is approximated to
the third-order.
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to higher ination risks. It seems to be reasonable that the model with
entry costs in e¤ective labour units predicts higher ination risks than
the model where entry costs are in consumption units as the former one
implies higher wage costs to nance new entrants following a positive
productivity shock and also higher marginal cost and ination through
the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
Robustness Checks
In Table (3.7) we perform robustness checks using the model in which
entry costs are expressed in terms of consumption units and govern-
ment spending is covered by income taxes. All three shocks are em-
ployed. In column A and B we gauge how much our results change in
the absence of price-rigidity i.e. setting P = 0 which is the case of
fully exible prices. In line with ndings of previous literature (see,
e.g., de Paoli et al. (2010)), nominal term premium has increased.
However, the standard deviation of real interest rate became counter-
factually low.
Some papers like Binsbergen et al. (2012) argue that it is relatively
easier to generate high equity premium with lower EIS as in our paper
rather than a higher one. In Column C and D we raised EIS in our
model to two, ceteris paribus. Even if there is some improvement in
terms of matching standard deviation of the equity return, the model
undershoots in terms of the volatilities of nance variables relative to
data. Most importantly, we nd that the size of the equity premium
is not a¤ected by the higher EIS.
In column E and F we investigate into the case of a higher Frisch
elasticity (1=' = 2). On the negative side, the model overshoots
the standard deviation of consumption, real wage and hours worked
relative to data. On the positive side the nance moments are closer
to the data. For instance, nominal term premium has risen to 75 basis
points from 55 basis points.
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In the last two columns (G and H) EIS and Frisch elasticity are
simultaneously reduced while risk-aversion is increased as a further
attempt to match data (for a similar experiment see RS and also
Chapter 2) to values which can help match the empirical level of the
nominal term premium. In particular, the EIS, the Frisch elasticity
and risk-aversion are set to 0.3, 0.28 and 85 respectively. In the RS
model without entry risk-aversion needs to be raised to 110 in order to
arrive at a high mean value of the nominal term premium consistent
with data. However, the RS model with entry allows us to produce
the empirical mean of the nominal term premium with smaller upward
movement in risk-aversion (to 85) relative to the baseline value (75).
3.8 Conclusion
This paper has shown that a slightly modied version of the Rude-
busch and Swanson (2012, RS) model extended with rm entry can ex-
plain the means of bond and equity premium reasonably well without
worsening the t of the model to key macroeconomic variables. Also
the model produces procyclical prots and countercyclical markups in
line with estimates of Rotemberg andWoodford (1999). The empirical
evidence in Clarida et al. (1998, 2000) reveals that the coe¢ cient on
the output gap can be either low or high depending on the choice of
the sample period. The RS model without entry features a trade-o¤
between the volatility of ination and the output gap. RS relies on a
high estimate of the output gap coe¢ cient in the Taylor-rule to achieve
low or even negative real risks and, thus, positive ination risks. How-
ever, in the RS model with entry the trade-o¤ between ination and
output gap volatility is present only for an output gap coe¢ cient of
0.5 at most. For values of the output gap coe¢ cient higher than 0.5
ination and consumption risks mount simultaneously. We also show
that ination risks emerge in the entry model only when the coe¢ cient
on the output gap is relatively low.
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A shortcoming of our model is that it cannot capture the enormous
volatility of the stock return (16%). Therefore, future research should
address the ways our model can increase the standard deviation of the
return on equity without magnifying the volatility of macro variables
extremely. This is quite a challenging exercise if we insist on small-size
shocks as done in this paper. However, an extension of our model with
capital denitely deserves further exploration.
3.9 Appendix The steady-state number of rms
We generalise Bilbiie et al. (2012) for the case of IES<1 and positive
government spending in the resource constraint. Of course, the steady-
state is a¤ected by these two pieces of modications.
The steady-state number of rms in the case of entry costs in ef-
fective labour units can be obtained numerically from
N

[(N)  1] + (r + )
[(N)  1]

=
1  

Z
fE
2664 1   
1  GY C
  [1 (1 )]fE (N)(N)
(1 )(1  1(N)) 1N
 (N)(N)ZM
3775
1='
while in the case of entry costs in consumption units:
1 =


(1  GY )( 1Z )
1
'

( 1(1 ) 1)N
1  1
'+1
'
Z(1  )
where we have functional forms for (N) and (N). In the CES case
(N) = =( 1) and (N) = N 1 1 while in the translog case (N) =
1+1=(&N) and (N) = exp( 12
~N N
& ~NN
), ~N Mass(
) where & is chosen
such that the steady-state number of rms under the CES and translog
case is the same. G=Y C is the government spending-GDP ratio.
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Table 3.4: Unconditional moments of the term-structure
Unconditional Data Y = 0:93 Y = 0:125
moments RS model without entry
corr(c^; ^) -0.35* -0.20 0.11
(^) 2.52 1.63 0.92
(c^) 1.96* 0.86 0.74
(a) yieldnom10-year 6.94^ 4.2989 3.7851
(b) yieldnom, eh10-year na 3.9078 3.4406
(c) yieldreal10-year 1.96^ 3.9047 3.8527
(d) yieldreal , eh10-year na 3.9078 3.4406
(e) NTP(=a-b) 1.06 0.39 0.34
(f) RTP(=c-d) ' 1:00 0.01 0.42
IRP(=e-f) 0.5 0.38 -0.08
EQPR 6.2 0.85 0.71
RS model with entry
corr(c^; ^) -0.35* -0.45 -0.55
(^) 2.52 5.43 1.38
(c^) 1.96* 2.16 1.83
(g) yieldnom10-year 6.94^ 3.6551 4.0898
(h) yieldnom, eh10-year na 3.5221 3.4859
(j) yieldreal10-year 1.96^ 3.9872 3.9314
(k) yieldreal , eh10-year na 3.5254 3.8482
(l) NTP(=g-h) 1.06 0.13 0.24
(m) RTP(=j-k) ' 1:00 0.46 0.08
IRP(=l-m) 0.5 -0.33 0.16
EQPR 6.2 11.43 10.51
where yieldnom10-year (yield
real
10-year) stands for the unconditional mean on a 10-year nom-
inal (real) bond while yieldnom, eh10-year (yield
real , eh
10-year ) denote yields for a 10-year nominal
(real) bond which is consistent with the expectations hypothesis of the term struc-
ture. Corr, , NTP, RTP, IRP and EQPR are abbreviations of the unconditional
correlation, standard deviation, nominal term premium, real term premium, ina-
tion risk premium and equity premium. Data on () and NTP is from Rudebusch
and Swanson (2012).
*the source is Binsbergen et al. (2012) who used US NIPA data over 1953-2008.
^the source are the databases of Gürkaynak et al. (2007, 2008).
ination risk premium and RTP is the estimate by DAmico et al. (2008). They
note that most of the RTP is liquidity premium (especially in the early years of
TIPS).
na=not identied from the data.
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Table 3.5: Moments from variants of the Rudebusch and Swanson (=RS) (2012)
model compared to US data
Unconditional US data, RS A B C D E F
Moment 1961-2007
SD(C) 0.83 1.42 0.93 0.87 1.01 0.97 1.15 1.09
SD(L) 1.71 1.5 0.40 0.63 0.43 0.66 0.59 0.83
SD(W) 0.82 1.32 1.33 1.33 1.47 1.49 1.54 1.52
SD() 2.52 1.64 1.44 - 1.62 - 1.59 -
SD(R) 2.71 1.6 1.43 - 2.01 - 2.09 -
SD(Rreal) 2.30 0.93 0.57 0.63 1.87 2.06 1.9 2.07
SD (R(40)) 2.41 0.85 1.01 - 1.03 - 0.96 -
Mean(NTP (40)) 1.06 0.39 0.28 - 0.29 - 0.30 -
SD(NTP (40)) 0.54 0.04 0.02 - 0.02 - 0.02 -
Mean(R(40)  R) 1.43 0.43 0.27 - 0.30 - 0.37 -
SD(R(40)  R) 1.33 0.9 0.56 - 1.47 - 1.58 -
Mean(x(40)) 1.76 0.69 0.48 - 0.51 - 0.57 -
SD(x(40)) 23.43 7.81 8.94 - 9.14 - 8.85 -
Equity Premium 6.2 0.85 7.46 - 7.49 - 10.61 -
SD(Re) 15.98 1.20 1.46 1.29 2.63 2.68 2.75 2.79
where SD=standard deviation, NTP (40)=nominal term premium on a 40-quarter
bond, Mean=Unconditional Mean, R(40)   R is the slope and x(40) is the excess
holding period return for a 40-quarter bond. Re is the return on equity. Each
version of the models listed above utilises the baseline calibration of Rudebusch and
Swanson (2012) that does not t macro and nance moments of US data (neither
here nor in their paper).
RS=reproduction of the results of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) without entry
(Note that their results are very close to ours.)
A=Technology and scal shock (lump-sum taxation).
B=Technology and scal shock (lump-sum taxation), data-consistent real variables.
C=Technology, scal (lump-sum taxation) and monetary policy shocks.
D=Technology, scal (lump-sum taxation) and monetary policy shocks, data-
consistent real variables.
E=Technology, scal (income taxation) and monetary policy shocks.
F=Technology, scal (income taxation) and monetary policy shocks, data-consistent
real variables.
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Table 3.6: Moments from variants of the Rudebusch and Swanson (=RS) (2012)
model compared to US data
Unconditional US data, RS A B C D E F
Moment 1961-2007
SD(C) 0.83 1.42 1.12 0.98 1.33 1.08 1.58 1.41
SD(L) 1.71 1.5 0.83 1.28 0.92 1.50 0.92 1.31
SD(W) 0.82 1.32 1.18 1.09 1.87 1.75 1.89 1.72
SD() 2.52 1.64 1.58 - 1.90 - 2.03 -
SD(R) 2.71 1.6 1.53 - 2.21 - 2.61 -
SD(Rreal) 2.30 0.93 0.54 0.64 0.97 1.16 1.25 1.36
SD (R(40)) 2.41 0.85 0.88 - 1.59 - 1.10 -
Mean(NTP (40)) 1.06 0.39 0.30 - 0.38 - 0.55 -
SD(NTP (40)) 0.54 0.04 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 -
Mean(R(40)  R) 1.43 0.43 0.47 - 0.57 - 0.70 -
SD(R(40)  R) 1.33 0.9 0.75 - 1.59 - 1.83 -
Mean(x(40)) 1.76 0.69 0.80 - 0.94 - 1.18 -
SD(x(40)) 23.43 7.81 7.95 - 9.20 - 11.78 -
Equity Premium 6.2 0.85 10.77 - 11.00 - 11.17 -
SD(Re) 15.98 1.20 1.63 1.94 1.88 3.66 2.44 4.10
where SD =standard deviation, NTP (40)=nominal term premium on a 40-quarter
bond, Mean=Unconditional Mean, R(40)   R is the slope and x(40) is the excess
holding period return for a 40-quarter bond. Re is the return on equity. Each version
of the models listed above utilises the baseline calibration of Rudebusch and Swanson
(2012) that does not t macro and nance moments of US data (neither here nor
in their paper). Note that we are unable to carry out a third-order approximation
when entry cost is specied in consumption as Dynare stops with a non-trivial error.
Thus we have to resort to a second-order approximation when calculating moments
in this table (except for column RS).
RS=reproduction of the results of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) without entry
(Note that their results are very close to ours.)
A=Technology and scal shock (lump-sum taxation).
B=Technology and scal shock (lump-sum taxation), data-consistent real variables.
C=Technology, scal (lump-sum taxation) and monetary policy shocks.
D=Technology, scal (lump-sum taxation) and monetary policy shocks, data-
consistent real variables.
E=Technology, scal (income taxation) and monetary policy shocks.
F=Technology, scal (income taxation) and monetary policy shocks, data-consistent
real variables.
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Table 3.7: Moments from variants of the Rudebusch and Swanson (=RS) (2012)
model compared to US data
Unconditional US data, A B C D E F G H
Moment 1961-2007
SD(C) 0.83 1.75 1.64 1.16 0.98 1.72 1.61 1.42 1.32
SD(L) 1.71 0.42 0.85 1.25 1.79 0.73 1.06 0.89 1.35
SD(W) 0.82 2.03 1.93 1.95 1.80 2.73 2.77 2.73 2.75
SD() 2.52 5.02 - 1.78 - 2.40 - 2.33 2.48
SD(R) 2.71 2.65 - 2.51 - 2.77 - 2.89 -
SD(Rreal) 2.30 0.71 0.81 1.18 1.32 1.21 1.37 1.23 1.37
SD (R(40)) 2.41 1.19 - 1.08 - 1.30 - 1.51 -
Mean(NTP (40)) 1.06 0.67 - 0.51 - 0.75 - 1.06 -
SD(NTP (40)) 0.54 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 -
Mean(R(40)  R) 1.43 0.78 - 0.52 - 0.84 - 1.09 -
SD(R(40)  R) 1.33 1.61 - 1.73 - 1.81 - 1.78 -
Mean(x(40)) 1.76 1.23 - 0.91 - 1.44 - 1.93 -
SD(x(40)) 23.43 13.10 - 11.13 - 13.25 - 14.69 -
Equity Premium 6.2 10.57 - 11.11 - 11.47 - 11.87 -
SD(Re) 15.98 1.69 1.78 2.03 3.73 2.79 4.16 2.66 3.97
where SD =standard deviation, NTP (40)=nominal term premium on a 40-quarter
bond, Mean=Unconditional Mean, R(40)   R is the slope and x(40) is the excess
holding period return for a 40-quarter bond. Re is the return on equity.
RS=reproduction of the results of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) without entry
(Note that their results are very close to ours.)
Here we used the second version of the entry model where entry costs are dened in
consumption units. All three types of shocks are employed and spending is nanced
by income taxation. Note that we are unable to carry out a third-order approxima-
tion when entry cost is specied in consumption as Dynare stops with a non-trivial
error. Thus we have to resort to a second-order approximation when calculating
moments in this table.
A=removing price rigidity (P = 0).
B=removing price rigidity (P = 0), data-consistent real variables.
C=higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS = 1= = 2 instead of the
baseline 0:5).
D=higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS = 1= = 2 instead of the
baseline 0:5), data-consistent real variables.
E=Higher Frisch elasticity of labour supply (1=' = 2 instead of the baseline 2=3).
F=Higher Frisch elasticity of labour supply (1=' = 2 instead of the baseline 2=3),
data-consistent real variables.
G=Lowering EIS to 0:3 and Frisch elasticity to 1=' = 0:28.
H=Lowering EIS to 0:3 and Frisch elasticity to 1=' = 0:28, data-consistent real
variables.
Conclusion and Policy
Implications
The rst chapter has shown that labour tax-cuts can stimulate output
when short-term interest rate is close zero (the zero lower bound on the
nominal interest rate is binding) as in the United States since end of
2008 if, on one hand, the economy contains non-Ricardian households
who raise their consumption expenditure in response to the tax-cut
generating a Keynesian-type demand e¤ect. On the other hand, wage
rigidity is also necessary for the tax-cut to have positive e¤ects since it
does reduce the sensitivity of real wage to the negative demand shock
that makes the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate binding.
Our model contains both Ricardian and non-Ricardian households.
Ricardian households are forward-looking agents with perfect foresight
exhibiting life-cycle consumption behaviour and knowing that the tax-
cut at the present will be followed by tax-hikes in the future such that
the budget constraint of the government is satised in present value
terms. Therefore, Ricardians do not react to the tax-cut through a
change in their consumption expenditure. Instead they save up the
tax-cut in order to cover future tax-burden. However, non-Ricardians
have a static horizon and can alternatively be interpreted as house-
holds with a borrowing constraint which is relaxed due to the tax-cut.
As a result non-Ricardians spend the increase in their disposable in-
come.
Our results are in stark contrast to Christiano et al. (2011) and
Eggertsson (2011) who made the policy recommendation of increasing
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the labour-tax rate to enhance economic growth during the zero lower
bound using a model that contains only Ricardian agents. From policy
point of view it is important to stress that chapter 1 allows for a
uniform labour-tax cut i.e. the tax rate is reduced for both Ricardian
and non-Ricardian households by the same extent. As a result the
policy maker does not have to be able to distinguish between Ricardian
and non-Ricardian households. The policy recommendation of our
model is consistent with what was enacted as part of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment package of 2009 which prescribed cuts in
the labour taxes paid by employees as in our model.
In chapter 2 we investigate into the connection between scal policy
and long-term yields on non-defaultable zero-coupon bonds in a fully
Ricardian setup. Yields on long-term nominal bonds include term pre-
mium paid as a compensation to investors for consumption/ination
risks over the duration of the bond. Nominal bonds are risky in the
sense that real payo¤ correlates positively with consumption. If a
rise in future ination which erodes bond prices due to heavier dis-
counting of future nominal coupons coincides with times of low con-
sumption (growth) then nominal bonds carry ination risks (i.e. bond
yields contain risk-premium) because bonds loose value at the time
when household values consumption the most (Rudebusch and Swan-
son (2012)). Accordingly shocks like innovations to technology which
induce negative comovement between ination and consumption are
most likely to generate risk-premium.
Orszag and Gale (2004) present empirical evidence on the positive
relationship between government decits and treasury yields of var-
ious maturities. We study the response of nominal bond yields to
government spending shocks which are either nanced by lump-sum
or distortionary income taxes. We used the New Keynesian model
of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) where government spending shocks
are nanced by lump-sum taxes and government budget is balanced in
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each period quite similar to the scal side of the Smets and Wouters
(2007) model of the US economy. As an alternative we allowed for
government debt the possibility of decit that can be retired either
in the short- or long-run through lump-sum or distortionary income
taxes. We found that government spending has little impact on nomi-
nal yields if it is nanced with lump-sum taxes either with or without
debt.
However, distortionary income taxation implies negative correla-
tion between ination and consumption and therefore contributing to
ination risks. The ability of the model with income taxation in con-
tributing to the risk-premium is similar to Rudebusch and Swanson
(2012) model with long-run ination risks where ination target is up-
dated in each period according to a moving average of ination and
also contains a stochastic element. The performance of the model with
income taxes in terms of moments of key macroeconomic and nance
variables is also very similar to one with long-run ination risks when
the baseline calibration of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) is consid-
ered. However, the Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) model with either
long-run ination risks or with income taxation is unable to match
nance data when we consider their baseline calibration.
Further research needs to be conducted to explore the empirical
relevance of the relationship between tax system and bond yields. In
particular, it would be interesting to see whether countries featuring
more distortionary tax system or higher taxes on labour income are
associated with higher bond yields.
In chapter 3 we introduce costly rm entry and an endogenous lag
in production into the New Keynesian asset-pricing model of Rude-
busch and Swanson (2012) used in chapter 2. As a rst contribution
we show that this extension explains both bond and equity premium
puzzles without compromising the t of the model to key macroeco-
nomic moments. The inclusion of costly rm entry in RBC or New
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Keynesian setups (see, e.g. Bilbiie et al. (2007, 2012)) proved to
be successful in accounting for procyclical prots and countercyclical
markups found in the data by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
In chapter 2 we argue that in a world featuring technology shocks
there is a strong negative comovement between consumption growth
and ination leading to ination risks that are compensated for in
the form of bond risk premium. When rm entry is added to the
basic model the positive correlation between consumption and prots
(dividends) is magnied. In case of a negative technology shock both
consumption and the return on equities (dividends) fall. Therefore,
equity claims are considered to be risky as times of low consumption
are coupled with reduced yields on equity and investors who are willing
to hold them command a premium.
The standard New Keynesian model like the Rudebusch and Swan-
son (2012) model without entry implies a trade-o¤ between stabilisa-
tion of the volatility of ination and the output-gap (see also Clarida et
al. (1999)). It is also true in the New Keynesian model without entry
that the higher is the coe¢ cient on the output-gap the more success-
ful is monetary policy in driving down the volatility of the output-gap
(or stabilising the output-gap) at the cost of increasing the volatility
of ination and, hence, a trade-o¤ exists between volatility of ina-
tion and the output-gap. This chapter also recognises that the size of
Taylor-rule coe¢ cient is crucial for the ability of the New Keynesian
model with/without entry in generating ination-risks. In particular,
one can show that the Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) model without
rm entry implies high ination risks and zero consumption risks when
the coe¢ cient on the output-gap in the Taylor rule is large in line with
the estimate Clarida et al. (2000) using US data of 1983-1996. It is
generally true in a New Keynesian model that a large coe¢ cient on the
output-gap reduces real risks and magnies ination risks (see, e.g.,
Clarida et al. (1999)). On the contrary the Rudebusch and Swanson
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(2012) model with costly rm entry exhibits ination-risks when entry
costs are expressed in e¤ective labour units and the coe¢ cient on the
output-gap is low consistent with the estimate of Clarida et al. (1998)
using US data over 1979-1994.
The second main nding of chapter 3 is that the trade-o¤ between
the standard deviation of the ination and the output-gap is non-linear
in the New Keynesian model with entry. In particular, we found that
the trade-o¤ between the volatility of ination and the output-gap
exists for an output-gap coe¢ cient below 0.5 but disappears for an
output gap coe¢ cient of at least 0.5 or above. Therefore, the entry
model implies that a coe¢ cient on the output-gap higher than 0.5
does not help stabilise the volatility of the output-gap but, in fact,
raises real uncertainty even further. It follows that the entry model is
unable to produce high ination risks with relatively high output-gap
coe¢ cient leading to large real term premium. The latter result is
found to be robust irrespectively of the specication of the entry costs
which can be either in terms of e¤ective labour units (which is the
baseline) or consumption units.
The limited trade-o¤ between ination and output gap volatility
in the entry model is very interesting from policy point of view as it
imposes a constraint on monetary policy in its ability of stabilising
uctuations in the output-gap.
The third main nding of chapter 3 is that scal policy in the form
of income taxation also raises nominal term premium when entry cost
is expressed in consumption units (instead of e¤ective labour units).
However, the increase in the nominal term premium is due to a rise in
consumption (real) risks in contrast to chapter 2 where scal policy
shocks are the source of ination risks.
A fourth result of chapter 3 is that empirical mean of the nominal
term premium is matched with a risk-aversion coe¢ cient lower than in
previous literature. However, the risk-aversion coe¢ cient we maintain
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is still considered to be well above the empirical estimates of about 5-
10 (see, e.g. Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio (2003)) versus the value
of 75 used in chapter two and three.
A shortcoming of the model used in chapter 3 is that it produces
counterfactually low volatility of equity. Therefore, future research
should address the ways of magnifying the variability of equity re-
turns. In particular, the inclusion of physical capital in the entry
model with adjustment costs might be a promising avenue to explain
further stylised facts like the excess volatility of equity.
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